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INTRODUCTION 
Jn a nation that emerged from the womb of dissent, where progress grew from 
free thought, from diversity of opinion, from challenge of majority concurrence, 
conformity that banishes challenge becomes a dead hand that seeks to stay 
evolution - a dead hand that beckons to oppression and stagnation. 1 
The right of an individual to dissent from the ideas of his or her peers, or even his or her 
government, has been one of the defining characteristics of American civil society. The United 
States itself was founded as a result of American colonists' dissenting from the British 
government, and our Constitution established a governmental system that would not only 
l 
accommodate, but encourage a process of deliberative democracy in which the views of both the 
many and the few would be taken into account and considered thoroughly. A system of internal 
checks and balances between the legislative, judicial and executive branches, the balance of 
federal and state power, as well as the public accountability of each branch and its members, 
have ensured a consideration of various values and ideas within all of the institutions of 
govemment.2 
The process of expressing often conflicting ideals within the institutions of government, 
inevitably producing majority and minority opinions, is perhaps most visible in the judiciary. 
1 Percival E. Jackson, Dissent in the Supreme Court: A Chronology (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1969), 3. 
2 The right to dissent is not only made visible in governmental structure, but also in the underlying philosophy that 
as a free society we are committed to diversity of thought and its public expression. The freedoms ensured by First 
Amendment to the Constitution are a testament to the deep respect for the pluralism of thought and opinion that 
exists in the American nation. Further, the important discussions that stem from the constitutionally protected 
expression of various thoughts and ideals fuel American society. Thus, the liberty to express varied opinions has 
been manifested in American society at the level of both theory and practice, and in doing so has also become a 
fundamental right. 
2 
The Supreme Court's legitimacy "depends in part upon the Court reaching its judgments through 
a deliberative process, just as Congress's legitimacy depends in part on its members enacting 
legislation through such a process. Given the secrecy of the Court during the formation of its 
judgments, the practice of dissent is necessary to manifest the deliberative character of the 
process through which the Court reaches its decisions." Dissent in the Court "takes on the 
critical role of revealing the Court's consistency with the constitutional commitment to 
deliberative democracy: Dissenting opinions manifest and constitute the deliberative interaction 
among judges that produces opinions and decisions of the Court."3 
The Government's Resident Public Intellectuals 
The practice of judicial dissent has implications for, and is representative of the role that 
justices assume as leaders in American society. 4 Long considered the government's resident 
public intellectuals, Supreme Court justices play an important role in shaping the American 
public conscience, by engaging in a process of intellectual and political leadership through their 
opinions, both majority and dissenting. 
Typically, when leadership is examined on the Court, it is the Chief Justice who is looked 
to as the most influential member. It is most often his method of constitutional interpretation 
that is said to be representative of the Court, as he is still largely viewed as its leader with regard 
to both procedure and philosophy. This is best depicted by the fact that eras of the Court are 
designated by the name of the current chief justice. By referring to an era of the Supreme Court 
3 Kevin M. Stack, "The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court," Yale Law Journal 105 (June 1996), 2259. 
4 See, for example, Stack, "The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court." This view argues that the most important 
justification for the practice of dissent on the Supreme Court is that it is a function of our political system; it is 
reflective of the process of deliberative democracy that occurs elsewhere in government. Therefore, dissent in the 
court is necessary to ensure that the rule of law is upheld through the same deliberative process that occurs in the 
legislative branch and American society in general. 
3 
as either "the Taney Court," "the Warren Court," "the Rehnquist Court," and so on, is to suggest 
that those years were personified by the judicial leadership of the man after which each era was 
named. 
Despite the focus on the chief justice, there is a way in which other justices can make 
themselves known. The tradition of dissenting opinions in the Supreme Court allows the voices 
of individual justices to be heard despite the decision of the majority. In addition to allowing 
justices to express their individual ideas, dissents have been described as "offering some of the 
most pungent polemical writing ever produced in America."5 In writing a dissent, each justice 
has the opportunity to influence not only the current court, but future jurisprudence, and perhaps 
American public opinion as well. Some have gone so far as to argue that the practice of judicial 
dissent is "a form of prophecy in the biblical sense of that term" which delivers "an Isaiahlike 
warning of unhappy consequences" due to what the dissenting justice perceives to be the error of 
the majority. 6 
In addition to the role all justices assume as leaders, the justice who dissents takes on a 
position of heightened importance. The dissenting justice contributes to leadership in the truest 
sense of the word, as it is he who displays the courage necessary to cling to, and to communicate, 
his convictions despite the differing opinion of a majority of his peers. It is he who calls on both 
the current and future members of the Court and the American public to follow his philosophy, 
as it will make right the errors and injustices he believes the current Court to have propounded. 
In this sense, the dissenting judge, as leader, furthers the philosophical underpinnings of the 
5 Alan Barth. Prophets with Honor: Great Dissents and Great Dissenters in the Supreme Court (New York: Alfred 
A Knopf, 1974), I. 
6Ibid., xii. 
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nation by encouraging debate and thereby hopefully influencing the conscience of both the 
judiciary and the nation. 
This "pungent, polemical writing" is often targeted at different audiences; that is, the 
group that the dissenting justice hopes to influence differs with each dissent. Broadly speaking, 
however, it can be said that four audiences to which judicial dissents are most commonly 
directed are: their current colleagues on the court; the other branches of government, such as 
Congress and the Presidency; future members of the Court; and, finally, the American public. Of 
these, the opinions that have the most lasting influence are often those which are directed toward 
changing the direction of the Court in the future. 
"An Appeal to the Brooding Spirit of the Law" 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of dissenting opinions is that the justices' 
"prophecies" often come to fruition. This has been made unmistakably apparent by dissents such 
as that of John Marshall Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson7, whose claim that "Our Constitution is 
color-blind and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens" would be eventually adopted 
as the view of the majority in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) which overruled the doctrine 
of separate-but-equal.8 Similarly, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. and Louis D. Brandeis, often 
referred to as two of "the great dissenters," both dissented repeatedly in order to secure First 
Amendment rights, dissents that later came to be the rationale of majority opinions.9 More 
7 P/essy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J.M., dissenting). 
8 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). Brown states "segregation is a denial of the 
equal prolection of the laws." 
9 See, for example, Abrams v. United States 250 U.S. 616 ( 1919) (Holmes, 0.W., dissenting) in which Holmes 
asserted that whether during times of war or peace "the principle of the right to free speech is always the same" and 
Whitney v. California 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, L., dissenting) where Brandeis wrote that "freedom to think as 
5 
recently, it can be said that the current Chief Justice, William H. Rehnquist, has influenced the 
direction of the Court by "revitalizing Federalism," a principle that was the focus of many of his 
dissents during his tenure as an Associate Justice-'° 
As these cases indicate, a dissenting opinion is a plea to posterity, a hope that current or 
future generations will eventually heed the message of the dissenting justice, and replace the 
majority's reasoning with his or her own. 11 This has led some to regard judicial dissent as a duty 
rather than a mere right. 12 "A dissent in a court of last resort", Charles Evans Hughes wrote, "is 
an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day, when a later 
decision might possibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to 
have been betrayed."13 Thus, judicial dissent is a process that gives the judiciary and the 
American public the opportunity to reflect upon, and to appeal to, the wisdom of minority 
viewpoints in the future. 14 "We are a free and vital people because we not only allow, we 
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth." For other 
dissents not regarding First Amendment rights, see Olmstead v. United States 277 U.S. 438 (1928), etc. 
10 See, for example, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) and Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
11 This is not meant to suggest that all dissents have this effect. Barth states, "It would be romantic to suppose that 
dissenting opinions always, or even very often, embody great wisdom or refute error on the part of the 
majority ... But to acknowledge that there has frequently been folly in dissents is not to deny that occasionally the 
future has been illuminated by their discernment and understanding. Dissent has played a seminal role in the 
functioning of the Supreme Court. Sometimes it has served to stir the sensibilities and prod the conscience of the 
country, eventually leading the Court- which is in a true sense, the custodian of the country's conscience-" to 
correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to have been betrayed." Barth, Prophets with 
Honor, 4, 8. 
12 See, for example, Karl M. Zobell. "Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial 
Disintegration," Cornell Law Quarterly 44 (1958-1959), 214. Zobell writes, "when the balance has been struck in 
favor of publication - when he [the justice] has concluded that his opinion may contribute to the eventual correction 
of a decision which he believes to be wrong, and that this contribution is of greater moment than that which it will 
inevitably make to the appearance of a disintegrated Court - then his right becomes a duty." 
13 Charles Evans Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States (New York: Columbia University, 1928), 68. 
14 Jackson offers another religious allusion in stating, "Generally, the dissenter has viewed the core of mass 
acceptance with skepticism and found it wanting. He has supplied the "con" in the debate that lies at the basis of 
modern democracy. He has borne the scorn of the herd whose collective thinking he challenges. He is the heretic 
6 
encourage debate, and because we do not shut down communication as soon as a decision is 
reached." 15 
The Tnte Meaning of the Text 
Although it is important that dissents be pungent and even prophetic, the sheer act of 
writing a dissenting opinion that harkens to future generations is not enough, even when its 
message is heeded. 16 If, as Hughes wrote, a dissent "is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the 
law ... when a later decision might possibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge 
believes the court to have been betrayed," it is as important to discern the error that the judge 
seeks to correct as it is to see the remedy urged in the dissent. 17 Perhaps the unifying aim of the 
most important dissents is not merely to advocate one policy or another, but to argue in behalf of 
what that particular justice sees as the meaning of the text of the Constitution. 
The justices who attempt to discern the true meaning of the Constitution in the face of a 
majority that has been led astray are truly worthy of being called great dissenters. Those who 
seek to bring the Court back to the true meaning of the text when it has, in their view, obviously 
been misconstrued are those who exert the most formidable kind of intellectual leadership on the 
whose heresy may not stand the rays of established thought or the spectrum of time. Or he may be the prophet 
whose heresy of today becomes the dogma of tomorrow." Jackson, Dissent in the Supreme Court, 3. 
"William J. Brennan, "In Defense of Dissents," Hastings Law Journal 37 (January 1986): 427, 435, 433. Brennan 
discussed issues direetly concerning, and indirectly surrounding, the judicial right to dissent. "A dissent," according 
to Brennan, "challenges the reasoning of the majority, tests its authority and establishes a benchmark against which 
the majority's reasoning can continue to be evaluated and perhaps, in time, superseded." Brennan briefly traced the 
origins of Supreme Court dissent; he also spent a great deal of time discussing the role of the repeating dissenter in 
attempting to promote a judicial perspective on a certain topic. His basic argument explained why judicial dissent in 
particular is important in furthering "the marketplace of ideas" that we as an American democratic society hold in 
such high regard. In the lecture, he maintained that dissent has an important and essential role in a pluralistic 
society, based on social necessity and political origins. 
16 See, for example, Zobell, "Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court," 214. 
17 Hughes, Ifie Supreme Court of the United States, 68. 
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Court. Thus, it can be said that the error of the majority that great dissenters seek to correct, 
though it may vary somewhat from case to case, is that of straying too far from the actual 
meaning of the Constitution. Perhaps the best explanation of this came from Justice Benjamin R. 
Curtis in his dissent in Dred Scott v. Sandford: 
[ w ]hen a strict interpretation of the Constitution ... is abandoned, and the 
theoretical opinions of individuals are allowed to control its meaning, we have no 
longer a Constitution; we are under the government of individual men, who for 
the time being have power to declare what the Constitution is, according to their 
own views of what it ought to mean. When such a method of interpretation of the 
Constitution obtains, in place of a republican government, with limited and 
defined powers, we have a government which is merely an exponent of the will of 
Congress; or what, in my opinion, would not be preferable, an exponent of the 
individual political opinions of the members of this court. 18 
In examining the historical basis, political situation, and current applications regarding 
the tradition of judicial dissent, a framework will emerge by which this practice can be better 
used to analyze leadership in our nations' highest court. In providing for individual justices' 
attempts to bring the Court back to the true meaning of the Constitution when the majority has 
construed it to be something which is not and cannot be found in a reasonable reading of the text, 
the Court has produced its great leaders. Beyond engaging in judicial leadership by merely 
writing a dissent, the men and women who attempt to interpret the text properly, and also 
encourage the Court to correct the error of straying too far, are those that can be viewed as true 
champions of the law. 
18 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). He also writes: "To engraft on any instrument a substantive 
exception not found in it, must be admitted to be a matter attended with great difficulty. And the difficulty increases 
with the importance of the instrument, and the magnitude and complexity of the interests involved in its 
construction. To allow this to be done with the Constitution, upon reasons purely politieal, renders its judicial 
interpretation impossible - because judicial tribunals, as such, cannot decide upon political considerations." 
8 
Case Studies in the Judicial Leadership of Dissent 
What follows is a historical analysis of the practice and the contemporary importance of 
Supreme Court dissent. Specifically, this study will focus on the historical, constitutional, and 
political origins of dissent in the highest court, considering as a case study Justice William 
Johnson, who has been rightly described as the first influential dissenter on the Supreme Court. 
In examining Johnson, Chief Justice John Marshall, and their contemporaries, the understanding 
of the way opinions are issued by the Supreme Court, the practical and philosophical background 
of dissent, and the political tensions surrounding the establishment of a dissenting tradition in the 
early court, will identify the historical origin of dissenting opinions as they are currently 
understood. Further, the way in which Johnson attempted to promote Republican ideology in 
spite of the Federalist majority under Marshall is the classic example of a justice attempting to 
bring the Court back to the Constitution as the dissenting justice understands it. A consideration 
of the origin of judicial dissent will enable us to better understand the role of dissent in the 
Supreme Court down to the present day. 
The focus of Chapter One will be the tensions between Marshall, Jefferson, and 
Jefferson's appointee, Johnson, as well as the circumstances specifically surrounding the role of 
dissent, not only in the nation's highest court but in the early nation itself. This analysis will 
support a right to dissent given the early justices' understanding of opinion issuance in both the 
British and the early American systems. Most importantly, it will argue that Jefferson and his 
appointee Johnson best served the Court in establishing the practice of dissent as a means of 
bringing the Court back to its duty when it seemed to have gone too far a field. 
The second chapter will bolster the argument that it is, in fact, the dissenting justice who 
engages in effective leadership by promoting a constitutional philosophy. In studying Justice 
Benjamin Curtis's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, the role of dissent in promoting a correct 
constitutional interpretation with regard to the question of slavery will be examined. This 
argument will be furthered by an examination of John Marshall Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. 
Ferguson in Chapter Three. Harlan's notion that "our constitution is color-blind," would 
eventually replace the misguided notion of the majority in Plessy v. Ferguson that separate-but-
equal institutions for the races were constitutionally legitimate. 
Chapter Four will discuss the seminal decision of Lochner v. New York, and its criticism 
in the dissenting opinion of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. In asserting that the Constitution was 
being severly misinterpreted by the majority to suit their own personal ideologies, Holmes' 
judicial philosophy concerning the use of substantive due process will be communicated. 
9 
The dissenting opinion of Justice Hugo L. Black in Adamson v. California, in which he 
first explicates what he sees as the proper interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, is 
examined in Chapter Five. In this case, Black calls for a complete incorporation of the 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; an 
interpretation of the Constitution that he would tirelessly promote during his tenure on the Court. 
Chapter Six will offer a recent example of effective dissent by a member of the current 
Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. In analyzing the caustic dissent of Justice Antonin 
Scalia, a case will be made for the importance of a constitutional interpretation that serves to 
establish the correct meaning of the Constitution. Further, it will be suggested that similar to 
Justice Johnson, Justice Scalia was appointed to promote an originalist ideology in spite of the 
activist majority that existed during the time leading up to his appointment, and has succeeded in 
doing so thus far. 
JO 
Finally, the seventh chapter will conclude that the historical role of Johnson and those 
influential dissenters who have followed in his path, coupled with civil society's commitment to 
freedom of thought and expression, prove that the historically and philosophically rooted, 
constitutionally supported, and politically necessary right to dissent has been of the utmost 
importance in American constitutional history. 19 
19 In one view the right to "express disagreement to one 1s colleagues privately; have one's disagreement with the 
majority's opinion publicly noted; and issue a written dissenting opinion in company with the majority's" is in fact a 
guaranteed constitutional right under the free speech clause of the First Amendment and the establishment of the 
court under Article III. Rory K Little, "Reading Justice Brennan: Is There a "Right" to Dissent?," Hastings Law 
Journal 50 (April 1999), 688. 
INTRODUCTION 
In a nation that emergedfrom the womb of dissent, where progress grew from 
free thought, from diversity of opinion, from challenge of majority concurrence, 
confonnity that bani shes challenge becomes a dead hand that seeks to stay 
evolution - a dead hand that beckons to oppression and stagnation. 1 
The right of an individual to dissent from the ideas of his or her peers, or even his or her 
government, has been one of the defining characteristics of American civil society. The United 
States itself was founded as a result of American colonists' dissenting from the British 
government, and our Constitution established a governmental system that would not only 
I 
accommodate, but encourage a process of deliberative democracy in which the views of both the 
many and the few would be taken into account and considered thoroughly. A system of internal 
checks and balances between the legislative, judicial and executive branches, the balance of 
federal and state power, as well as the public accountability of each branch and its members, 
have ensured a consideration of various values and ideas within all of the institutions of 
government. 2 
The process of expressing often conflicting ideals within the institutions of government, 
inevitably producing majority and minority opinions, is perhaps most visible in the judiciary. 
1 Percival E. Jackson, Dissent in the Supreme Court: A Chronology (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1969), 3. 
2 The right to dissent is not only made visible in governmental structure, but also in the underlying philosophy that 
as a free society we are committed to diversity of thought and its public expression. The freedoms ensured by First 
Amendment to the Constitution are a testament to the deep respect for the pluralism of thought and opinion that 
exists in the American nation. Further, the important discussions that stem from the constitutionalJy protected 
expression of various thoughts and ideals fuel American society. Thus, the liberty to express varied opinions has 
been manifested in American society at the level of both theory and practice, and in doing so has also become a 
fundamental right. 
2 
The Supreme Court's legitimacy ''depends in part upon the Court reaching its judgments through 
a deliberative process, just as Congress's legitimacy depends in part on its members enacting 
legislation through such a process. Given the secrecy of the Court during the formation of its 
judgments, the practice of dissent is necessary to manifest the deliberative character of the 
process through which the Court reaches its decisions." Dissent in the Court "takes on the 
critical role of revealing the Court's consistency with the constitutional commitment to 
deliberative democracy: Dissenting opinions manifest and constitute the deliberative interaction 
among judges that produces opinions and decisions of the Court. "3 
The Government's Resident Public Intellectuals 
The practice of judicial dissent has implications for, and is representative of the role that 
justices assume as leaders in American society. 4 Long considered the government's resident 
public intellectuals, Supreme Court justices play an important role in shaping the American 
public conscience, by engaging in a process of intellectual and political leadership through their 
opinions, both majority and dissenting. 
Typically, when leadership is examined on the Court, it is the Chief Justice who is looked 
to as the most influential member. It is most often his method of constitutional interpretation 
that is said to be representative of the Court, as he is still largely viewed as its leader with regard 
to both procedure and philosophy. This is best depicted by the fact that eras of the Court are 
designated by the name of the current chief justice. By referring to an era of the Supreme Court 
'Kevin M. Stack, "The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court." Yale Law Journal 105 (June 1996), 2259. 
' See, for example, Stack, "The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court.'' This view argues that the most important 
justification for the practice of dissent on the Supren1e Court is that it is a function of our political system; it ls 
reflective of the process of deliberative democracy that occurs elsewhere in government. Therefore, dissent in the 
court is necessary to ensure that the ru]e of law is upheld tluough the same deliberative process that occurs in the 
legislative branch and American society in general. 
3 
as either "the Taney Court," "the Warren Court," "the Rehnquist Court," and so on, is to suggest 
that those years were personified by the judicial leadership of the man after which each era was 
named. 
Despite the focus on the chief justice, there is a way in which other justices can make 
themselves known. The tradition of dissenting opinions in the Supreme Court allows the voices 
of individual justices to be heard despite the decision of the majority. In addition to allowing 
justices to express their individual ideas, dissents have been described as "offering some of the 
most pungent polemical writing ever produced in America."5 In writing a dissent, each justice 
has the opportunity to influence not only the current court, but fulllre jurisprudence, and perhaps 
American public opinion as well. Some have gone so far as to argue that the practice of judicial 
dissent is "a form of prophecy in the biblical sense of that term" which delivers "an Isaiahlike 
warning of unhappy consequences" due to what the dissenting justice perceives to be the error of 
the majority.6 
In addition to the role all justices assume as leaders, the justice who dissents takes on a 
position of heightened importance. The dissenting justice contributes to leadership in the truest 
sense of the word, as it is he who displays the courage necessary to cling to, and to communicate, 
his convictions despite the differing opinion of a majority of his peers. It is he who calls on both 
the current and future members of the Court and the American public to follow his philosophy, 
as it will make right the errors and injustices he believes the current Court to have propounded. 
In this sense, the dissenting judge, as leader, furthers the philosophical underpinnings of the 
5 Alan Barth. Prophets with Honor: Great Dissents and Great Dissenters in the Suprenie Court (New York: Alfred 
A Knopf, 197 4 ), I. 
6Ibid .. xii. 
4 
nation by encouraging debate and thereby hopefully influencing the conscience of both the 
judiciary and the nation. 
This "pungent, polemical writing" is often targeted at different audiences; that is, the 
group that the dissenting justice hopes to influence differs with each dissent. Broadly speaking, 
however, it can be said that four audiences to which judicial dissents are most commonly 
directed are: their current colleagues on the court; the other branches of government, such as 
Congress and the Presidency; future members of the Court; and, finally, the American public. Of 
these, the opinions that have the most lasting influence are often those which are directed toward 
changing the direction of the Court in the future. 
"An Appeal to the Brooding Spirit of the Law" 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of dissenting opinions is that the justices' 
"prophecies" often come to fruition. This has been made unmistakably apparent by dissents such 
as that of John Marshall Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson7, whose claim that "Our Constitution is 
color-blind and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens" would be eventually adopted 
as the view of the majority in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) which overruled the doctrine 
of separate-but-equal. 8 Similarly, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. and Louis D. Brandeis, often 
referred to as two of "the great dissenters," both dissented repeatedly in order to secure First 
Amendment rights, dissents that later came to be the rationale of majority opinions.9 More 
7 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J.M., dissenting). 
8 Brown v. Roard of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). Brown states "segregation is a denial of the 
equal protection of the laws." 
9 See, fur example, Abrams v. United States 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, O.W., dissenting) in which Holmes 
asserted that whether during times of war or peace "the principle of the right to free speech is always the same" and 
Whitney v. California 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, L., dissenting) where Brandeis wrote that "freedom to think as 
5 
recently, it can be said that the current Chief Justice, William H. Rehnquist, has influenced the 
direction of the Court by "revitalizing Federalism," a principle that was the focus of many of his 
dissents during his tenure as an Associate Justice. 10 
As these cases indicate, a dissenting opinion is a plea to posterity, a hope that current or 
future generations will eventually heed the message of the dissenting justice, and replace the 
majority's reasoning with his or her own. 11 This has led some to regard judicial dissent as a duty 
rather than a mere right. 12 "A dissent in a court of last resort", Charles Evans Hughes wrote, "is 
an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day, when a later 
decision might possibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to 
have been betrayed."13 Thus, judicial dissent is a process that gives the judiciary and the 
American public the opportunity to reflect upon, and to appeal to, the wisdom of minority 
viewpoints in the future. 14 "We are a free and vital people because we not only allow, we 
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth." For other 
dissents not regarding First Amendment rights, see Olmstead v. United States 277 U.S. 438 (1928), etc. 
10 See, for example, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 65 L (1974) and Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
11 This is not meant to suggest that all dissents have this effect. Barth states, "It would be romantic to suppose that 
dissenting opinions always, or even very often, embody great wlsdom or refute error on the part of the 
majority ... But to acknowledge that there has frequently been folly in dissents is not to deny that occasionally the 
future has been illuminated by their discernment and understanding. Dissent has played a seminal role in the 
functioning of the Supreme Court. Sometimes it has served to stir the sensibilities and prod the conscience of the 
country, eventually leading the Court- which is in a true sense, the custodian of the country's conscience-" to 
correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to have been betrayed." Barth, Prophets with 
Honor, 4, 8. 
12 See, for example, Karl M. Zobell, "Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial 
Disintegration," Comell Law Quanerly 44 ( 1958-1959), 214. Zobell writes, "when the balance has been struck in 
favor of publication - when he [the justice] has concluded that his opinion may contribute to the eventual eorrection 
of a decision which he believes to be wrong, and that this contribution is of greater moment than that which it wlll 
inevitably make to the appearance of a disintegrated Court- then his right becomes a duty." 
13 Charles Evans Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States (New York: Columbia University. 1928), 68. 
14 Jackson offers another religious allusion in stating, "Generally, the dissenter has viewed the core of mass 
acceptance with skepticism and found it wanting. He has supplied the "con" in the debate that lies at the basis of 
modern democracy. He has borne the scorn of the herd whose collective thinking he challenges. He is the heretic 
6 
encourage debate, and because we do not shut down communication as soon as a decision is 
reached." 15 
The True Meaning of the Text 
Although it is important that dissents be pungent and even prophetic, the sheer act of 
writing a dissenting opinion that harkens to future generations is not enough, even when its 
message is heeded. 16 If, as Hughes wrote, a dissent "is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the 
law ... when a later decision might possibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge 
believes the court to have been betrayed," it is as important to discern the error that the judge 
seeks to correct as it is to see the remedy urged in the dissent. 17 Perhaps the unifying aim of the 
most important dissents is not merely to advocate one policy or another, but to argue in behalf of 
what that particular justice sees as the meaning of the text of the Constitution. 
The justices who attempt to discern the true meaning of the Constitution in the face of a 
majority that has been led astray are truly worthy of being called great dissenters. Those who 
seek to bring the Court back to the true meaning of the text when it has, in their view, obviously 
been misconstrued are those who exert the most formidable kind of intellectual leadership on the 
whose heresy may not stand the rays of established thought or the spectrum of time. Or he may be the prophet 
whose heresy of today becomes the dogma of tomorrow." Jackson, Dissent in the Supreme Court, 3. 
"William J. Brennan, "In Defense of Dissents," Hastings Law Journal 37 (January 1986): 427, 435, 433. Brennan 
discussed issues directly concerning, and indirectly surrounding, the judicial right to dissent. "A dissent," according 
to Brennan, .. challenges the reasoning of the majority, tests its authority and establishes a benchmark against which 
the majority's reasoning can continue to be evaluated and perhaps, in time, superseded." Brennan briefly traced the 
origins of Supreme Court dissent; he also spent a great deal of time discussing the role of the repeating dissenter in 
attempting to promote a judicial perspective on a certain topic. His basic argument explained why judicial dissent in 
particular is important in furthering "the marketplace of ideas" that we as an American democratic society hold in 
such high regard. In the lecture, he maintained that dissent has an important and essential role in a pluralistic 
society, based on social necessity and political origins. 
16 See, for example, Zobell, "Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court," 214. 
17 Hughes, The Supreme Coun of the United States,68. 
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Court. Thus, it can be said that the error of the majority that great dissenters seek to correct, 
though it may vary somewhat from case to case, is that of straying too far from the actual 
meaning of the Constitution. Perhaps the best explanation of this came from Justice Benjamin R. 
Curtis in his dissent in Dred Scott v. Sandford: 
[w ]hen a strict interpretation of the Constitution ... is abandoned, and the 
theoretical opinions of individuals are allowed to control its meaning, we have no 
longer a Constitution; we are under the government of individual men, who for 
the time being have power to declare what the Constitution is, according to their 
own views of what it ought to mean. When such a method of interpretation of the 
Constitution obtains, in place of a republican government, with limited and 
defined powers, we have a government which is merely an exponent of the will of 
Congress; or what, in my opinion, would not be preferable, an exponent of the 
individual political opinions of the members of this court. 18 
In examining the historical basis, political situation, and current applications regarding 
the tradition of judicial dissent, a framework will emerge by which this practice can be better 
used to analyze leadership in our nations' highest court. In providing for individual justices' 
attempts to bring the Court back to the true meaning of the Constitution when the majority has 
construed it to be something which is not and cannot be found in a reasonable reading of the text, 
the Court has produced its great leaders. Beyond engaging in judicial leadership by merely 
writing a dissent, the men and women who attempt to interpret the text properly, and also 
encourage the Court to correct the error of straying too far, are those that can be viewed as true 
champions of the law. 
18 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). He also writes: "To engraft on any instrument a substantive 
exception not found in it, must be admitted to be a matter attended with great difficulty. And the difficulty increases 
with the importance of the instrument, and the magnitude and complexity of the interests involved in its 
construction. To allow this to be done with the Constitution, upon reasons purely political, renders its judicial 
interpretatlon impossible - beeause judicial tribunals, as such, cannot decide upon political considerations." 
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Case Studies in the Judicial Leadership of Dissent 
What follows is a historical analysis of the practice and the contemporary importance of 
Supreme Court dissent. Specifically, this study will focus on the historical, constitutional, and 
political origins of dissent in the highest court, considering as a case study Justice William 
Johnson, who has been rightly described as the first influential dissenter on the Supreme Court. 
In examining Johnson, Chief Justice John Marshall, and their contemporaries, the understanding 
of the way opinions are issued by the Supreme Court, the practical and philosophical background 
of dissent, and the political tensions surrounding the establishment of a dissenting tradition in the 
early court, will identify the historical origin of dissenting opinions as they are currently 
understood. Further, the way in which Johnson attempted to promote Republican ideology in 
spite of the Federalist majority under Marshall is the classic example of a justice attempting to 
bring the Court back to the Constitution as the dissenting justice understands it. A consideration 
of the origin of judicial dissent will enable us to better understand the role of dissent in the 
Supreme Court down to the present day. 
The focus of Chapter One will be the tensions between Marshall, Jefferson, and 
Jefferson's appointee, Johnson, as well as the circumstances specifically surrounding the role of 
dissent, not only in the nation's highest court but in the early nation itself. This analysis will 
support a right to dissent given the early justices' understanding of opinion issuance in both the 
British and the early American systems. Most importantly, it will argue that Jefferson and his 
appointee Johnson best served the Court in establishing the practice of dissent as a means of 
bringing the Court back to its duty when it seemed to have gone too far a field. 
The second chapter will bolster the argument that it is, in fact, the dissenting justice who 
engages in effective leadership by promoting a constitutional philosophy. In studying Justice 
Benjamin Curtis's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, the role of dissent in promoting a correct 
constitutional interpretation with regard to the question of slavery will be examined. This 
argument will be furthered by an examination of John Marshall Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. 
Ferguson in Chapter Three. Harlan's notion that "our constitution is color-blind," would 
eventually replace the misguided notion of the majority in Plessy v. Ferguson that separate-but-
equal institutions for the races were constitutionally legitimate. 
Chapter Four will discuss the seminal decision of Lochner v. New York, and its criticism 
in the dissenting opinion of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. In asserting that fhe Constitution was 
being severly misinterpreted by the majority to suit their own personal ideologies, Holmes' 
judicial philosophy concerning the use of substantive due process will be communicated. 
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The dissenting opinion of Justice Hugo L. Black in Adamson v. California, in which he 
first explicates what he sees as the proper interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, is 
examined in Chapter Five. In this case, Black calls for a complete incorporation of the 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; an 
interpretation of the Constitution that he would tirelessly promote during his tenure on the Court. 
Chapter Six will offer a recent example of effective dissent by a member of the current 
Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. In analyzing the caustic dissent of Justice Antonin 
Scalia, a case will be made for the importance of a constitutional interpretation that serves to 
establish the correct meaning of the Constitution. Further, it will be suggested that similar to 
Justice Johnson, Justice Scalia was appointed to promote an originalist ideology in spite of the 
activist majority that existed during the time leading up to his appointment, and has succeeded in 
doing so thus far. 
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Finally, the seventh chapter will conclude that the historical role of Johnson and those 
influential dissenters who have followed in his path, coupled with civil society's commitment to 
freedom of thought and expression, prove that the historically and philosophically rooted, 
constitutionally supported, and politically necessary right to dissent has been of the utmost 
importance in American constitutional history. 19 
19 In one view the right to "express disagreement to one's colleagues privately; have one's disagreement with the 
majority's opinion publicly noted; and issue a written dissenting opinion in company with the majority's" is in fact a 
guaranteed constitutional right under the free speech clause of the First Amendment and the establishment of the 
court under Article III. Rory K Little, "Reading Justice Brennan: Is There a "Right"' to Dissent?." Hastings Law 
Journal 50 (April 1999), 688. 
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THE ORIGIN OF JUDICIAL DISSENT 
The early Supreme Court was a fledgling institution. For at least ten years after its 
creation (many say until the appointment of John Marshall in 180 I), the highest appellate 
court in the nation was not taken seriously as an essential governmental or judicial entity, let 
alone as the court of last resort. Perhaps for this reason, the Court before Marshall is 
neglected by historians due to what is viewed as its relative unimportance. However, in order 
to understand fully the origins of the Court and its process of dissent, and also to "correct the 
impression that the Supreme Court appeared full-blown with Marshall like Athena from the 
forehead of Zeus," the early Court and the British system that influenced it must be 
considered. 1 
Many have argued that one of the main reasons the Court was not taken seriously in 
its formative years was that, most often, politics found a way not only of entering into the 
decisions and daily affairs of the judiciary, but of taking center stage in each.2 Both 
collectively and individually, justices concerned themselves with actively promoting the 
1 Scott Douglas Gerber, Seriatim: The Supreme Court before John Marshall, (New York: New York University. 
1998), ix-x. 
2 As Meredith Kolsky asserts, "The court's lack of prestige was due, at least in part, to the blatantly political 
behavior of the early judges. On circuit, Justices generally opened each session with speeches politicking 
on behalf of Federalist candidates. Almost all judges were Federalists, and most used the bench as a 
platform from which to praise fellow Federalists." Meredith Kolsky, "Justice William Johnson and the 
History of the Supreme Court Dissent," Georgetown Law Journal 83: 2071. Donald G. Morgan echoes this 
assertion: "The courts had overridden the laws and the settled policies of several states; they had shown a 
tendency to decide for themselves to what limits to extend their jurisdiction, notwithstanding the 
constitutional authority of Congress and the Judiciary Acts passed in consonance with this authority. Their 
jury charges attacking Republicans and Republican doctrines sounded like campaign oratory." Donald G. 
Morgan, Justice William Johnson: The First Dissenter, (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 
1954), 43. 
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politics of their particular parties. 3 Therefore, the fact that all of the members of the early 
Supreme Court up to 1804 were appointed by Federalist presidents Washington and Adams, 
and were all highly committed to the Federalist cause, was made more than readily apparent 
by the Court's behavior. In essence, the early Court seemed to act as little more than a 
sounding board for Federalist ideas and doctrines, causing it to be viewed as more of a 
political body than as a disinterested interpreter of law. Another reason that the Court was 
not held in such high esteem is that there were few occasions on which it was actually called 
upon to interpret the law. The early Supreme Court decided very few cases, a fact that 
contributed to the negative perception of the American public regarding the prestige and 
power of the Court.4 During the early years of the republic, when the Court was led by Chief 
Justices John Jay and John Rutledge (1791-1795), it decided only 17 cases, a far cry from the 
number of decisions it reaches currently.5 
When it was called upon to decide a case, many methods were employed in delivering 
the decision of the Court. It is interesting to note that in its early years, the Court did not 
actually issue written opinions except in important cases; most were given orally.6 It was not 
until 1801, after Marshall had assumed his chief justiceship, that William Cranch became the 
first regular reporter of the Supreme Court of the United States, as the written opinions had 
become the rule rather than the exception.7 But when the gravity of the judicial question 
warranted a written opinion, for the most part, the early Supreme Court engaged in the 
3 Kolsky, "Justice William Johnson and the History of the Supreme Court Dissent," 2071. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Morgan, Justice William Johnson: The First Dissenter, 46. At the end of the October 2003 term, for 
example, the Court decided 79 cases. 
6 Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States, 52. 
7 Ibid. 
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practice of issuing opinions seriatim as was common under British practice. The seriatim 
custom, which originated in the ''.jury-charge practice of the common-law courts," is Latin 
for "several" or in "series," and involves having each justice issue a separate decision and 
explicating the rationale used in reaching it.8 In this way, each judge's understanding of the 
case, the judicial question being decided, its justification, and its implications were made 
evident. 
The English Seriatim Tradition 
The way in which the practice of seriatim opinions made its way to the United States 
Supreme Court is slightly complicated. Since the judiciary in England did not exist 
independent of its executive and legislative branches, its processes cannot be directly traced 
to the distinctly independent judiciary of the United States. The Privy Council and the House 
of Lords most mirrored the Supreme Court with regard to jurisdiction, but delivered one 
unanimous opinion in which dissent was not allowed "as a consequence of the historical 
connection of the tribunal with the Executive."9 The House of Lords sometimes delivered 
independent opinions, but these were not written, published, or distributed because the 
branch was partially legislative in nature.10 It is obvious that although the Privy Council and 
the House of Lords were the highest appellate tribunals in England, the importance of 
8 Gerber, Seriatim, 20. 
9 Zobell, "Division of Opinion in the Supreme Coun: A History of Judicial Disintegration," 192. Also note that "the 
notion that survived a decision of the Council constituted only advice, or a recommendation to the Crown," 188. 
10 Ibid., 192. The colonists would not likely have known of the methods of the House of Lords because the 
publication of reports of Parliamentary debates was not authorized in the eighteenth century. "It was thought to be a 
necessary corollary of this rule (or in view of the concept of identity of judicial and legislative function, simply 
another application of the same rule) that reports of judicial proceedings in the House of Lords could not be 
published. It was not, in fact, until about 1848 that the public dissemination of such reports was first authorized," 
189. 
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seriatim opinions were obviously not derived frorn their methods. Even though the Privy 
Council and the House of Lords were technically the high appellate tribunals "for all causes 
arising in the courts of England and its possessions;" most appeals were, in fact, decided in 
the common law courts such as the Echequer Chamber, the Court of Common Pleas, and 
King's Bench. 11 It was in the King's Bench that the practice of issuing seriatim opinions was 
customary in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the transcription of these 
individual opinions were the ones to which colonists had most ready access. 12 Therefore, it 
seems that the Supreme Court likely derived its early method of delivering opinions seriatim 
from the King's Bench, the English common law court that with which Americans would 
probably have been most familiar. 13 
When Lord Mansfield became Chief Justice of the King's Bench in 1756, he moved 
away from seriatim opinions and chose to deliver the decision of the court in a single 
opinion. This process entailed the justices meeting "secluded from the presence of the 
public, and [making] what was to be delivered as the opinion of the court." 14 This practice 
did not last long, however, as "on the retirement of Mansfield [in 1793], Ld Kenyon put an 
end to the practice, and the judges returned to that of seriatim opinions." 15 Thus, the time 
during which Mansfield was Chief Justice was regarded by most as an exception to the rule 
11 William Searle Holdsworth, A History of English Law (London: Metheun, 1922-1972) 17 vol., 200-201, 213-217, 
244-45. 
12 Zobell, "Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial Disintegration," 192. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Jefferson to Johnson, 27October1822 in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Paul L. Ford (New York: G. P. 
Putnam's Sons, 1892-99), 224. 
15 Ibid., 224. 
with regard to opinion issuance; as a trial for a system that was later abandoned due to the 
advantages of the seriatim system in delivering the opinion of the court. 
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A situation similar to that of Mansfield and Kenyon on the King's Bench in England 
was the battle waged between Chief Justices Edmund Pendleton and Spencer Roane in the 
Virginia Court of Appeals. Pendleton, who was Chief Justice from 1778-1803, "adored Ld 
Mansfield, & considered him as the greatest luminary of the law that any age had ever 
produced," and thus favored deliberating decisions in secrecy and then delivering one 
majority opinion, delivered as "the Oracles of the court, in mass."16 His successor, Spencer 
Roane (1803-1822), "broke up the practice, refused to hatch judgments, in Conclave or to let 
others deliver opinions for him" when he became Chief Justice in 1803. In this way, the 
same turn of events that had unfolded in England also occurred on the high court of Virginia, 
and eventually the Supreme Court of the United States. 17 
Even before the Judiciary Act of 1789 formally established the federal courts, 
opinions in state courts were delivered seriatim, and dissents were often present. Justice 
Benjamin Rush of the High Court of Errors and Appeals of Pennsylvania wrote a dissent in 
Purviance v. Angus in which he clearly defined the importance of dissent in the judiciary. 18 
He opened his opinion by saying, "however disposed to concur with my brethren in this 
cause, I have not been able to do it. Unanimity of courts of justice, though a very desirable 
object, ought never to be attained at the expense of sacrificing the judgment."19 Similarly, 
the first case reported after the Judiciary Act of 1789 established the court system in the 
16 Jefferson to Johnson, 27 October 1822 in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 224. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Purviance v. Angus, I Dall. 180 (Err. App. Pa. 1786). 
19 Justice Benjamin Rush quoted in Jackson, Dissent in the Suprerne Court: A Chronology, 20. 
16 
United States, Georgia v. Brailsford, was also issued seriatim and in fact opened with a 
dissentw Whether before or after the court system was firmly established, issuing opinions 
seriatim was the norm. The decisions of the Court prior to 1801, therefore, allowed the 
justices "a rare freedom in the expression of their views." 21 Given the prevalence of the 
seriatim style, each justice on the court before Marshall was able to deliver his own opinion 
in at least one decision per year.22 Even though some of the decisions did result in unanimity 
based on the decision which was reached as well as the legal reasoning behind it, each justice 
had an opportunity to write the majority opinion; that is, the duty was not dominated by 
whoever was serving as Chief Justice at that particular time. In addition, even when a 
majority decision was reached, justices were always given the opportunity to share their 
views by way of a dissenting opinion.23 This shows that the English common law practice 
had become the prevalent method in the United States Supreme Court, allowing each 
individual justice to have his voice heard on matters that were of importance in defining the 
young nation. 
A Practice for the "lazy, the modest & the incompetent" 
Given the historical basis of, and freedom associated with issuing separate opinions, 
some disagreed as to the value of issuing opinions seriatim, or in expressing any difference 
in opinion at all. The many differences in opinion were not only said to be confusing, but 
also to create "an impossible burden on the Court," whose Justices had to devote an 
20 Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. 402 (1792). 




extraordinary amount of time to the drafting of opinions. 24 Perhaps for this reason, Chief 
Justice John Marshall "would do for America, what Sir William Murray, Lord Mansfield, 
had done for common law in England a generation before."25 However, Marshall believed 
his contribution to be capable of having a longer-lasting effect than Mansfield's, or even 
Pendleton's, after whom he had modeled his chief justiceship.26 Marshall transformed the 
system by issuing Supreme Court decisions in a single opinion, said to express the views of 
all of the judges comprising the court. He believed that in speaking with a voice of 
unanimity the public would be more apt to recognize and agree with the decision of the 
court, and that a unified front would be conveyed to the public.27 This in turn would 
strengthen the role of the judiciary generally and heighten the status of the Supreme Court in 
particular. When it came to delivering the decision of the court, Marshall strongly believed 
that "difference of opinion must be sacrificed on the altar of authoritativeness and 
prestige."28 
Even though achieving credibility and securing the respect of the public might have 
been Marshall's stated intentions for delivering single opinions of the Court, others speculate 
that Marshall used this process to ensure that the Federalist view (or, more specifically, his 
Federalist view) would almost always be the one adopted. As the Republicans gained control 
of Congress and the Executive branch during the election of 1800, "the Court was shorn of 
its close relations with a friendly executive and its political support in Congress, [and] it 
24 Barth, Prophets with Honor, 5. 
25 Gerber, Seriatim, 331. 
26 R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University, 2001),40. 
27 Stack, "The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court," 2238-2239. 
28 Morgan, William, Johnson: The First Dissenter, 176. 
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would have to look elsewhere for prestige and strength."29 Marshall himself was appointed 
Chief Justice by John Adams only a month before Thomas Jefferson was to take presidential 
office. This gave the Federalists full control of the judiciary, and "accordingly, they took 
steps to consolidate their position in the one branch of government remaining in their 
control." 30 The members of the Federalist Party therefore worked to ensure that the 
judiciary would rise to a level more prestigious and powerful than the other two branches 
then occupied by their Republican opponents.31 Thus, did Marshall seek to use the 
unanimous voice of the Supreme Court to further Federalist aims in light of the newly 
elected Republican president and majority in Congress. 
Marshall all but did away with the process of delivering seriatim opinions, as made 
clear by the chart below. In addition to eliminating separate opinions, the new Chief Justice 
also sought most often to be the justice to write the single opinion for the Court. As shown, 
during the years of 1801-1804, Marshall wrote for the majority on every case on which he sat 
and "even when decisions were collective in nature, which was often, he always had the last 
word, so to speak. "32 The practices of the early court stand in stark contrast to the practices 
adopted under Marshall: 33 
29 Marshall saw that to gain effectiveness the Court must appear to be united. Whether it truly was united or 
merely appeared to be did not matter much. What was important was that issuing single opinions "would 
enhance the Court's authoritativeness of its decrees" and therefore strengthen the Federalist Judiciary given 
the Republiean control of the other two branches of government. Morgan, Justice William. Johnson: The 
First Dissenter, 45. 
30 Ibid., 43. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Newmyer, John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the S1Jpreme Court, 399. 
33 Morgan, William Johnson: The First Dissenter, 46. 
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Period and 1 ustice Total Seriatim Opinions Majority Opinions by Chief Justice 
Nun1ber 
of Cases Number % of Total Number % of Total 
1791-1795 - Jay and 17 5 29.4 2 11.7 Rutledge 
1796-1800- 46 7 15.2 12 26.1 Ellsworth 
1801-1804 - Marshall 38 0 0 24 63.2 
Although it may be true that Marshall strengthened the court in the eyes of the public 
by issuing single opinions, the process exacerbated feelings of animosity among the 
Republicans. Not only did the Federalists maintain their majority on the Court, they also 
issued decisions that were detrimental to the aims of the Jeffersonian Republicans. As 
Jefferson himself fumed, "the Federalists have retired into the judiciary as a stronghold ... 
and from that battery all the works of republicanism are to be beaten down and erased. "34 
With Marshall as leader of the Federalist judicial army, "the precise and simultaneous firing 
of Marshall's guns increased the power of the fortress."35 
Jefferson refused to sit idly by and watch Marshall and the Federalists gain control of, 
and strengthen, the judiciary through the method of issuing unanimous opinions. However, 
he faced the not inconsiderable problem of having no opportunity to appoint a justice of his 
own persuasion. For his first three years in office, Jefferson was left without any nominations 
to the Court and thus was unable to try to balance or even outweigh Marshall and the 
Federalists. Fortunately for him and his Republican followers, Jefferson was finally afforded 
the opportunity of appointing a justice to the Supreme Court when Justice Alfred Moore 
resigned due to health problems in 1804.36 Moore had been riding the Sixth Circuit at the 
34 Quoted in Morgan, William Johnson: The First Dissenter, 47. 
35 Ibid. 
time of his resignation, and so Jefferson looked to Georgia and South Carolina for his 
replacement, since it was these states that would lack representation due to Moore's 
absence.37 
20 
Soon after receiving various recommendations, Jefferson nominated South Carolina 
judge William Johnson, Jr. to the post, and he accepted. Johnson was appointed "with the 
hope that he would dilute Marshall's nationalism and check his authority." 38 Before 
Johnson's appointment, the only break from the practice of issuing single opinions was a 
one-line concurring opinion of Justice Samuel Chase in Head & Armory v. Providence 
Insurance Company. 39 This "silent acquiescence" of justices was soon challenged by the 
constant dissents of Justice Johnson, who during his thirty years on the Marshall Court wrote 
21 concurring opinions and 34 dissenting opinions.40 While on the court, Johnson "rejected 
the practice of silent opposition and put forth his disagreements with the majority for all his 
judicial contemporaries and successors to ponder.''41 With regard to both practice and 
ideology, Jefferson finally had succeeded in challenging the Federalists in their judicial 
stronghold. 
36 Morgan, William Johnson: The First Dissenter, 49. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Newmyer, John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court, 404. 
39 Head & Armory v. Providence lnsumnce Company, 6 U.S. 127 169 (1804). 
40 Donald G. Morgan, "The Origin of Supreme Court Dissent," The William and Mary Quarterly IO: 377. 
41 Meredith Kol sky, "Justice William Johnson and the History of the Supreme Court Dissent," 2070. 
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William Johnson before the Marshall Court 
Justice William Johnson, Jr., was born in South Carolina in 1771.42 His father, the 
elder William Johnson, was himself fully supportive of the Revolution, and was considered 
"one of the first to dissent for American independence."43 Just as his family background laid 
the foundation for independent expression, Johnson's education gave him the ability to do so 
in the public sphere. He was the only one of his siblings to attend college in the North when, 
either in 1786 or 1787 (there are conflicting reports), he was enrolled at the College of New 
Jersey at Princeton. 
After graduating from Princeton with highest honors, Johnson returned to South 
Carolina where he studied law under Charles Cotes worth Pinckney. 44 Pinckney had himself 
studied at Oxford under Sir William Blackstone and therefore had a great understanding of 
British common law in addition to the law of the United States. This knowledge of the 
British system was undoubtedly passed along to Johnson, who would employ the method of 
opinion issuance similar to that used in Britain. In addition, it was under Charles Cotesworth 
Pinckney that Johnson was to become acquainted with Charles Pinckney, the man 
responsible for making Johnson want to "attach himself warmly to Jefferson's rapidly 
growing party."45 It was this identification with the Jeffersonian Republicans that would be 
directly responsible for furthering Johnson's judicial career in the years to come. 
42 Jackson, Dissent in the Supreme Court: A Chronology, 26. 
43 Morgan, Justice Williarn Johnson: The First Dissenter, 22. 
44 Ibid., 21. 
45 Ibid., 29. 
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On October 15, 1794, Johnson began his governmental career with election to the 
South Carolina House of Representatives, where he would serve three terms.46 From this 
position, he was appointed to serve on the South Carolina Constitutional Court when the 
lower court system was expanded on December 18, 1799 .47 While on the state court, 
Johnson was a member of a system that "tolerated a healthy difference of opinion and 
expression."48 It was here that he developed "convictions as to the proper construction to be 
applied to the Federal Constitution."49 Both of these characteristics were to be of utmost 
importance in Johnson's later life when he assumed his role a justice of the United States 
Supreme Court. "At twenty-seven, he had found a career that was to absorb his energies for 
the remainder of his life. It was as judge that he would acquire his reputation and make his 
principal contribution."50 
Before Johnson was nominated by Jefferson, he already had many experiences and 
formed many views which would greatly influence his time on the Supreme Court. His sole 
biographer, Donald G. Morgan, specifically identifies four of these crucial influences. First, 
Johnson's childhood was "close to the struggles of the revolution"; his father had instilled in 
him the value of public and governmental dissent, and he had also come to realize that the 
nation and states were inevitably interdependent.51 
46 Morgan, Justice Willia1n Johnson: The First Dissenter, 26. 
47 Ibid., 36. 
48 Ibid., 37. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., 36. 
51 Ibid., 39-40. 
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Second, Johnson's education at Princeton under its President John Witherspoon, gave 
him a "zest for intellectual inquiry" and "furnished groundwork for a rounded political 
philosophy."52 It was during the years that Johnson attended the university that he not only 
studied classics and political theory, but undoubtedly discussed the timely issue of the 
framing and adopting of the Constitution then taking place. It is likely that much of his 
practical and judicial philosophy was shaped during these years. 
Third, Charles Coates worth Pinckney taught him the principles of English 
jurisprudence which would be the basis of Johnson's knowledge of law in general. Finally, 
his career in the public arena as representative and judge, during which he served on various 
committees, gave him the opportunity not only to be an influential member of state 
government, but also exercise his Republican idealism. Together, these experiences, 
influences, and characteristics were to give shape to his life as a Justice when Johnson found 
himself nominated for appointment to the Supreme Court of the United States by Jefferson 
on April 18, 1804 at the age of thirty-three. 
Most contemporary Americans view Supreme Court appointments as a high honor, 
one that should be automatically accepted. This was not the prevalent attitude in Johnson's 
time. Johnson's mentor Charles Cotesworth Pinckney had himself turned down a Supreme 
Court appointment in favor of private practice. Many others understood a career on the high 
court as being not as prestigious and lucrative as other realms of the law. In addition, 
Johnson had a specific problem with regard to his appointment. The Supreme Court at the 
time "remained a citadel of Federalism; to overcome it would be the aim of Jefferson and 
52 Morgan, Justice William Johnson: The First Dissenter, 40. 
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conceivably the duty of any Republican who might accept an assignment to enter it."53 In 
other words, it would be Johnson's duty as the sole Republican to further the Republican 
philosophy while on the court. 
Johnson would also likely encounter other problems after his appointment was made a 
reality. First, at thirty-three, he would be the youngest justice on the bench, with all of the 
others at least ten years his senior. 54 Second, his "modest origins might be regarded with 
disdain in Federalist circles. "55 Last, and perhaps most important for this discussion, 
Marshall's rule of issuing single opinions, "and the virtual monopoly of expression which 
had drifted into Marshall's hands" would not allow for the freedom of expression Johnson 
was accustomed to while on the South Carolina bench.56 Johnson's position would certainly 
be "unenviable" given the obstacles that awaited him on the Marshall Court. 57 
Even so, Johnson was ready to face the many challenges he would inevitably 
encounter while serving on the Supreme Court of the United States, and on April 18, 1804 
accepted his appointment from Jefferson: 
Sir, I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communications of 
the 30'h & 31 March accompanying a commission constituting me one of the 
Associate Justices of the United States, together with the President's 
arrangement of the Circuits. I will trouble you sir to present my 
acknowledgements to the President for this mark of attention and confidence, 
& to communicate my willingness to accept the appointment.58 
53 Morgan, Justice William. Johnson: The First Dissenter, 169. 
54 Ibid., 53. William Cushing was seventy-two, Samuel Chase, sixty-three, William Paterson, fifty-nine, 




58 Records of the Department of State, Miscellaneous Letters (The National Archives), quoted in Morgan, 
Justice William. Johnson: The First _Dissenter, 51-52. 
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Jefferson's Influence, Johnson's Response 
Thomas Jefferson was to influence Justice William Johnson not only with regard to 
his adoption of Republican principles, but also on a point of procedure that was important to 
both men: that of writing judicial opinions. In the words of Percival Jackson, "Jefferson not 
only was an exponent of the English seriatim practice but also was convinced that Marshall's 
ability to have the Court avoid it resulted in many of the important decisions with which he 
differed."59 As is made clear through his various letters, Jefferson was firmly committed to 
influencing others with regard to the importance of the seriatim system. 
In a letter to Thomas Ritchie of December 25, 1810, Jefferson explained that the main 
problem with the Supreme Court justices is that, due to the practice of issuing a single 
opinion of the court, they do not believe themselves as being personally accountable for a 
decision, or likely to be impeached. Regarding impeachment as "a mere scare-crow," 
justices "consider themselves secure for life; they sculk [sic] from responsibility to public 
opinion, the only remaining hold on them.''60 He forcefully attacked the practice of Marshall, 
as well as the willingness of the associate justices to bend to his will, in asserting that by 
Marshall's practice, 
An opinion is huddled up in a conclave, perhaps by a majority of one, 
delivered as if unanimous, and with the silent acquiescence of lazy or timid 
associates, by a crafty chief judge, who sophisticates the law to his mind, by 
h fh. . 61 t e turn o 1s own reasonmg. 
Reverting to the practice of seriatim opinions of the British system would be the only 
remedy; although the creation of "A judiciary independent of a king or executive alone, is a 
59 Jackson, Dissent in the Supreme Court: A Chronology, 23. 
'
0 Jefferson to Ritchie, 25 December 1810 in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Paul L. Ford, 171. 
61 Ibid. 
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good thing" that the American system did not inherit from the British, "but independence 
from the will of the nation is a solecism, .at least in a republican government. "62 
Jefferson communicated similar, yet more concise, sentiments to Archibald Thweat 
and Judge Spencer Roane in the early months of 1821.63 At the end of the same year, he 
would again discuss at length his advocacy of the seriatim system, as well as the dangers that 
resulted from Marshall's abandoning of it. To James Pleasants he wrote, 
Another most condemnable practice of the supreme court to be corrected is 
that of cooking up a decision in Caucus & delivering it by one of their 
members as an opinion of the court, without the possibility of knowing how 
many, who, and for what reason each member concurred."64 
After this discussion, Jefferson echoed his discussion concerning avoidance of the 
accountability and impeachment, and also claimed that were the justices to give their 
opinions seriatim, they would "endeavor to justify themselves to the world by 
explaining the reasons which led to their opinion."65 
Thus, it should have come as no surprise that on October 27, 1822 Jefferson penned a 
letter to Johnson regarding a subject that "has long weighed on my mind ... ; the habitual 
mode of making up and delivering the opinions of the supreme court of the US."66 In light 
of Johnson's "candor and devotedness to the Constitution, in its true spirit," Jefferson would 
62 Jefferson to Ritchie, 25 December 1810 in The Writings ofT/wmas Jefferson, ed. Paul L. Ford, 171. 
63 Jefferson to Thweat, 19 January 1821, and Jefferson to Roane, 9 March 1821 in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 
ed. Paul L. Ford,184, 188. 
64 Jefferson to Pleasants, 26 December] 821 in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Paul L. Ford, 199. 
" Ibid. It is also in this letter that Jefferson discusses the fact that Edmund Randolph proposed an amendment which 
wou1d ensure the use of the seriatim system by stating that "every judge should give his individual opinion, and 
reasons in open court." Jefferson also appeals to future generations as he states that there will probably not be much 
revision of the practice of de1ivering opinions during his time. In this way, Jefferson himself was invoking the 
wisdom of future generations, as those dissenters who believed in their freedom and duty to express their judicia1 
philosophies would also eventually come to do as well. 
66 Jefferson to Johnson, 27 October 1822 in The Writings ofT/wmas Jefferson, ed. Paul L. Ford, 223. 
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give historical background regarding the English practice of delivering opinions seriatirn, 
and in doing so indirectly expressed his concerns regarding Marshall's practice: 
You know that from the earliest ages of the English law, from the date of the 
year-books, at least, to the end of the lid George, the judges of England in all 
but self-evident cases, delivered their opinions seriatim, with the reasons and 
authorities which governed their decisions. If they sometimes consulted 
together, and gave a general opinion, it was so rarely as not to excite either 
alarm or notice. Besides the light which their separate arguments threw on the 
subject, and the instruction communicated by their several modes of reasoning, 
it shewed whether the judges were unanimous or divided, and gave 
accordingly more or less weight to the judgment as a precedent.67 
Later in the same letter, Jefferson directly discussed Marshall's practice of issuing 
single opinions for the Court, as well as the reasons this practice was fatally flawed. 
According to Jefferson, issuing single opinions, especially those consistently written by the 
Chief Justice himself, did not heighten public confidence in the court and the judges, but 
instead produced the opposite effect. Moreover, this process enabled the rest of the judges 
on Marshall's Court to effectively avoid impeachment, and ensure that the public would have 
no way to measure their individual reputations; two things that Jefferson saw as inherent in 
their duty as justices.68 Impeachment, he said, was impossible: "For nobody knows what 
opinion any individual member gave in any case, nor even that he who delivers the opinion, 
concurred in it himself. Be the opinion therefore ever so impeachable, having been done in 
the dark it can be proved on no one."69 Personal reputation was also completely done away 
with due to the fact that all of the justices are shielded from being identified. This practice of 
single opinion issuance is, as Jefferson so harshly noted, "certainly convenient for the lazy, 
the modest & the incompetent. It saves them the trouble of developing their own opinion 




methodically and even of making up an opinion at all."70 After identifying the flaws of 
Marshall's system, Jefferson once again defended seriatim opinions in stating that they 
publicly ensure that each judge has read and understood the case and formed his own 
opinion, "instead of pinning it on another's sleeve."71 In expressing themselves personally, 
the public would apt to be more confident in their justices, instead of the opposite view that 
Marshall had expounded.72 
In a later letter to Johnson, Jefferson could not "lay down my pen without recurring to 
one of the subjects of my former letter, for in truth there is no danger I apprehend so much as 
the consolidation of our government by the noiseless, and therefore unalarming, 
instrumentality of the supreme court."73 In again aiming to influence his appointee, Jefferson 
stressed the importance of expressing independent judicial opinions by arguing that each 
justice must "prove by reasoning that he has read the papers, that he has considered the case, 
that in the application of the law to it, he uses his own judgment independently and unbiased 
by party views and personal favor or disfavor."74 In this way, in every case, it should be 
judged as more valuable that a judge offers his opinion than hides it behind a majority 
opinion for unanimity's sake. In writing his own opinion, Jefferson believed each justice 
would "Throw himself in every case on God and country; both will excuse him for error and 








Jefferson's letters shed light on the historical origins of dissent in two ways. First, his 
own extensive knowledge of seriatim opinions as used in Britain would suggest that many of 
his contemporaries had similar knowledge. Therefore, it can be safely assumed that many of 
the founders, especially those involved in the drafting of the Constitution and the creation of 
the judiciary, were aware of British seriatim practice, fully understood it, and believed it to 
be the common and most effective method of delivering opinions. Second, these letters 
illustrate clearly that Jefferson's goal was to have Johnson, as well as many others, also 
realize the value that lay in differences of opinion on the Court. In the case of Johnson, 
Jefferson was to achieve his goal, as his letter prompted Johnson to respond with a 21 page 
letter addressing all of Jefferson's concerns. 
In his response to Jefferson, Johnson chronicled his effort to express himself on the 
bench and also offered blunt criticism of Marshall and the other associate justices. This 
letter gives insight into Johnson's experience on the court:76 
While I was on our state-bench I was accustomed to delivering seriatim 
opinions in our appellate court, and was not a little surprised to find our Chief 
Justice in the Supreme Court delivering all the opinions in cases in which he 
sat, even in some instances when contrary to his own judgment and vote. But I 
remonstrated in vain; the answer was he is willing to take the trouble and it is 
a mark of respect to him. I soon however found out the real cause. Cushing 
was incompetent, Chase could not be got to think or write - Paterson was a 
slow man and willingly declined the Trouble, and the other two (Marshall and 
Washington) are commonly estimated as one Judge."77 
This passage tells much of Johnson's struggle and also of his personal views 
regarding the others with whom he shared the bench. But perhaps the most important text 
76 Morgan, Justice William Johnson: The First Dissenter, 182. 
77 Johnson to Jefferson, December JO, 1822 from Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress, quoted in Donald 
G. Morgan, "Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Constitution," 57 Harvard Law Review 328, 334. 
specifically related to the establishment of the process of judicial dissent as we know it 
today, not merely a seriatim approach, was written by Johnson later in the same letter: 
Some case soon occurred in which I differed from my brethren, and I thought 
it a thing of course to deliver my opinion. But during the rest of the session I 
heard nothing but lectures on the indecency of judges cutting at each other, 
and the loss of the reputation which the Virginia appellate court had sustained 
by pursuing such a course. At length I found that I must either submit to 
circumstances or become such a cipher in our consultations as to effect no 
good at all. I therefore bent with the current and persevered until I got them to 
adopt the course they now pursue, which is to appoint someone to deliver the 
opinion of the majority, but leave it to the discretion of the rest of the judges to 
record their opinions or not ad libitum.78 
Here, Johnson stated himself that it was his constant pursuit of freedom of thought 
and expression which led to the system we have adopted today: a single majority opinion 
coupled with concurring opinions and/or dissents when necessary. This was not simply a 
mere resurgence of the seriatim opinion as Jefferson had so forcefully suggested, but the 
creation of an entirely new system under which both unanimity and individual expression 
could exist symbiotically. 
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Jefferson was so impressed with Johnson's response that he sent his original letter to 
Johnson along with Johnson's reply to his dear friend and political confidant James Madison 
for his review. Preceding the letters, Jefferson wrote, "This conveys [Johnson's] views of 
things and they are so serious and sound, that they are worth your reading."79 After reading 
the Jefferson and Johnson's correspondence, Madison responded to Jefferson: 
78 Ibid. 
79 Jefferson to Madison, 26 January 1823, in The WriringsofThomasJejferson, ed. Paul L. Ford, 245. Jefferson also 
wrote to Madison following his second letter to Johnson in which he states, "I communicated to you a former part of 
a correspondence between Judge Johnson of Charleston and myself, chiefly on the practice of caucusing opinions 
which is that of the Supreme Court of the U.S ... I enclose a copy of my letter to the judge becayse if you think of it 
as I do, I suppose your connection with Judge Todd & your antient intimacy with Judge Duvel might give you an 
opening to say something on the subject. If Johnson could be backed by them in the practice, the others would be 
obliged to follow suit and this dangerous engine of consolidn would feel a proper restraint by their being compelled 
to explain publicly the grounds of their opinions." It is not known whether Madison ever did write to Justice Todd 
Judge Johnson's letter was well entitled to the perusal you recommended. I 
am glad you have put him in possession of such just views of the course that 
ought to be pursued in the Court in delivering its opinions ... A good work on 
the side of truth, from his pen will be an apt & effective antidote to that of his 
Colleague [Marshall] which has been poisoning the public mind, & gaining a 
. 80 passport to postenty. 
Johnson had succeeded in providing such an "antidote" to the practice of Marshall. 
He coupled the seriatim process so favored by Jefferson with the solidarity that the Chief 
Justice had made to be the norm: 
The outcome of his ventures in strategy are clear: it was the establishment of 
that procedure for rendering the decrees of the Supreme Court which most 
harmoniously reconciled authoritativeness with intellectual freedom - the 
single statement for the majority combined with separate utterances by 
independents. Then and now, this has proved the mode of expression best 
adapted to the exigencies of the high tribunal. 81 
Conviction without Sacrificing Unanimity 
31 
During the years from 1801 until 1835, the court was dominated by the leadership of 
Chief Justice John Marshall, who is credited with formally establishing the role of the Court 
as truly supreme. However, alternative leadership was occurring elsewhere on the court by 
Justice William Johnson's practice of offering dissenting opinions as we would know them 
today. Some would assert that it was Jefferson who made the most lasting impression on the 
Court due to the fact that he was both relentless in his advocacy of the seriatim system and 
also that it was he who "pushed Johnson to dissent in hopes that this would weaken the 
court," a practice that, in actuality, made the court stronger." 82 Thus, Jefferson's 
or Duvel regarding the practice, as no record of correspondence with either can be found in his writings after this 
date in 1823. Jefferson to Madison, 13 June 1823 in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Paul L. Ford, 260. 
80 Madison to Jefferson, 15 January 1823 in The Writings of James Madison, ed. Gaillard Hunt, 114. 
81 Morgan, Justice William Johnson: The First Dissenter, 188. 
82 Kolsky, "Justice William Johnson and the History of the Supreme Court Dissent," 2070. 
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contribution in appointing Johnson, and Johnson's direct influence in shaping the ways 
opinions were issued is seen today by some to be of equal if, not greater importance than 
Marshall's own contributions to the court at that time. 83 
The tensions that existed between Marshall, Jefferson and Johnson are not on! y 
relevant specifically with regard to the political situation at the time of the Marshall Court, 
but also with regard to the evolution of judicial dissent in the Supreme Court in later years. 
The process of dissent as we know it today was firmly established by Johnson as he 
confronted the firm, single-majority opinion favored by Marshall with the freedom of 
expression inherent in the seriatim opinions championed by Jefferson. It was Johnson who 
truly acted as leader not only by holding his convictions in the face of his opponents both on 
and off the court, but also in creating a judicial practice that would give justices a tool for 
potentially influencing future generations and public opinion. As Marshall sought to 
strengthen the court through unanimity, Johnson insisted that right judgment should never be 
sacrificed in its wake. As Charles Evans Hughes has written, 
When unanimity can be obtained without sacrifice of conviction, it strongly 
commends the decision to public confidence. But unanimity which is merely 
formal, which is recorded at the expense of strong conflicting views, is not 
desirable in a court of last resort, whatever may be the effect upon public 
opinion at that time. This is so because what must ultimately sustain the court 
in public confidence is the character and independence of the judges. They are 
not there simply to decide cases, but rather, to decide them as they think they 
should be decided, and while it may be regrettable that they cannot always 
agree, it is better that their independence should be maintained and recognized 
than that unanimity should be secured through its sacrifice. 84 
Overall, the right to dissent - historically, politically, and constitutionally - has done 
more than produce inspirational writing in legal scholarship. It has worked simultaneously 
'' Kolsky, "Justice William Johnson and the History of the Supreme Court Dissent," 2070. 
84 Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States, 67-68. 
to reflect the ideals of our society and further them. The tensions that existed between 
Marshall, Jefferson and Johnson regarding the role of unanimity and dissent during the 
Court's formative years, as well as the tensions that currently exist today, are inevitably 
important in examining how the leaders of our nation's highest court express their judicial 
philosophies, and also shape the public conscience of the nation. As made clear by the 
example of Marshall, Jefferson, and Johnson, it was then, as it is now, the great dissenter 




"WE ARE UNDER THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIVIDUAL MEN" 
Just as Jefferson appointed Johnson with the hope of challenging Federalist 
constitutional interpretation, other dissenters have followed suit by articulating a principled 
definition of the Constitution despite the majority's judicial philosophy. One of the most 
important dissenters to do this was Justice Benjamin R. Curtis in Dred Scott v. Sandford. 1 
While the majority attempted to skew the meaning of the Constitution to justify the 
institution of slavery, Curtis warned of the path the Court was taking based not only on the 
facts of the case, but on what he saw as the correct interpretation of the Constitution. He 
insisted that the Court was committing a grave error not only with regard to the specific 
situation of Dred Scott, or even with regard to slavery as an institution, but also with regard 
to the true meaning of the Constitution and the proper role of the judiciary as the 
interpreter of it. 
If the Marshall Court's cause was nationalism, that of the Taney Court was 
regionalism, and in Dred Scott v. Sandford the politics and morality of the justices 
"combined to produce the worst constitutional decision of the nineteenth century."2 Just 
as "Marshall was a great Federalist conservative; Taney was to be the great democratic 
Jackson liberal. Marshall had been devoted to the Federalist promotion of individual 
property rights; Taney was to be devoted to the social and economic rights of people under 
1 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
2 Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 28. 
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the aegis of the police powers of the state."3 As such, Taney attempted to promote this 
ideology by issuing a definitive national statement on slavery. "He endeavored to settle by 
judicial decision what debate in Congress and on the hustings could not settle but only disturb. 
He tried to avert the revolutionary disruption of a social and economic system. He was playing 
for high stakes, he played his trump card to maintain the old constitutional arrangements and 
prevent disunion - and he failed."4 
The Origins of the Race Question 
The question of slavery and the issue of inequality between races did not simply 
arise in the mid-1800s. Long before the conflict between North and South that degenerated 
into the American Civil War, the nation was divided ideologically regarding the 
justification of slavery.5 "Although not the source of national apoplexy that it eventually 
became ... ," differences with respect to slavery, "were a significant cause of friction and 
uncertainty in 1787. "6 Although it can be said that during the time of the Constitutional 
Convention the most obvious struggle was between large and small states over their 
representation in the legislative branch, the Great Compromise resolved this conflict by 
"establishing proportional representation in one house while retaining state equality in the 
3 Pcrcieval Jackson, Dfasent in the Supreme Court: A Chronology (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1969), 42. 
4 Charles W. Smith, Jr., Roger B. Taney: Jacksonian Jurist (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1936), 
155, 173. 
5 Don E. Fehrenbacher states, "slavery had in fact been an obsLacle tu American union since the beginning of 
independence, contributing to the financial weakness of the Articles of Confederation." Fehrenbacher, The Dred 
Scott Case: Its Significance in American I.aw and Politics (New York: Oxford, 1978), 19. 
6 Donald E. Lively, Foreshadows of the Law: Supreme Court dissents and Constitutional Development 
(Westport: Praeger, 1992), 3. 
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other."7 Once the question of representation was settled, the sectional dispute regarding slavery 
once again became a source of great controversy with regard to the formation and ratification of 
the new Constitution. As James Madison put it in the Constitutional Convention, sectional 
disputes stemmed "principally from the effects of...having or not having slaves," and 
therefore the issue of slavery served as the reason for "forming the great division of 
interests in the U. States [which] lay between the Northern [and] Southern."8 
In 1787, each state could decide whether or not to allow slavery within its borders.9 
Only three clauses in the new Constitution directly dealt with the institution of slavery, and none 
of them mentioned the practice by name. These clauses -the three-fifths clause, the slave trade 
clause, and the fugitive slave clause - "dealt only with certain peripheral features of the 
institution" of slavery.10 The deliberate avoidance of the word "slavery" in each of these clauses 
should not be readily overlooked, as "the law inheres most essentially in the text of the 
document"; that is, the absence of this word in the text says much about the intent of the framers 
with regard to the treatment of this delicate constitutional question. 11 There was a deliberate 
effort in the drafting of the text relating to slavery in these aforementioned clauses in order to 
achieve "compromise for the sake of union."12 "Constitution-making, after all, was a noble 
7 Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case, 20. 
8 James Madison, 30 June 1789 in The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, ed. Max Ferrand, vol. 3 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1937). 
9 Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case, 29. 
10 Ibid., 26. This implies that "to begin with, the Constitution neither authorized nor specifically forbade the 
abolition of slavery" in and of itself. Further, it is interesting to note that "neither the three-fifths clause nor the 
slave trade clause offered slavery any positive protection under the Constitution. 'fhe fugitive slave clause, on the 
other hand, became the basis for the most notorious kind of federal intervention in behalf of the institution ... Not in 
what it said, but only in how it was universally understood, did the so-called fugitive-slave clause acknowledge the 
existence of slavery in America," 24-25. 
ll Ibid., 27. 
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enterprise, infused with a good deal of political philosophy and moral grandeur. Overt 
recognition of slavery did not fit well with the solemn discussion of fundamental law, the social 
compact, and bills of rights."13 
In essence, the new national government created by the Constitution left the slavery 
question uniformly unanswered, an action that was necessary at that moment for the union 
proposed by the new Constitution to be acceptable. 14 "The early assumption and premise 
for compromise was that free and slave states could co-exist." 15 Thus, "the compromise of 
Northern and Southern agendas, although leaving significant loose ends, made possible the 
Constitution's ratification and union's formation." 16 
In addition to allowing for compromise on the slavery issue to create the union, 
there was a prevalent belief during the time of ratification that slavery would die a natural 
death and eventually cease to exist due to the prohibition of the slave trade in 1808. This 
"body of dubious opinion" basically stated that "had the slavery question been permitted to 
simmer without exploding, ultimately the institution would have decline and 
disappeared."17 This view could not have been farther from predicting the reality of the 
situation regarding slavery or the threat that it would come to pose to the union. 
12 Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case, 26. 
13 Ibid., 28. 
14 Fehrenbacher states that "it might seem that in a nation already plainly becoming half slave and half free in 1789, 
the new federal government ought to have followed a policy of scrupulous neutrality and detachment, leaving 
slavery entirely to the responsibility of slaveholding states." But it did not explicate a policy on slavery as such due 
to the fact that "various influences and circumstances conspired not only to involve the United States government 
with slavery but to n1ake it Jn some degree a sponsor and protector of the institution." Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott 
Case, 36-37. 
"Lively, Foreshadows of the Law, 4. 
16 Ibid., 4. 
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What the founders did predict, however, were the problems that would result from 
fugitive slaves entering free states. Most obviously, these "runaway slave problems" were 
a concern of the Constitutional Convention, which drafted the fugitive slave clause, and 
also the view of Congress, which passed the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.18 The 
complications that would necessarily ensue from not having a definitive, national rule 
regarding the practice of slavery were anticipated, but a uniform policy on slavery was not 
adopted to solve this problem. Instead, the Constitutional Convention and the Congress 
prolonged the inevitable by allowing both slave and free states to attempt not only to exist, 
but to respect each others' philosophies. 
Although the problems of fugitive slaves were obviously expected by the framers of 
the Constitution, and even though they believed that slavery would eventually decline on 
its own, the framers did not foresee one of the most important challenges slavery would 
create. "Less comprehended in 1787 ... was the nation's rapid geographical expansion 
during the eighteenth century and the intense sectional competition it bred to define 
standards for the nation's growth and governance." 19 It was this geographical expansion 
that would raise the most exigent questions with regard to slavery and its regulation. As 
there were a finite number of states that could possibly come into being given the size of 
the American continent, controversy over the extension or restriction of slavery would be 
of grave importance for the growing country. 
17 Bork, The Tempting of America, 29. Bork states that "Abraham Lincoln was once of that view, "resting in 
the hope and belief that [slavery] was in course of ultimate extinction," a view he later abandoned." 
18 Lively, Foreshadows of the Law, 8. Lively also later states that, "The Fugitive Slave Act itself became a 
focal point of review in 1842, after a slave catcher convicted for a violation of a state anti-kidnapping law 
challenged the enactment's constitutionality. The circumstances resulting in Prigg v. Pennsylvania 
disclosed precisely the abuses that had prompted legislative concern and action in free states." Ibid., 10. 
19 Ibid., 5. 
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As evidenced when Missouri sought statehood, Congress was faced with the 
balancing act of reconciling the competing claims of the North and South with regard to the 
slavery issue. 20 In this particular situation, Missouri was admitted as a slave state, but 
Maine was admitted as a free state as a counterbalance. In addition, slavery was prohibited 
in the territory acquired by the Louisiana Purchase north of Missouri's southern border.21 
Dubbed the Missouri Compromise of 1820, this method of allowing states into the union in 
pairs (one slave to one free) became the rule from this time forward. "Though not 
satisfactory to the more ardent opponents and defenders of slavery, North and South, this 
compromise, whatever its morality, had the beneficial political result of allowing the 
United States to develop with a degree of stability."22 Still, this stability would not last 
long, with new territory becoming all the more important to ardent Northerners and 
Southerners in the race to end or promote slavery, respectively. The Missouri Compromise 
and the struggle that accompanied it would leave a "bitter memory," as, "slavery remained a 
haunting presence in national politics, unmentioned much of the time, but inspiring many 
apprehensive glances over the shoulder."23 As Thomas Jefferson wrote, "a geographical line, 
2° Fehrenbacher writes, .. Missouri the incipient state was belatedly controversial, and doubly so because of its 
geographical position as a rather northerly sectional borderland. It was, in fact, the only one of the so-called border 
states to have been part of the territorial system." Fehrenbaeher, The Dred Scott Case, 115. 
21 Bork, The Te1nptin.g of Am,erica, 29. Also see Fehrenbacher's discussion of the Missouri Compromise in relation 
to its historical significance and relation to the Dred Scott case. He writes, ''The Missouri crisis, it has been said, 
.. intrcxluced the antislavery issue into American politics." But in fact, the issue was more or less continually present 
in the consciousness of American political leaders from the very beginning of the Republie, and often enough before 
1819 it had broken through the surface of congressional business. Perhaps in part beeausc of Jefferson's 
overwrought imagery, the Missouri controversy appears in textbook history as a sudden, interruptive event, full of 
meaning for the future but somewhat anomalous in the context of its own time ... Unlike the crisis of 1850, it did not 
arise inevitably from the consequences of a war recently ended, and it had no inflamed aftermath like northern 
reaction to the Fugitive Slave Act, nor a spectacular sequel like that of the Kansas Nebraska controversy. Yet the 
Missouri affair was actually not an isolated eruption but instead the most prominent part of a sequential pattern." 
Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case, 114. 
22 Bork, The Tempting of America, 29. 
23 Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case, 116-117. 
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coinciding with a marked principle, moral and political, once conceived and held up to the angry 
passions of men, will never be obliterated; and every new irritation will mark it deeper and 
deeper."24 With regard to the issue of slavery "we have the wolf by the ears, and we can neither 
hold him, nor safely let him go." 
From a National Debate to a Constitutional Question 
Since the justification of slavery would eventually have to be defined nationally, 
"what eventually became central to doctrinal development for or against slavery ... was the 
Constitution itself."25 In this way, the political battle that had existed over slavery evolved 
into one of constitutional interpretation. 26 
"The progress of slavery from an issue of political compromise toward one of 
constitutional resolution injected a new institutional factor into the controversy. As the 
case for and against slavery acquired increasingly significant constitutional overtones, it 
became the function of the Supreme Court to say 'what the law is' ."27 Long treated as a 
political question, pressure on other branches of the government led to an increasing interest in 
settling the slavery question by way of the judiciary. They had the opportunity to do just this 
when a man named Dred Scott sued for his freedom, eventually taking his case to the 
Supreme Court of the United States. It was here that the law regarding slavery would 
24 Jefferson to John Holmes, 22 April 1820 in The Writings ofT/wmas Jefferson, ed. Paul L. Ford, 698. 
25 Lively, Foreshadows of the Law, 5. 
26 Ibid., "Fortifying the premises at both poles of the debate were revisionist readings of the Constitution. 
The more radical abolitionists, typified by William Lloyd Garrison, regarded the Constitution as a pro-
s Javery document. So defective was it... that the only remedy was disunion of the nation. An equally 
significant strand of abolitionist thought favored development of the Constitution to defeat slavery ... Like 
the abolitionists, the South also Jocked to the Constitution for counterargument and vindication. In a Senate 
speech delivered in 1836, John C. Calhoun referred to slaves and property and an interest thereby protected 
by the Fifth Amendment guarantee against deprivation without due process of law." Ibid., 6-7. 
27 Ibid.,7. 
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finally be decided. The constitutional question that came before the Court in the Dred Scott 
case "was one that divided Republicans from Democrats - namely, whether Congress has the 
power to prohibit slavery in the territories ... and also one that divided northern Democrats from 
southern Democrats - namely, whether a territorial legislature had the power to prohibit 
slavery .... "28 But in the end the Court would do even more than create a uniform law 
regarding slavery and answer a constitutional question. The action of the Court would also 
"reflect public understanding of the nature of judicial power and the Court's own sense of 
strategic responsibility in the American constitutional system."29 
The notion of judicial review, expounded by the Court under John Marshall in the case of 
Marbury v. Madison, gave the Court the express right to determine the constitutionality of the 
laws and to declare them null and void if at odds with the Constitution itself. However, after 
establishing this power in Marbury, John Marshall and his Court never again invalidated a 
federal law for the remaining thirty-two years of his chief justiceship. Thus, "the Marbury 
doctrine remained prominently on the record, well-respected, but more or less dormant."30 
Judicial review would not be exercised again after Marbury until Dred Scott. 
The Dred Scott decision "was the Supreme Court's first invalidation of a major federal 
law."31 Therefore, the case had importance beyond deciding the slavery question in being "a 
landmark in the history of judicial review ... since it was in 1857 that Americans for the first time 
had to consider the operational scope and meaning of judicial review in national politics."32 
28 Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case, 2ITT. 
29 Ibid., 209. 
30 Ibid., 223. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case, 4. 
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Indeed, there was a heightened political situation not only with regard to the existence of slavery 
as a territorial question, but also with regard to partisanship on the Court that would decide its 
fate. as the election of 1837 resulted in a Jacksonian Democratic majority in most levels of 
government.33 These triumphant Jacksonians were a largely Southern based party that was 
"proslavery at heart, but quietly so in order to accommodate its robust northern wing."34 Roger 
B. Taney, the chief justice at the time of the Dred Scott decision was a member of this majority 
party. Luckily for Taney, and quite unlike the political situation surrounding the chief 
justiceship of his predecessor John Marshall, it was his party who held the majority on the Court 
as well as the other two branches. 35 
Although the chief justiceship of Taney was of a different element with regard to political 
partisanship, the two men were very alike in two respects. First, Taney believed in the authority 
of the Court and his being the voice responsible for that authority, as had Marshall. "According 
to a contemporary [Taney] spoke with 'so much sincerity ... that it was next to impossible to 
believe that he could be wrong.' Taney himself had the same difficulty [when] as chief justice 
there were times when he reminded men of the Pope, speaking 'ex cathedra, infallibly.'"36 
Second, as Marshall was not at all reserved about the promotion of his Federalist 
ideology, Taney was also committed to his Democratic views. Taney was intensely partisan 
where slavery was concerned, not letting his position as chief justice quell his democratically 
33 Ibid., 229. "In the perspective of history, the supposed revolution of 1837, like Jefferson's revolution of 1800, 
became something less definitive and more complex, in which change of considerable significance took place within 
an elemental flow of continuity." 
34 Ibid., 117. 
35 With regard to the Court, of the fourteen members appointed from 1829-1861, only Benjamin R. Curtis, the great 
dissenter in the Dred Scott case, was a northern Whig. Timothy S. Huebner, The Taney Court: Justices, Rulings, 
and Legacy (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2003), 97. 
36 Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case, 227. 
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influenced statements. In many cases before Dred Scott, he ruled pro-slavery and was not 
hesitant to give political reasons for doing so.37 Slavery was not the only substantive issue in 
which Taney showed his political nature, as he once "disqualified himself from a case involving 
the Bank of the United States but then wrote a long commentary, amounting to a dissenting 
opinion, and had it printed as an appendix to the official report."38 
Thus, when the Senate confirmed on March 15, 1836 the nomination of Roger B. Taney 
as Chief Justice of the United States by a vote of 29 to 15, they were unknowingly setting the 
stage for a conflict that would later prove to be one of the most pernicious Supreme Court 
decisions of all time. Ironically, it was during that same spring that an army medical officer 
from Illinois took his slave with him to his new assignment, an assignment in the federal territory 
where slavery had been forbidden by the Missouri Compromise. "The historical convergence of 
these two unrelated but nearly simultaneous events lay twenty years in the future, but to a 
considerable degree, the forces that would bring them ultimately together were visible."39 
The "Antithesis of Taney" 
Born and raised in Massachusetts, Benjamin Robbins Curtis was in many ways the 
antithesis of Taney, and therefore something of a parallel to the man who had been the 
antithesis of Marshall, the great dissenter Justice William Johnson. As Johnson was the 
lone Republican on an entirely Federalist Court, Curtis was the lone Whig on a court 
37 Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case. 234. This is made apparent by his rulings and dictum in Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania 41 US 539 (1842), Groves v. Slaughter40 U.S. 449 (1841), and Strader v. Graham 51 US. JO 
Howard, 395 (1851). 
38 Ibid., 233-234. 
39 Ibid., 12!. 
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composed entirely of Democrats.4° Curtis was the first member of the Court to have 
graduated from law school, and after completing his study of the law at Harvard under 
Justice Joseph Story, he became, from 1840 on, a strong supporter of "the fortunes and 
principles" of Daniel Webster.41 The appointment of Curtis by Fillmore can be viewed as 
parallel of Johnson's appointment by Jefferson. Just as Jefferson nominated the young 
Republican judge after strong party recommendations, when Justice Levi Woodbury's seat 
on the Court fell vacant in 1851 it was party affiliate Daniel Webster who strongly 
recommended Curtis to President Millard Fillmore. Just as Jefferson specifically sought to 
add a Republican to the bench, Fillmore similarly wanted to nominate a young Whig from 
New England, and therefore appointed Curtis who had little trouble winning 
f . . 42 con lfmatJon. 
As was the case with Johnson on the Marshall Court, Curtis' influence on the Taney 
Court was almost immediate. Just a few months after his confirmation as Associate 
Justice, he wrote the majority opinion in one of the most important Commerce Clause cases 
in United States history, Cooley v. Board of Wardens,43 which "raised the issue of whether 
or when states could regulate commercial activity - a question that had bedeviled the 
justices for decades."44 Writing for five of eight justices, Curtis declared that the power to 
regulate commerce did not rest exclusively with Congress; his opinion helped the Court to 
resolve a seemingly intractable problem by establishing a new, pragmatic standard of 
40 Except for Justice McLean, who associated himself with a variety of political parties over the course of 
his career. Huebner, The Taney Court: Justices, Rulings. and Legacy, 97. 
41 Vincent C. Hopkins, Dred Scott's Case (New York: Russell & Russell, 1967), 82. 
42 Huebner, The Taney Court, 99. 
43 Cooley v. Board of Wardens 53 US 299 (1852). 
"Huebner, The Taney Court, 100. 
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interpretation.45 Thus, Curtis had already established himself as a force on the court, and a 
partisan adversary to Taney, before the battle over the fate of Dred Scott. 
The Situation of Dred Scott 
Dred Scott was a slave originally owned by Dr. John Emerson, a man who served as 
a surgeon in the United States army. In 1834, Emerson took Scott from Missouri to the 
military post at Rock Island, Illinois where they remained until the spring of 1836. From 
Rock Island, Scott was taken by his master to another military post in the Louisiana 
Territory which was free until 1838. In 1838, Dr. Emerson brought Scott back to Missouri. 
Based on these events, Scott alleged that his master had taken him to Illinois and the 
Louisiana Territory, and that under the Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1787 and the 
Missouri Compromise of 1820, he had become free. "He sought an adjudication to that 
effect and also holding that he had remained free though thereafter he had been taken to 
Missouri, a slave state."46 Emerson sold Scott to his brother in law, John F.A. Sandford, 
before Scott sued for his freedom, hence rendering the Supreme Court case Dred Scott v. 
Sandford. 
Scott first sued for his freedom in a state court in Missouri. The Missouri Supreme 
Court held that he was not entitled to his freedom. Scott's attorneys then brought suit for 
his freedom in the United States Circuit Court, from whence it eventually reached the 
Supreme Court of the United States. 47 The case was first argued before the Supreme Court 
in 1856. There was a question of whether or not Dred Scott was eligible to sue in a federal 
"Ibid. 
46 Jackson, Dissent ;n the Suprem,e Court, 56. 
47 Smith, Roger B. Taney: Jacksonian Jurist, 159-160. 
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court, and therefore the case was postponed to the next term. At that time, it was re-argued 
with the main questions being whether Scott was eligible to sue and whether or not his 
residence in territories where slavery was prohibited had made him a free man.48 Thus, as 
it came before the Supreme Court, the Dred Scott case clearly presented three issues that had 
been previously debated in many "courtrooms, legislative halls, political meetings, and 
newspapers throughout the country." 49 These were the question of negro citizenship; the status 
of slaves who had been brought to free territory; and, perhaps most importantly, the 
constitutionality of federal legislation which prohibited slavery in these territories. The Court 
was to rule on all three of these issues, reaching a decision that would live in infamy. 
The Dred Scott Decision 
The Dred Scott case could have been resolved by the Supreme Court "on narrow 
grounds that the law of a slave state rather than a free state or territory was outcome 
deterrninative."50 They also could have stated that, "because the litigants were not citizens 
of different states as required for purposes of federal jurisdiction, it could not reach the 
merits of the dispute."51 But instead of following a procedural approach in this regard, the 
Court instead chose to use to the case of Dred Scott v. Sandford to expound upon the 
constitutionality of slavery in its broadest sense. 
Originally, the majority decided that the Missouri Compromise "did not liberate 
Dred Scott under the particular circumstances, and also that it was inoperative to free a 
48 Ibid., 160. 
49 Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case, 235. 
50 Lively, Foreshadows of the Law, 17. 
51 Ibid. 
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slave in any case."52 However, they also agreed that the Court's decision should only refer 
to the particular case of Dred Scott; that is, they would leave "the question of the 
constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise provision for the abolition of slavery in the 
northern Territory ... untouched" and simply make a decision regarding the facts of the 
specific case at hand.53 The majority opinion was to be written in this vein by Justice 
Samuel Nelson. But this was to change, and it was Chief Justice Taney who delivered the 
majority opinion.54 
Justice John McLean advised the Court that he was going to write "a long dissent 
giving his opinion and arguments on the Missouri Compromise and the right of a Negro to 
sue in the federal courts."55 However, because it was widely known that Justice McLean 
wanted to be president of the United States, his action in the Dred Scott case is often 
construed as one that he hoped would give him the Republican nomination. But when 
Justice Curtis also asserted that he would write a "far-flung dissent", the nature of the 
decision changed drastically as the Court "decided to embody in it a discussion of all of the 
questions involved in the case, including the question of the constitutionality of a 
congressional prohibition of slavery in the Territories."56 It was then that Chief Justice 
Taney was assigned the writing of the opinion to himself. 
"Smith. Roger B. Taney: Jacksonian Jurist, 160. 
53 Ibid. 
" Ibid. 
55 Ibid., 161. 
56 Ibid. 
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The Dred Scott decision consisted of nine separate opinions, including two dissents, 
and taking up 241 pages in the United States Reports. 57 Although it was quite apparent that 
most members of the court believed Scott was to remain a slave, Taney went a step further 
in "read[ing] into the Constitution the legality of slavery forever." 58 In this way, it can be 
said that Taney's "majority opinion" was not widely accepted with regard to its judicial 
philosophy. Taney "resented the arrogance of the North on the slavery issue and most 
especially resented the principle, insulting to the South, that lay beneath the North's 
acceptance of the Missouri Compromise: slavery is an evil and must be limited so long as it 
cannot be ended."59 In his opinion, therefore, Taney sought not only to articulate a 
decision based on Scott's particular case, but to justify the institution of slavery on a 
national level by finding its basis in the Constitution. "The Dred Scott decision was the one 
occasion when Taney yielded to the temptation, always disastrous, to save the country, and put 
aside the judicial self-restraint."60 
First, Taney made the assertion that blacks were not considered citizens of the 
United States and therefore had no right to bring suit in the federal court.61 His assertion "that 
an entire racial class was unqualified for citizenship, possessed no rights and properly was 
57 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, (1857). 
"Bork, The Tempting of America, 29. 
59 Ibid. 
6° Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case, 231. 
61 Dred Scott v. Sandford 60 U.S. 393 (1857). Specifically, Taney wrote that "The question before us is, whether the 
class of persons described in the plea in abatement compose a portion of this people, and are constituent members of 
this sovereignty? We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under 
the word "citizens" in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that 
instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States. On the contrary, they were at that time 
considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, 
whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those 
who held the power and the Government might choose to grant them," 60 U.S. 393, 404-405 (1857). 
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relegated to slavery was at best dubious and at worst a perversion of history."62 But he did 
not stop at simply nullifying blacks' rights to American citizenship. He would also state 
that the right of property in slaves was guaranteed by the Constitution. In his opinion he 
declared that Scott had never been free due to the fact that slaves were personal property; the 
right guaranteed to masters by the Constitution. He wrote that according to the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment: 
[T]he rights of property are united with the rights of person, and placed on 
the same ground by the fifth amendment to the Constitution, which provides 
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, and property, without due 
process of law. And an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the 
United States of his life, liberty or property, merely because he came himself 
or brought his property into a particular Territory of the United States, and 
who had committed no offence against the laws, could hardly be dignified 
with the name of due process of law. 63 
With regard to this premise, he also stated that when the federal government enters 
into possession of a territory, "It has no power of any kind beyond [the Constitution]; and it 
cannot ... assume discretionary or despotic powers which the Constitution has denied to 
it."64 Further, he went on to make an analogy between slavery and other rights guaranteed 
by the Constitution. Taney wrote, "no one, we presume, will contend that Congress can 
make any law in a Territory respecting the establishment of religion, or the free exercise 
thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or the right of the people of the 
Territory peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for the redress of 
grievances. Nor can Congress deny to the people the right to keep and bear arms, nor the 
62 Lively, Foreshadows of the Law, 19. 
63 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 450 (1857). 
64 Ibid., 449. 
right to trial by jury, nor compel any one to be a witness against himself in a criminal 
proceeding."65 
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This may be very well true, "but there is no similar constitutional provision that can 
be read with any semblance of plausibility to confer a right to own slaves."66 Although it 
may have been more feasible to make the case that the federal government could not free 
slaves in states where slavery was still permitted without violating the Fifth Amendment's 
due process requirement with regard to property, it was and is a skewed version of 
constitutional interpretation that allows for, or requires, the federal government to permit 
and protect slavery in all of the areas under its control. 
Thus, Taney's Fifth Amendment premise "pushed constitutional principle beyond 
accommodation of slavery to the point of unqualified security for the institution. "67 
Regardless of its questionable validity, Taney's opinion became the law of the land, and 
with his premise regarding the Fifth Amendment also declared the Missouri Compromise of 
1820 was unconstitutional, since the Federal Government had no right to prohibit slavery in the 
new territories. In this way, Taney sanctioned slavery under the terms of the Constitution itself, 
and basically put into law that slavery could not be outlawed or restricted within the United 
States. 
But even beyond the far-reaching and important implications of Taney's decision 
regarding the facts of Dred Scott's case, as well as the fate of slavery, there was yet another 
argument that served to be controversial in Taney's opinion. He also discussed at length 
the duty of the Court with regard to constitutional interpretation: 
65 Dred Scottv. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 449 (1857). 
66 Bork, The Tempting of America., 30. 
67 Lively, Foreshadows of the law, 21. 
It is not the province of the court to decide upon the justice or injustice, the policy 
or impolicy, of these laws. The decision of that question belonged to the political 
or law-making power; to those who formed the sovereignty and framed the 
Constitution. The duty of the court is, to interpret the instrument they have 
framed, with the best lights we can obtain on the subject, and to administer it as 
we find it, according to its true intent and meaning when it was adopted.68 
It was this statement regarding the original meaning of the Constitution which would 
move Justice Curtis to write a dissent that would be regarded as almost as influential as 
the majority opinion. 
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"We Have No Longer a Constitution; We Are Under the Government of Individual 
Men" 
The dissenting opinions in Dred Scott v. Sandford were "two of the three longest" in 
the case, constituting about 44 per cent of the total judicial wordage."69 Perhaps more 
important than what many consider the horrifying assertions of Taney's opinion, were the 
responses to his opinion in the dissents, especially that of Justice Curtis, whose opinion 
was generally regarded as "more thorough, scholarly, and polished" than the dissent of 
Justice McLean. 7° Curtis became "the judicial icon of the antislavery cause with his 
powerful dissent. .. " where his, "lengthy opinion took aim at both of Chief Justice Taney's 
major conclusions: that blacks lacked any claims to citizenship and that Congress had no 
power over slavery in the territories.'.71 
In the opening of his dissent in Dred Scott, Curtis "announced that he dissociated 
himself from the opinion of the Chief Justice and from the judgment of the majority of the 
68 Dred Scott v. Sandford 60 U.S. 393, 405 (1857). 
69 Fehrenbacher, Slavery, Law, and Politics, (New York: Oxford, 1981), 221. 
70Ibid. 
71 Huebner, The Taney Court, 100. 
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Court'', a careful distinction that was necessary for his argument. 72 His argument was 
formed by responding to the assertions of Taney's opinion: first, that blacks were not 
citizens; and, second, that they were to be regarded as property and thus must be 
guaranteed to their masters under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In 
responding to Taney's first claim, Curtis stated that before 1789, "U.S. citizenship was 
synonymous with state citizenship; the Articles of Confederation prohibited Congress from 
making any citizenship rules, and the Constitution itself referred to 'citizens at the time of 
the adoption of the Constitution' ."73 Because "all free native-born inhabitants of the States of 
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and North Carolina, though descended 
from African slaves, were not only citizens of those States, but such of them as had the other 
necessary qualifications possessed the franchise of electors, on equal terms with other citizens,"74 
and "under the Constitution of the United States, every free person born on the soil of a 
State, who is a citizen of that State by force of its Constitution and laws, is also a citizen of 
72 Hopkins, Dred Scott's Case, 82. Fehrenbacher summarizes Curtis' argument as stating the following:"!. 
According to the Marshall Court formula, nothing in the law of Missouri could deprive Dred Scott of his rights 
under the diverse-citizenship clause, provided that he was a citizen of the United States and a resident of Missouri at 
the time of bringing suit. 2. Since his residence had not been controverted, the only question was whether Scott's 
African ancestry and slave parentage made him ineligible for United States citizenship 3. If any person of such 
background could be a United States citizen, Scott had the right to claim citizenship, since no other reason for 
excluding him had been advanced in the plea in abatement. 4. United States citizenship antedated the Constitution. 
This was indicated by the language of Article Two, Section Four, referring to "a citizen of the United States at the 
time of adoption of the Constitution." 5. The Confederation was a government of severely limited authority and had 
been delegated no power "to act on any question of citizenship, or to make any rules in respect thereto." The matter 
was left entirely in the hands of the states, and thus United States citizenship was synonymous with state citizenship 
in 1789. 6. Under the Confederation government, free Negroes in five states, being recognized as citizens of their 
respective states, were also citizens of the United States. 7. There was nothing in the Constitution which, prorio 
vigore, deprived any class of persons of citizenship possessed at the time of its adoption. 8. The Constitution in fact 
neither defined citizenship nor invested Congress with any authority to do so, except in regard ta naturalization of 
aliens ... 9. The plea in abatement therefore showed no facts inconsistent with Dred Scott's being a United States 
citizen or a resident of Missouri, entitled to bring suit in federal court", 223-224. 
73 Huebner, The Taney Court, lOO. 
74 Dred Scott v. Sandford 60 U.S. 393, 410 (1857). 
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the United States,"75 blacks had a valid claim to citizenship. In addition, Curtis interpreted 
the Territories Clause of the Constitution broadly, "so as to grant Congress power to 
organize and govern territories in whatever way it wished. This included the power to pass 
legislation pertaining to slavery, as Congress had done with the Northwest Ordinance of 
1787."76 
With regard to Taney's second argument concerning the Due Process Clause, Curtis 
also offered a strong response. Here, he concluded that it was most 
rational to conclude that they who framed and adopted the Constitution were 
aware that persons held to service under the laws of a State are property only 
to the extent and under the conditions fixed by those laws; that they must 
cease to be available as property, when their owners voluntarily place them 
permanently within another jurisdiction, where no municipal laws on the 
subject of slavery exist; and that, being aware of these principles, and having 
said nothing to interfere with or displace them, or compel Congress to 
legislate in any particular manner on the subject, and having empowered 
Congress to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the Territory of 
the United States, it was their intention to leave to the discretion of Congress 
what regulations, if any, should be made concerning slavery therein.77 
75 Dred Scott v. Sandford 60 U.S. 393, 418 (1857). 
76 Huebner, The Taney Courr, J 00. Curtis himself wrote in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 'That Congress has some power 
to institute temporary Governments over the territory, 1 believe all agree; and, if it be admitted that the necessity of 
some power to govern the territory of the United States could not and did not escape the attention of the Convention 
and the people, and that the necessity is so great, that1 in the absence of any express grant, it is strong enough to raise 
an implication of the existence of that power, it would seem to follow that it is also strong enough to afford material 
aid in construing an express grant of power respecting that territory; and that they who maintain the existence of the 
power, without finding any words at all in which it is conveyed, should be willing to receive a reasonable 
interpretation of language of the Constitution, manifestly intended to relate to the territory, and to convey to 
Congress some authority concerning it," 495. He further states, ''There was to be established by the Constitution a 
frame of government, under which the people of the United States and their posterity were to continue indefinitely. 
To take one of its provisions, the language of which is broad enough to extend throughout the existence of the 
Government, and embrace all territory belonging to the United States throughout all time, and the purposes and 
objects of which apply to all territory of the United States, and narrow it down to territory belonging to the United 
States when the Constitution was framed, while at the same time it is admitted that the Constitution contemplated 
and authorized the acquisition, from time to time, of other and foreign territory, seems to me to be an interpretation 
as inconsistent with the nature and purposes of the instrument, as it is with its language, and I can have no hesitation 
in rejecting it. I construe this clause, therefore, as if it had read, Congress shall have power to make all needful rules 
and regulations respecting those tracts of country, out of the limits of the several States, which the United States 
have acquired, or may hereafter acquire, by cessions, as well of the jurisdiction as of the soil, so far as the soil may 
be the property of the party making the cession, at the time of making it." Dred Scott v. Sandford 60 U.S. 393, 503 
(1857) (Curtis, B., dissenting). 
77 Dred Scottv. Sandford 60 U.S. 393, 530 (1857). 
But what was perhaps Curtis' strongest point was that which suggested that Taney 
and the majority who joined him had gone too far with regard to their explication of 
constitutional principle. His words merit full quotation. 
With the weight of either of these considerations, when presented to 
Congress to influence its action, this court has no concern. One or the other 
may be justly entitled to guide or control the legislative judgment upon what 
is a needful regulation. The question here is, whether they are sufficient to 
authorize this court to insert into this clause of the Constitution an exception 
of the exclusion or allowance of slavery, not found therein, nor in any other 
part of that instrument. To engraft on any instrument a substantive exception 
not found in it, must be admitted to be a matter attended with great difficulty. 
And the difficulty increases with the importance of the instrument, and the 
magnitude and complexity of the interests involved in its construction. To 
allow this to be done with the Constitution, upon reasons purely political, 
renders its judicial interpretation impossible - because judicial tribunals, as 
such, cannot decide upon political considerations. Political reasons have not 
the requisite certainty to afford rules of juridical interpretation. They are 
different in different men. They are different in the same men at different 
times. And when a strict interpretation of the Constitution, according to the 
fixed rules which govern the interpretation of laws, is abandoned, and the 
theoretical opinions of individuals are allowed to control its meaning, we 
have no longer a Constitution; we are under the government of individual 
men, who for the time being have power to declare what the Constitution is, 
according to their own views of what it ought to mean. When such a method 
of interpretation of the Constitution obtains, in place of a republican 
government, with limited and defined powers, we have a government which 
is merely an exponent of the will of Congress; or what, in my opinion, would 
not be preferable, an exponent of the individual political opinions of the 
members of this court.7 
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This "learned, crisp, and well reasoned" argument is what makes Curtis deserving of 
the name judicial leader.79 "In his Dred Scott dissent. .. Curtis showed signs of judicial 
greatness, as he thoroughly outmatched the chief justice."80 This is not mere speculation, 
or undeserving praise of Curtis, as Taney himself took the extraordinary step of re-writing 
78 Dred Scott v. Sandford 60 U.S. 393, 518-520 (1857). [Emphasis Supplied]. 




his majority opinion before publishing it in order to respond to Curtis' claims. Soon after 
the Dred Scott decision was announced from the Bench, Taney's majority opinion "was 
caught in a crossfire of lavish Democratic praise and Republican denunciation."81 But what was 
more interesting than the controversy surrounding the majority opinion was that its contents were 
not released for publication promptly as the full texts of the dissenting opinions were. All that 
the public had knowledge of with regard to Taney's opinion was a summary written by an 
Associated Press reporter and printed in major newspapers. 82 
On April 2, Justice Curtis wrote a letter to William T. Carroll, Clerk of the Supreme 
Court, asking for a copy of Justice Taney's opinion when it was available for publication. Curtis 
received a reply from Carroll stating that the Chief Justice had advised him not to circulate any 
copies of the printed opinion before it was officially published in the reports. Curtis responded 
that Taney could surely not extend this rule to the other members of the Court, but was again 
denied a copy of the opinion when Carroll replied that the directive applied to everyone, as was 
confirmed by the Chief Justice himself. 83 
After receiving Carroll's reply Curtis penned a letter to Taney himself on April 18, 
asking for an explanation for what seemed to be a strange directive with regard to the majority 
opinion. In this letter, Curtis stated that, surely, Taney did not mean to keep the opinion from 
him. Taney responded harshly in saying, 
It would seem from your letter to me that you suppose you are entitled to demand 
[the opinion] as a right, being one of the members of the tribunal. This would 
undoubtedly be the case if you wished it to aid you in the discharge of your 
official duties. But I understood you as not desiring or intending it for that 
81 Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case, 316. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Benjamin R. Curtis, ed. A Memoir of Benjamin Robbins Curtis, LL.D. (2 vols; Boston, 1879), I, 212-213, 216. 
purpose. On the contrary, you announced from the Bench that you regarded this 
opinion as extra judicial - and not binding upon you or anyone else. 84 
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Thus, "Taney made it plain that he resented the content of Curtis' dissenting opinion, as 
well as its early release for publication."85 But there would be even more blatant admission by 
Taney later in the exchange of letters concerning his resentment for Curtis and his dissent, as 
well as the way he intended to respond to it. After receiving Taney's stinging response, Curtis 
wrote to the Chief Justice again on May 13, in which he protested Taney's questioning his 
motives, discussed the particular situation of the restriction and whether or not Taney and two 
other justices indeed had the authority to impose it. Curtis implied that the directive violated the 
rules of the Court in withholding an opinion for an extended period of time. 86 The Chief Justice 
did not reply calmly. 
After the official publication of the Dred Scott decision in May, Taney finally responded 
to Curtis' letter. In an eleven-page missive, Taney answered assertions in Curtis' letter that he 
believed could not be "passed by without notice." Taney claimed that in writing a dissent 
without announcing it to the Court served to discredit the authority of the Court's majority 
opinion, especially when its goal was "impair [the majority opinion's] authority and discredit it 
as a judicial decision."87 With regard to the assertion that he had substantively changed his 
opinion since the time it was pronounced from the bench, Taney stated 
There is not one historical fact, nor one principle of constitutional law, or 
common law, or chancery law, or statute law in the printed opinion which was not 
distinctly announced and maintained from the Bench; nor is there any one 
historical fact, or principle, or point of law, which was affirmed in the opinion 
from the Bench, omitted or modified, or in any degree altered, in the printed 
84 Ibid., 213-215, 217-230. 
85 Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case, 317. 
86 Curtis, A Memoir of Benjamin Robbins Curtis, I , 213-216 
87 Ibid. 
opinion ... And until the Court heard them denied, it had not though it necessary to 
refer to proofs and authorities to support them - regarding the historical facts and 
principles of law which were stated in the opinion as too well established to be 
open to dispute. BB 
In arguing that there were certain elements of the majority decision that had to be elucidated 
given the dissents, Taney all but stated outright that his revisions to the opinion were mainly to 
serve as a rebuttal to the arguments of Curtis in his dissenting opinion. 
Curtis compared Taney's published opinion with his memory of what had been given 
from the Bench. He concluded that at least eighteen pages of additional remarks had been 
inserted into the opinion, and insisted that "No one [could] read them without perceiving that 
they are in reply to [his] opinion."B9 Unfortunately, Taney's original majority opinion was not 
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preserved or well-documented, but there was a historical analysis by Don E. Fehrenbacher which 
sought to analyze Curtis' claims about the differences between Taney's two opinions. 
Fehrenbacher first points to the fact that "the Chief Justice read his opinion on March 6 in 
two hours or a little more, but at his measured pace, the published version (containing 23,000 
words) would have required at least three hours for reading. ff so, the opinion was ultimately 
expanded 50%, making it some eighteen pages longer, as Curtis calculated."90 Secondly, and 
perhaps more conclusively, Fehrenbacher argues that given two different sets of page proofs of 
the Taney opinion preserved by the National Archives, "handwritten additions to the proofs 
constitute about eight pages of the version finally published."91 When the fact that Taney added 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid., 229. 
90 Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case, 320. 
91 Ibid. He goes into detail aboul these additions, and states that the three most lengthy are as follows: 1) Five 
paragraphs supplementing a passage of three paragraphs in which Taney defended the right of the Court to examine 
the facts in the case after having upheld the plea in abatement. All eight paragraphs are plainly rebuttal to the 
assertion of Curtis (and McLean) that much of Taney's opinion was without authority; 2) Fifteen paragraphs in 
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eight pages after it had been typeset originally, "it is not difficult to believe that he had expanded 
the original manuscript by as much as ten pages before he sent it to the printer", thus 
substantiating Curtis' claim and underscoring the importance of Curtis' dissent both in the 
crafting of the majority opinion of the Court on which he sat and in the future of American 
jurisprudence. 
Perhaps the effectiveness of this dissent is best described by the leading historian of 
the case: 
Curtis's opinion, especially when read head-on against Taney's, is very 
impressive. One cannot entirely suppress the suspicion that the hostility 
displayed by the Chief Justice in the aftermath of the decision was partly 
inspired by the realization that he had been badly beaten in the argument by 
his much younger colleague from Massachusetts.92 
A Reliance on Constitutional Principle 
The framers who were most concerned with establishing union under the 
Constitution left the "disruptive slavery question largely open for future resolution."93 
Exactly seventy years later, Taney's response to a question, deliberately left open in 1787, 
was that the "act of Congress which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning property 
on this land in the territory of the United States .. .is not warranted by the Constitution and 
is therefore void. "94 But this reasoning was not to go unchallenged, as alternate view was 
offered by Justice Benjamin Curtis, who dissented in Dred Scott, and thus "destroyed 
which Taney attempted to reconcile his views on the territory clause with those of John Marshal1 in Arnerican 
Insurance Company v. Canter. This was likewise rebuttal, but primarily to McLean rather than Curtis; 3) Three 
paragraphs near the end of the opinion denouncing the manner in which the case had been brought before the 
Supreme Court. This introduced a new question that had not been argued by counsel. 
92 Ibid., 229. 
93 Lively, Foreshadows of the Law, 21. 
94 Ibid. 
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Taney's reasoning, and rested his own conclusions upon the original understanding of those 
who made the Constitution."95 
If Curtis's opinion seems more convincing than the opinions of the Court majority, 
"it is not merely because [he was] by modern standards, on the right side. Curtis ... 
displayed a fundamental agreement on the major issues that contrasted sharply with the 
heterogeneity of the majority's reasoning."96 It was his reliance on constitutional principle, 
and the original meaning of the text that grounded his argument and made him able to 
articulate the ways in which the Court had been lead astray by the majority's political 
passions over the slavery question. 
95 Bork, The Tempting of America, 33. 
96 Fehrenbacher, Slaveiy, Law and Politics, 229. 
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"OUR CONSTITUTION IS COLOR-BLIND" 
Dred Scott was not the only infamous case regarding race relations to be decided by the 
Court. 1 In 1896, it was again faced with the issue of race in Plessy v. Ferguson, a case that 
focused on the constitutionality of segregation. Once again, a great dissenter, John 
Marshall Harlan, warned that the otherwise unanimous majority was misconstruing the 
meaning of the Constitution as it pertained to race relations. In what has been referred to 
as "perhaps the most eloquent and prophetic dissent in the whole history of the United States 
Supreme Court," Harlan set out to make a plea not only to the Court at that moment, but to the 
public and to posterity.2 Although he could not prevent the majority from handing down a 
decision that would "in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal 
in the Dred Scott case," he at least rendered the force of the opinion weak, as it was his "cry in 
the wilderness" that is perhaps most remembered. 3 
The Remnants of Dred Scott 
The Dred Scott decision had many repercussions in the years that followed. For those 
opposed to slavery and its expansion, "the decision meant that America had gone from being a 
1 Harvey Fireside, Separate and Unequal: Homer Plessy and the Supreme Court Decision that Legalized Racism 
(New York: Carroll & Graf, 2004), 7. Fireside writes, "Plessy v. Ferguson,'" was "second only to Dred Scott v. 
Sandford as the most likely candidate for the all-time most shameful chapter in U.S. Supreme Court annals." 
2 Alan Barth, Prophets with Honor: Great Dissents and Great Dissenters in the Supreme Court (New York: Alfred 
A Knopf, 1974), 32. 
3 Plesry v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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nation with slave states to a slave nation."; After the decision was handed down, many groups of 
abolitionists became adamant about demise of slavery, and often turned to violence to promote 
their aims. Where the slaves themselves were concerned, their earlier hope of escaping to the 
North was no longer feasible as "there would be no quarter, no hope of freedom, and no place to 
run."
5 Abraham Lincoln declared Dred Scott an erroneous ruling in a speech before the Illinois 
legislature, also stating the Republican view that the "negro [is] a man; that his bondage is 
cruelly wrong, and that the field of his oppression ought not to be enlarged."6 Thus, given its 
many implications, "Dred Scott ... probably helped to promote the Civil War, as it certainly 
required the Civil War to bury its dicta."7 
When the Civil War came to an end, three new constitutional amendments came into 
effect based on the new situation of former slaves in the Union. These amendments included the 
Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery and its remnants everywhere in the Union; the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which guaranteed (amongst other things) equal protection under the 
law; and the Fifteenth Amendment which was adopted for the purpose of assuring citizenship 
and suffrage to the freedmen. Together, these amendments gave new shape to the Constitution 
and the laws of the nation. Under the newly amended Constitution, it appeared as though slavery 
and its ideological remnants were finally truly abolished. This, however, was little more than lip 
service, as the reality of local law in the South regarded the Constitutional amendments as far 
from being the law of the land. 
4 Keith Weldon Medley, We as Freemen: Plessy v. Ferguson (Gretna, LA: Pelican Pub. Co., 2003), 73. 
5 Ibid., 72. 
6 Abraham Lincoln, Lincoln's Speech on the Dred Scott Decision, 26 June 1857. 
7 Bernard Schwattz, A History of the Supreme Court (New York: Oxford, 1993), 120-121. 
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Even after the adoption of the new constitutional amendments, most southern states 
passed so-called Black Codes in 1865 and 1866, which "virtually reimpos[ed] the caste divisions 
of the old slave system."8 In response, "the United States Supreme Court in the 1870s ushered in 
a Jong procession of rulings that limited the scope of the Reconstruction Jaws and constitutional 
amendments ... ," but, "as the Supreme Court overturned or narrowed civil-rights statutes, states 
enacted more discriminatory laws."9 This "intransigence" of the southern states in refusing to 
abide by the new amendments and to proceed to effectively reintroduce slavery enraged 
congressional radicals and, in tum, caused them to mandate a military occupation of the South. 10 
This occupation was part of the "reconstruction" of the South which was begun by 
Lincoln at the end of the war. Reconstruction was to play an important role in the formation of 
local and national Jaw as "the gulf between presidential and congressional plans for 
Reconstruction widened after Lincoln's death on April 15, 1865." 11 When Andrew Johnson, 
Lincoln's Democratic vice president, assumed the presidency, it was made clear that this 
Tennessean who had stayed Joyal to the Union after his state's secession may have begun to 
remember his roots. During his presidency, Johnson attempted to continue Lincoln's 
Reconstruction policies, "but he lacked his predecessor's intelligence, stature, or powers of 
persuasion." 12 In addition to these differences between Lincoln and Johnson, President Johnson 
was a slaveholder himself and had said that the United States was "a country of white men and a 
8 Fireside, Separate and Unequal, 34-35. Specifically, under lhese Black Codes "several states decreed that Negroes 
eould be employed only as workers in agriculture or domestic service .... So1ne states forbade Negroes the 
ownership of weapons or alcohol. They were generally denied the right to vote, were barred from serving on juries, 
and kept from testifying in cases where whites were the parties." See also C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career 
of Jim Crow (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974). 
9 Medley, We as Freemen, 90. 
10 Fireside, Separate and Unequal, 34-35 
11 Ibid., 36. 
12 Ibid. 
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government of white men."13 Thus, his attitude toward the Southern states and the laws 
pertaining to African Americans which they enacted during the time of Reconstruction, was not 
that they were unconstitutional aberrations, but were instead necessary local laws that should not 
be regarded as unconstitutional. 
President Johnson's southern sympathies and "his refusal to budge on measures to bring 
badly needed help to the four million freed slaves," were not the only factors in shaping his 
Reconstruction policies. 14 There was also a partisan issue occurring in Washington at the time. 
After Lincoln's assassination, a clash between Congress and the President came about due to the 
"political ambitions of the parties in Washington as well as their different attitudes towards 
Negroes"15 . Johnson, who was a staunch Southern Democrat, "was eager to revive his party in 
the South," just as the Republicans who had control of Congress "wanted to postpone the 
enfranchisement of former Confederates because their votes might give pernianent national 
control to Democrats in Congress and the White House." 16 In addition, if former slaves and 
freedmen were given the vote, their Radical Republican votes might serve to ensure long term 
possession of the government. In this way, "the chief casualty of Reconstruction's failure was, 
of course, the freedman, the black, who was supposed to be its chief beneficiary. He became, 
instead, a helpless pawn in a fierce struggle for national political advantage," a struggle which 
the Democrats won.17 
13 Fireside, Separate and Unequal, 34-35. Northern newspapers ridiculed Johnson for being soft on the 
Confederacy, and his stalemate with Congress over the next year made him increasingly unpopular. Another issue 
mirroring the rift between the executive and legislative branches was the Reconstruction Act of 1867 which 
Congress passed over Johnson's veto on March 2, 1867. 




"It is crucial to an understanding of the Plessy case to fathom the depth of American 
racism at the time, as lawyers and judges could not help but be affected by it."18 In the years 
following the war and Reconstruction, the South "remained imprisoned in its own bitterness," 
and, feeling their defeat, the southern states and the individuals that comprised them "clung 
fanatically to [the] primary social principle that the black was an inferior, subordinate creature in 
relation to whom the white man - any white man - must be considered a master." 19 In the 
absence of the formal institution of slavery to justify racial superiority, many other explanations 
were contrived as to why whites would always be superior to those of the Negro race. 
Pre-war slaveholders had used biblical references to justify the need for white domination 
of black laborers "for their own good."20 Post-war southerners did not only look for biblical 
justification, but also academic findings from sociologists and other new social sciences which 
"claimed to provide scientific grounds for old prejudices."21 The theories were "both illogical 
and circular," but came to be known as gospel truth with regard to the need for racial 
discrimination and, "at least, the futility of enacting measures to upgrade the status of 
freedpeople, who were said to be innately fit only for unskilled labor."22 
In addition to the biblical, sociological, and scientific justifications used to justify racial 
discrimination and its manifestation in the law, another factor and perhaps "most direct trigger 
for the initial wave of Jim Crow legislation" was an increasing "black unwillingness to defer to 
17 Barth, Prophets with Honor, 24-25. 
18 Fireside, Separate and Unequal, 49. 
19 Barth, Prophets with Honor, 25. 
'° Fireside, Separate and Unequal, 49. Of course, the abolitionists and slaves also drew inspiration from scripture, 
especially the story of the Jewish exodus from Egypt. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid, 49-50. 
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whites."21 As a new generation of blacks who had never been subjected to the evils of slavery or 
its remnants in the black codes came into existence, discrimination and the laws that fostered it 
were increasingly challenged. "Negro newspapers perceived growing black assertiveness in the 
face of indignities inflicted by whites; and among the white population, stories of 'uppity' 
Negroes increased during the 1880s."24 Obviously, the newfound assertiveness of a new 
generation of blacks "no more 'caused' Jim Crow legislation than did the other ingredients 
already surveyed; but it evoked interpretations from the politically dominant race that produced 
the result."25 Thus, there was a harsh development with regard to race relations in South "a caste 
system in which the black became the American untouchable."26 
The First Jim Crow Law to Come into Being 
In 1881, Tennessee became the first Southern state to pass a law segregating railroad 
cars.27 It legislatively mandated "the equal-but-separate principle" with regard to transportation. 
This legislation was based on "a measure passed six years earlier that had abrogated the 
common-law duty of common carriers, hotels, and places of amusement to serve anyone who is 
willing and able to pay and is otherwise presentable in appearance and demeanor" which was 
23 Charles A. Lofgren, The Plessy Case: a Legal-Historical Interpretation (New York: Oxford University Press. 
1987), 25. 
24 Ibid. Lofgren writes, "The immediate context of Alabama's separate car law, significantly, was the threat of a 
series of black suits directed against the state's railways as a means of improving service. White attitudes made the 
problem worse, as Texas Governor James S. Hogg candidly admitted when he asked for a stronger Jim Crow Law in 
1891, stating, 'Insolence on one side, and intolerance on the other, unnecessarily exhibited by the disturbing 
elements of both races, have borne this fruit.• Even incidents of white violence against Negroes could be put to use, 
as in Georgia where one state representative argued that a separate car law would aid in ·preventing little riots' on 
railways," 25. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Barth. Prophets with Honor, 25. 
27 Medley, We as Freemen. 90. 
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adopted in part as a response to the federal Civil Rights Act of 1875, a law that was "interpreted 
as banning discrimination in facilities that had common-law duties to serve the public."28 The 
law enacted by Tennessee as a response, "in effect legalized the practice of charging blacks first-
class railway fares but assigning them to inferior coaches," and led to a complete disregard of the 
equality for African Americans mandated by the federal govemment.29 When this was signed 
into law by the governor, this became "the first 'Jim Crow' law" to come into being.30 
Six years after the Separate Car Act became Tennessee law, many other Southern states 
followed suit, passing mandatory Jim Crow transportation laws. Many of these laws were 
enacted prior to the case of Plessy v. Ferguson in I 896, and "included measures in Florida 
(1887), Mississippi (1888), Texas (1889 and 1891), Louisiana (1890 and 1894), Alabama (1891), 
Arkansas (1891 and 1893), Georgia (1891), and Kentucky (1892)."31 
It was Louisiana's version of the law which would eventually spark the controversy that 
ended up before the nation's highest court. Introduced as House Bill number 42 by 
Representative Joseph Saint Arnant of Ascension Parish, this law claimed to "promote the 
comfort of passengers in railway trains.'.32 However, what the Separate Car Act really did was 
deny people of different races the right to travel together.33 Specifically, the law stated 
that the officers of passenger trains shall have power and are hereby required to assign 
each passenger to the coach or compartment used for the race to which such passenger 
belongs; any person insisting on going into a coach or compartment to which by race he 
28 Lofgren, The Plessy Case, 21. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid, 22. 
32 Medley, We as Freemen, 95. 
33 Ibid., 96. "In the case of interracial couples, the law physically separated husbands, wives, and children .... Like 
the black codes of old, the law classified peopk by ancescry. Indeed, for Louisiana legislators of African heritage, 
the law prohibited them from traveling with their fellow government officials or many of their constituents." 
does not belong, shall be liable to a fine of Twenty Five Dollars or in lieu thereof to 
imprisonment for a period of not more [than] twenty days in the Parish Prison.34 
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"To those who remembered days before the Civil War, the Separate Car Act was reminiscent of 
the Dred Scott decision and the limiting caste system before the war."35 
This act however, was not to go unchallenged. In September 1891, black leaders of New 
Orleans "realized how their rights were being whittled away, year by year, their achievements 
disparaged by stereotypes of Negroes as constitutionally inferior" and therefore formed the 
"Citizens' Committee to Test the Constitutionality of the Separate Car Law."36 They recognized 
that in order to disprove "the caricatures of themselves in white newspapers and witless 
malcontents," that they would have to challenge local laws and notions in federal court.37 Even 
though it was a possibility, and what turned out to be a reality, that the white race would once 
again triumph, they believed that it was necessary to at least make sure that their voice was 
heard. 
Under the leadership of Louis Martinet, a New Orleans attorney and physician, the 
Citizens' Committee to Test the Constitutionality of the Separate Car Law began its work. 
Martinent called for funds so to "make a case, a test case, and bring it before the Federal Courts 
on the grounds of the invasion of the right [of] a person to travel through the States 
unmolested."38 After lengthy discussions regarding how best to test the constitutionality of the 
Separate Car Law, Homer A. Plessy, a man who was only one-eighth black and therefore 
34 The Separate Car Act, Section 2, Act 111, 1890 Louisiana Legislature. 
35 Medley, We as Freemen, 96. 
36 Fireside, Separate and Unequal, 55. 
37 lbid. 
38 Quoted in Lofgren, The Plessy Case, 29. 
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appeared to be Caucasian, was entrusted with the task of boarding a white car in a Louisiana 
train and challenging the constitutionality of the segregationist policies regarding 
. 39 transportat10n. 
"I Have to Tell You, According to Louisiana Law, I am a Colored Man" 
On June 7, 1892, Homer Adolph Plessy waited at the Press Street depot in New Orleans 
for a local train to Covington, a town thirty miles north near the Louisiana-Mississippi border.40 
Plessy was dressed similarly to the other first class passengers, in a suit and hat, and with regard 
to his outward appearance appeared to be of the white race. But as was menlioned earlier, this 
outward appearance was not completely accurate as P!essy was "of mixed descent, in the 
proportion of seven-eighths Caucasian and one-eighth African blood."41 He purchased a first 
class ticket, climbed aboard the train, and after taking his seat handed his ticket to J .J. Dowling, a 
conductor of the East Louisiana Railroad Company. This could have been the beginning of a 
very dull story of a two- hour train ride based on the facts of the situation thus far. However, this 
all changed when Plessy uttered a few fateful words. "I have to tell you," he said to the 
39 Options discussed by Martinet and others for testing constitutionality included having a mulatto woman who was 
nearly whlte try to board an an white car, having a black man book a ticket fron1 out of sate, and having a black man 
try to buy a sleeper ticket and be refused after a white man received one, amongst others. Lofgren, The Plessy Case, 
30-34. 
40 The facts of the case are stated as such in the opinion: "that on June 7, 1892, he engaged and paid for a first class 
passage on the East Louisiana Railway from New Orleans to Covington, in the same St.ate, and thereupon entered a 
passenger train, and took possession of a vacant seat in a coach where passengers of the white race were 
acconuno<late<l; that such railroad company was incorporated by the laws of Louisiana as a common carrier, and was 
not authorized to distinguish between citizens according to their race. But. notwithstanding this, petitioner was 
required by the conductor, under penalty of ejection from said train and imprisonment, to vacate said coach and 
occupy another seat in a coach assigned by said company for persons not of the white race, and for no other reason 
than that petitioner was of the colored race; that upon petitioner's refusal to comply with such order, he was, with the 
aid of a police officer, forcibly ejected from said coach and hurried off to and imprisoned in the parish jail of New 
Orleans, and there held to answer a charge made by such officer to the effect that he was guilty of having criminally 
violated an act of the General Assembly of the State, approved July l 0, 1890, in such case made and provided." 
Plessy v. Fer~uson 163 U.S. 537, 539 (1896). 
41 Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537, 539 (l 896). The case also notes, "that the mixture of colored blood was not 
discernible in him." 
69 
conductor of the train, "according to Louisiana law, I am a colored man. "42 As Plessy resembled 
all of the other passengers with regard to race and outward appearance, the conductor was utterly 
confused at his statement. But, in admitting to "some obviously remote Negro ancestry, Plessy 
was by definition of state Jaw, not a white man" and therefore unfit to ride in the first class 
. f h . 43 carnage o t e tram. 
Dowling, the conductor, informed Plessy that according to Louisiana Jaw, he had to move 
to the "colored" or Jim Crow car. Plessy, "showed outward signs of nervousness," and repeated 
"that he had properly bought a first-class ticket and was therefore entitled to stay right where he 
was. He politely but firmly refused the conductor's repeated order to move from his cushioned 
seat to the wooden benches of the Jim Crow car, which were set aside for Negroes, drunks, and 
derelicts."44 Due to Plessy's insistence and the fact that many of the other passengers were 
becoming impatient, Dowling called out for police assistance. 
Soon after Dowling's request, Chris C. Cain identified himself as a private detective, and 
quickly came to the conductor's aid. Dowling explained the situation to the officer, and Plessy 
was asked to leave the train. "Without offering any form of argument or resistance, Plessy was 
taken by Officer Cain to the Fifth Precinct police station ... where he was booked for violating the 
1890 Separate Car Act, and then jailed for the remainder of the night."45 
Plessy was released on bail from a bondsman he had hired before the event took place. 
Soon after, his trial was scheduled for nearly five months later on October 28 before Judge John 
42 Fireside, Separate and Unequal, !, and Barth, Prophets with Honor, 31, recount similar versions of the facts of 
the case. 
43 Fireside, Separate and Unequal, 1-2. 
44 Barth, Prophets with Honor, 31; Fireside, Separate and Unequal, 2. 
45 Ibid. 
H. Ferguson of the state criminal district court.46 James C. Walker served as Plessy's attorney, 
and filed a brief on October 14 stating his major argument in Plessy's defense. His argument 
was as follows: 
that the Louisiana law clashed with the United States Constitution, specifically, 
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments that had been ratified at the end of the 
Civil War. In short, Walker said, the state had undermined Plessy's rights as an 
American citizen. Although slavery had been abolished in 1865 by the Thirteenth 
Amendment, Louisiana had attached to Plessy a 'badge of slavery' hy confining 
him to a segregated 'colored car'. Louisiana's official excuse - that its action was 
promoting the comfort of passengers - was not a good enough reason for 
enforcing a law that treated Plessy as a second class citizen, thereby flying in the 
face of the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition against any state's abridging the 
"privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States."47 
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This argument would be denied by Judge Perguson, and later taken to the Supreme Court of the 
United States. 
An Unfriendly Reception from the Supreme Court .Justices 
Plessy had a broad base of support in New Orleans and a new defense lawyer, Albion 
Tourgee, by the time his appeal reached the Supreme Court. The only question that remained 
was how the justices would rule. In "sizing up their chances with the Supreme Court after their 
preliminary loss in the Louisiana courts," Plessy and his supporters did not find the "receptive 
forum [they] had anticipated."48 In October 1893, Tourgee, wrote to Louis Martinet who had 
organized Plessy's act of civil disobedience in New Orleans, and informed him "that their appeal 
faced an unfriendly reception from the Supreme Court justices."49 Five of them, Tourgee stated, 
were "against us," and, "four of their number would probably stay that way until Gabriel blows 
46 Fireside, Separate and Unequal, 3. 
47 Quoted in Fireside, Separate and Unequal, 4. 
48 Fireside, Separate and Unequal, 176. 
"Ibid., 169. 
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his horn."50 Only one justice, clearly Justice John Marshall Harlan who had been the lone 
dissenter in the Civil Rights Cases, was "known to favor the view we must stand upon."51 
The Chief Justice at that time was Melville W. Fuller, who had been appointed by 
Presidenl Grover Cleveland in March 1888 to succeed Chief Justice Morrison Waite.52 Fuller, 
who was known to share President Cleveland's views, was a man who came from an old New 
England family and had briefly attended Harvard Law School53 ; but he was not the Chief Justice 
for whom Plessy had hoped. Fuller '·had supported Stephen Douglas against Abraham Lincoln 
and later expressed sympathy for the South during the Civil War."54 Even more detrimental to 
Plessy's case, "Fuller also announced his belief that the Fourteenth Amendment had produced 
'no revolutionary change,' hence there was little use to Negro victims of discrirnination."55 
Finally, Fuller "became known for dubious opinions" during his tenure: "invalidating the federal 
income tax (though the result was overturned by the Sixteenth Amendment), and finding the 
Sherman Antitrust Act not applicable to the Sugar Trust because manufacture for sale was not 
deemed 'commerce' ."56 
One of the other justices who would prove to be integral to Plessy's case was Henry 
Billings Brown, who would draft the Plessy decision. A graduate of Yale University, Brown's 
contacts brought him to the notice of President Benjamin Harrison, who appointed him to the 
5° Fireside, Separate and Unequal, 176. 
51 Ibid. 
52 He specifically favored his views on sound currency and protective tariffs. 
53 This made Fuller the first chief justice with academic legal training. Curtis, as discussed in Chapter 2. was the 
first associate justice to be trained at a law school. 




Supreme Court in 1890.57 While on the Court, Brown was "protective of business and property 
rights," and, "generally wrote opinions that legitimated social conditions and precedents of the 
day"; this made him a logical choice as author of the Plessy decision. 58 But what was most 
troubling about the man who would effectively decide Homer Plessy's fate was that Brown was 
a firm believer in the fact that "respect for the law is inherent in the Anglo-Saxon race."59 As 
was perhaps best stated by his biographer, Brown was "a privileged son of a the Yankee 
merchant class ... a reflexive social elitist whose opinions of women, African Americans, Jews, 
and immigrants now seem odious even if they were unexceptional for their time."60 
The man who would eventually challenge this view was John Marshall Harlan, an often 
Ione dissenter on the Court with regard to race relations and other important notions of the 
time.61 According to a memoir written by his wife, Harlan "never forgot an incident that 
occurred when he was a small boy accompanying his father, James Harlan, to a Sunday church 
service in his hometown of Frankfort, Kentucky.''62 On this day, Harlan the elder and his soon 
passed a group of slaves being taken to a slave market in a neighboring town. "The able-bodied 
men and women were chained together, four abreast, proceeded [sic.] by the old ones and the 
little 'pickaninnies,' who walked unbound.''63 In witnessing the situation, James Harlan "walked 
up to the slave-driver and, shaking a forefinger in his face, said, 'You are a damned scoundrel. 




61 Harlan had already dissented from the majority regarding racial issues in the famed Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 
3 (1883), where in five separate cases, a black person was denied the same accommodations as a white person in 
violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. 
62 Fireside, Separate and Unequal, 178. 
63 Ibid. 
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Good morning, sir," and then father and son continued on to church. Young John always 
remembered that his father, "like some Old Testament prophet seemed to be calling Heaven's 
maledictions upon the whole institution of Slavery."64 Yet it would be the younger Harlan that 
would truly come to be remembered as a prophet who did just that with regard to the remnants of 
slavery in Jim Crow laws and segregation. It was he who was Plessy's only hope. 
"Separate but Equal" Becomes the Law of the Land 
On May 18, 1896, the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Plessy v. 
Ferguson, a decision that would, "in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision ... in the 
Dred Scott case."65 In the opinion written by Justice Billings Brown, the argument that 
Louisiana's Separate Car Act of 1890 was unconstitutional due to the fact that it violated the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments was dismissed as sheer absurdity. Brown, speaking for a 
majority of seven wrote that the fact that the separate car act "[did] not conflict with the 
Thirteenth Amendment. .. [was] too clear for argument." The reason he insisted, was that 
"slavery implie[d] involuntary servitude -- a state of bondage; the ownership of mankind as a 
chattel, or at least the control of the labor and services of one man for the benefit of another, and 
the absence of a legal right to the disposal of his own person, property and services."66 He 
claimed that the act in question merely implied "a legal distinction between the white and 
colored races -- a distinction which is founded in the color of the two races, and which must 
64 Fireside, Separate and Unequal, 178. 
65 Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896). 
66 Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896) (Harlan J., dissenting). 
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always exist so long as white men are distinguished from the other race by color."67 Perhaps 
most troubling, was that he claimed that making this distinction, even in the law, had "no 
tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races."68 History would prove him wrong. 
With regard to Plessy' s argument pertaining to violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Justice Brown made what today would be regarded as an absurd statement regarding the 
protection of life, liberty and property of all races. He wrote that, although "the object of the 
amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law," it 
could not and must not, "have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to 
enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon 
terms unsatisfactory to either."69 He claimed that laws which enforced segregation did not imply 
that blacks were inferior to whites but instead that such laws were merely a legitimate exercise of 
state police power. 70 
Brown further argued that had Plessy been a white man according the laws of Louisiana, 
and made had been made to move into the colored car, he then would have had a valid claim 
before the law of being deprived of his property. But being that Plessy was, "a colored man and 
67 Ibid., 543. He further made the distinction that according to Mr. Justice Bradley, "it would be running th~ slavery 
argument into the ground ... to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to 
the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he wi11 take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or 
theatre, or deal with in other matters of intercourse or business." 
68 Ibid., 543. 
69 Ibid., 544. 
70 Ibid., 546. In giving an example, Brown offered the situation of segregated schools and interracial marriages. He 
wrote, "the most common instance of this is connected with the establishment of separate schools for white and 
colored children, which has been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts of States where 
the political rights of the colored race have been longest and most earnestly enforced," and that, "Laws forbidding 
the intermarriage of the two races may be said in a technical sense to interfere with the freedom of contract, and yet 
have been universally recognized as within the police power of th~ State." 
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was so assigned," that he had, "been deprived of no property, since he [wasl not lawfully entitled 
to the reputation of being a white man."71 
A final argument made by Plcssy' s attorney suggested that the same rationale behind the 
Separate Car Act and other Jim Crow laws could in tum be used to require the separation of 
people whose hair is of a certain color, or who are aliens, or who belong to certain 
nationalities, or to enact laws requiring colored people to walk upon one side of 
the street, and white people upon the other, or requiring white men's houses to be 
painted white, and colored men's black, or their vehicles or business signs to be of 
different colors, upon the theory that one side of the street is as good as the other, 
or that a house or vehicle of one color is as good as one of another colorn 
Although a seemingly logical argument, Justice Brown stated that the above discussed situations 
would never be made a reality due to the fact that "every exercise of the police power must be 
reasonable, and extend only to such laws as are enacted in good faith for the promotion for the 
public good, and not for the annoyance or oppression of a particular class."73 On a general level, 
the fact that the exercise of police power must be reasonable and in the interest of the public 
good is basically a truism. However, stating that the practices of segregation were enacted for 
the "the public good" and did not result in "the annoyance or oppression of a particular class" 
was complete! y untrue and was an inaccurate assessment of the situation of the South. 
Perhaps the fact that such discrimination was construed as reasonable shows the flaws in 
the social climate of the time as much as in Brown's opinion. According to Brown, in 
"determining the question of reasonableness," the legislature, "is at liberty to act with reference 
to the established usages, customs and traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion 
" Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896). 
72 Ibid, 449-550. 
73 Ibid, SSO. 
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of their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good order."74 Based on this fact, 
laws that authorize or even require the separation of two races are not "more unreasonable, or 
more obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment than the acts of Congress requiring separate 
schools for colored children in the District of Columbia, the constitutionality of which does not 
seem to have been questioned."75 Thus, the fact that the constitutionality of school segregation 
was not questioned led to the conclusion that the constitutionality of segregation on railways 
must also not be questioned. What is lacking is an examination of the constitutional principles 
which would, in the end, lead to the right finding that both of these measures were not in keeping 
with the amended Constitution. 
Justice Brown closed his opinion by identifying what he called "the underlying fallacy of 
the plaintiffs argument," which he saw as, "the assumption that the enforced separation of the 
two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority."76 He claimed that this "fallacy" 
was not perpetuated by the law itself, but by the fact that the colored race had construed it as 
such. In a final argument that truly revealed Brown's misinterpretation of the Constitution and 
the law in general, he wrote that "legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to 
abolish distinctions hased upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in 
accentuating the difficulties of the present situation. If the ci vii and political rights of both races 
be equal one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race be inferior to the 
other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane."77 In 
claiming that the Constitution ensured equality to the civil and political rights of individuals and 
74 Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896). 
"Ibid. 
76 Ibid, 551. 
77 Ibid, 551-552. 
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races in general, but did not at all regulale social rights, coupled with the misconception that the 
three types of rights were nol inherently interrelated, the majority opinion led to a dangerous 
misconstruction of the meaning of the Constitution of the United States. 
In essence, Brown's majority opinion was characterized by "a compound of bad logic, 
bad history, bad sociology, and bad constitutional law.'' 78 In writing particularly that, 
"legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts," Brown was responsible for committing to 
posterity, "one of those phrases that live in constitutional history largely because of their 
inaccuracy."79 Luckily, the "bad logic ... history ... sociology ... and constitutional law" of 
Brown was not to go unchallenged, as his opinion was issued "over the ringing protest of John 
Harlan. " 80 
"Our Constitution is Color-Blind" 
John Marshall Harlan's dissent in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson has been called "the 
greatest of his many dissents, and ... one of the most majestic utterances in American law."81 
Enraged with the decision of the majority, Harlan wrote that he could not believe that "such state 
legislation, although conceived in hostility to, and enacted for the purpose of humiliating citizens 
of the United States of a particular race, would be held to be consistent with the Constitution."82 
"We boast of the freedom enjoyed by our people above all other peoples," Harlan stated. "But it 
is difficult to reconcile that boast with a state of the law which, practically, puts the brand of 
78 Robert J. Harris, The Quest for Equality: The Constitution, Congress, and the Supreme Court (Baton Rouge: LSU 
Press, 1960), LOI. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Paul Oberst, "The Supreme Court and States' Rights," 48 Kentucky Law Journal (\959), 78. 
81 Benno C. Schmidt Jr., "Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era; Part I; The 
Heyday of Jim Crow," 82 Columbia Law Review (1982), 467. As another scholar as written, "The truest function 
of dissent in a court of last resort was served by the emotional as well as intellectual content of this extraordinary 
opinion," Barth, Prophets with Honor, 34. 
82 Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537, 563 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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servitude and degradation upon a large class of our fellow-citizens, our equals before the law. 
The thin guise of 'equal accommodations,"' he declared, "will not mislead anyone, nor atone the 
wrong this day done."83 The majority opinion may have misled many of his contemporaries, but, 
as Harlan suggested, the day the Plessy decision was handed down would indeed live in infamy 
for years to come. 
Harlan's dissent "demolished the majority's rationale on every front." 84 Just as Justice 
Brown had articulated what he saw as the "underlying fallacy" of Plessy's reasoning, Ilarlan, 
too, responded to what he saw as the "underlying fallacy" in the majority's stance: "its failure to 
grasp the central purpose of the Civil War, the constitutional revolution the war had spawned, or 
the harsh realities of quasi-slavery in the post-Reconstruction era" resulting in the post-war 
amendments. 85 These amendments, Harlan declared, "had eliminated race as a legitimate basis 
for legislation or judicial decisions affecting civil rights."86 
Claiming that, "the statute of Louisiana is inconsistent with the personal liberty of 
citizens, white and black, in that State, and hostile to both the spirit and Jetter of the Constitution 
of the United States," Harlan proceeded to discuss the true meaning of the newly amended 
Constitution with regard to racial equality.87 In specifically discussing the Thirteenth and 
83 Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537, 561 (1896). 
84 Tinsley E. Yarbrough, Judicial Enigma: The First Justice Harlan (New York: Oxford University Press, I 995), 
160. 
85 Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537, 551 ( 1896) (Harlan, L, dissenting); Yarbrough, Judicial Enigma , 157. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537, 563 (1896). Harlan was not trying to legislate morality or interpret the 
Constitution loosely. With regard to the Separate Car Act and the facts of the case he wrote: "By the Louisiana 
statute, the validity of which is here involved, all railway companies (other than street railroad companies) carrying 
passengers in that State are required to have separate but equal accommodations for white and colored persons, "by 
providing two or more passenger coaches for each passenger train, or by dividing the passenger coaches by a 
partition so as to secure separate accommodations." Under this statute, no colored person is permitted to occupy a 
seat in a coach assigned to white persons; nor any white person, to occupy a seat in a coach assigned to colored 
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Fourteenth amendments, he asserted that "if enforced according to their true intent and 
meaning," the combination of these two amendments would, "protect all the civil rights that 
pertain to freedom and citizenship" and also remove "the race line from our governmental 
system."88 Described as being "welcomed by friends of liberty throughout the world," it was 
more than apparent that these amendments were put in place precisely to ensure the 
unconstitutionality of laws that attempted to promote racial discrimination. 
Even though "It was said in argument that the statute of Louisiana does not discriminate 
against either race, but prescribes a rule applicable alike to white and colored citizens," Harlan 
argued, "every one [knew] that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose, not so much 
to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people 
from coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons." Moreover, "no one would be so 
wanting in candor as to assert the contrary."89 
One of the most eloquent and reasoned passages in Harlan's dissent was the one which 
responded to Brown's assertion that it would be unreasonable for certain distinctions to be made 
under the law, but perfectly reasonable for segregation to be enforced by legislatures. According 
to Harlan, forming the question of whether or not a statute is considered "reasonable" is to 
overstep the boundaries of the Court as defined by the Constitution. With regard to the specifics 
of the case, Harlan wrote that "it is one thing for railroad carriers to furnish, or to be required by 
persons. The managers of the railroad are not aHowed to exereise any discretion in the premises, but are required to 
assign each passenger to some coach or compartment set apart for the exclusiv~ use of his race. If a passenger insists 
upon going into a coach or compartment not set apart for persons of his race, he is subject to be fined, or to be 
imprisoned in the parish jail. Penalties are prescribed for the refusal or neglect of the officers, direclors, conductors 
and employees of railroad companies to comply with the provisions of the act. However apparent the injustice of 
such legislation may be, we have only to consider whether it is consistent with the Constitution of the United 
States." Ibid., 552-553. 
88 Ibid., 555. 
89 Ibid., 556-557. 
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law to furnish, equal accommodations for all whom they are under a legal duty to carry. It is 
quite another thing for government to forbid citizens of the white and black races from travelling 
in the same public conveyance, and to punish officers of railroad companies for permitting 
persons of the two races to occupy the same passenger coach."9° Continuing with this line of 
argument, 
if a State can prescribe, as a rule of civil conduct, that whites and blacks shall not 
travel as passengers in the same railroad coach, why may it not so regulate the use 
of the streets of its cities and towns as to compel white citizens to keep on one 
side of a street and black citizens to keep on the other? Why may it not, upon like 
grounds, punish whites and blacks who ride together in street cars or in open 
vehicles on a public road of street? Why may it not require sheriffs to assign 
whites to one side of a court-room aud blacks lo the other? And why may it not 
also prohibit the commingling of the two races in the galleries of legislative halls 
or in public assemblages convened for the considerations of the political questions 
of the day? Further, if this statute of Louisiana is consistent with the personal 
liberty of citizens, why may not the State require the separation in railroad 
coaches of native and naturalized citizens of the United States, or of Protestants 
and Roman Catholics?91 
These questions were not all rhetorical, as Harlan stated that the answer to all of them would 
inevitably be that regulations such as these are completely "unreasonable, and could not, 
therefore, stand before the law."92 Based on this answer, would it necessarily follow that "the 
determination of questions of legislative power depends upon the inquiry whether the statute 
whose validity is questioned is, in the judgment of the courts, a reasonable one, taking all the 
circumstances into consideration?" Harlan wrote that "a statute may be unreasonable merely 
because a sound public policy forbade its enactment. But I do not understand that the courts 
have anything to do with the policy or expediency of legislation. "93 To further drive home his 
'




point, Harlan offered the following eloquent argument regarding what he views to be the 
"dangerous tendency" of the current Court: 
A statute may be valid, and yet, upon grounds of public policy, may well be 
characterized as unreasonable. Mr. Sedgwick correctly states the rule when he 
says that the legislative intention being clearly ascertained, "the courts have no 
other duty to perform than to execute the legislative will, without any regard to 
their views as to the wisdom or justice of the particular enactment." There is a 
dangerous tendency in these latter days to enlarge the functions of the courts, by 
means of judicial interference with the will of the people as expressed by the 
legislature. Our institutions have the distinguishing ch.aracteristic that th.e three 
departments of government are coordinate and separate. Each must keep within 
the limits defined by th.c Constitution. And the courts best discharge their duty by 
executing the will of the law-making power, constitutionally expressed, leaving 
the results of legislation to be dealt with by the people through their 
representatives. Statutes must always have a reasonable construction. Sometimes 
they are to be construed strictly; sometimes, liberally, in order to carry out the 
legislative will. But however construed, the intent of the legislature is to be 
respected, ifthe particular statute in question is valid, although the courts, looking 
at the public interests, may conceive the statute to be both unreasonable and 
impolitic. If the power exists to enact a statute, that ends the matter so far as the 
courts are concerned. The adjudged cases in which statutes have been held to be 
void, because unreasonable, are those in which the means employed by the 
legislature were not at all germane to the end to which. the legislature was 
competent.94 
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The last point in Harlan's dissent is not only important in extracting the true meaning of 
the Constitution, but also is chillingly prophetic. With regard to race relations and their proper 
construction under the Constitution, Harlan wrote that the white race "deems itself to be the 
dominant race in th.is country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth 
and in power;" further, he argued, "it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great 
heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty."95 But even given this harsh 
reality, the fact remains that the text of the Constitution states that all are equal under the law, 
and the decision in P/essy would achieve nothing but a misconception of the Constitution and a 
94 P/essy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 531, 557-559 (1896). 
95 Ibid., 559. 
further aggravation of the conflict between the races. Harlan powerfully discussed the true 
meaning of the Constitution with regard to race relations and the implications that the 
"pernicious" majority decision would bring into reality. With regard to constitutional 
interpretation, Harlan asserted that, 
in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no 
superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our 
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among 
citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The 
humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes 
no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed 
by the supreme law of the land are involved. It is, therefore, to be regretted that 
this high tribunal, the final expositor of the fundamental law of the land, has 
reached the conclusion that it is competent for a State to regulate the enjoyment 
by citizens of their civil rights solely upon the basis of race ... 
Specifically, he continued, 
it was adjudged ... that the descendants of Africans who were imported into this 
country and sold as slaves were not included nor intended to be included under 
the word "citizens" in the Constitution, and could not claim any of the rights and 
privileges which that instrument provided for and secured to citizens of the 
United States; that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution they were 
'considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been 
subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained 
subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who 
held the power and the government might choose to grant them."' 
Even given this argument, Harlan wrote that the recent amendments of the Constitution, 
were supposed to "eradicate these principles from our institutions." Unfortunately, they 
may not have achieved their goal as "it seems that we have yet, in some of the States, a 
dominant race - a superior class of citizens, which assumes to regulate the enjoyment of 
civil rights, common to all citizens, upon the basis of race.''96 
In discussing the implications of the Plessy decision for so harshly misconstruing 
the meaning of the post-war amendments, Harlan acted as a prophet, seemingly peering 
96 Ibid., 559-560. 
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into the future and rightly describing future events as they would inevitably unfold. He 
wrote, 
The present decision, it may well be apprehended, will not only stimulate 
aggressions, more or less brutal and irritating, upon the admitted rights of colored 
citizens, but will encourage the belief that it is possible, by means of state 
enactments, to defeat the beneficent purposes which the people of the United 
States had in view when they adopted the recent amendments of the Constitution, 
by one of which the blacks of this country were made citizens of the United States 
and of the States in which they respectively reside, and whose privileges and 
immunities, as citizens, the States are forbidden to abridge. Sixty millions of 
whites are in no danger from the presence here of eight millions of blacks. The 
destinies of the two races, in this country, are indissolubly linked together, and the 
interests of both require that the common government of all shall not permit the 
seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction of law. What can more 
certainly arouse race hate, what more certainly create and perpetuate a feeling of 
distrust between these races, than state enactments, which, in fact, proceed on the 
ground that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be 
allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white citizens? That, as all will 
admit, is the real meaning of such legislation as was enacted in Louisiana ... a 
badge of servitude wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality 
before the law established by the Constitution. It cannot be justified upon any 
legal grounds. 
Following the delivery of the majority's decision as well as Harlan's dissent, Chief 
Justice Fuller's former law partner, Henry M. Shepard, "wrote to Harlan from Chicago to 
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express his gratification at what the justice had written. 'It will stand,' Shepard predicted, 'when 
the majority opinion will be forgotten. "'97 
A Morally Correct Response, A Constitutionally Correct Opinion 
One of the most esteemed historians to research the Plessy decision stated that, "[i]t 
should need no belaboring: Harlan's indignation was the morally correct response in a republic 
founded on the truth that 'all men are created equal. "'98 But even more than issuing a morally 
97 Yarbrough, Judicial Enigma, 162. 
98 Lofgren, The Plessy Case,.4. 
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correct response, Harlan issued a constitutionally correct opinion in the face of an obviously 
misguided majority. It would take half of a century for the Court and the American public to 
"come around to a recognition of Justice Harlan's realism and moral indignation- and even 
longer to undo the <lrea<lful consequences that he foresaw of "its blindness and torpor."99 But the 
fact that it eventually did so may be a direct consequence of Harlan's writing a dissenting 
opinion and putting forth a correct interpretation of the Constitution with regard to race and the 
post-war amendments. 
99 Harth, Prophets M1ith Honor, 34. 
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"A WARFARE NOT WAGED WITH MEN BUT WITH IDEAS" 
Along with Dred Scott v. Sandford and Plessy v. Ferguson, Lochner v. New York has 
come to be known as one of "the most reviled Supreme Court cases of all time." 1 Long regarded 
as "the quintessential due process decision, at least with respect to economic rights doctrine," 
Lochner v. New York established the liberty to enter into contract as a constitutional right that 
must take priority to the state's power to regulate employment conditions. From Lochner 
"evolved three decades of judicially developed rights and liberties that negated a multitude of 
social and economic initiatives by the political process."2 
In Lochner v. New York, the Court claimed that a New York law mandating a ten-hour 
work day for bakers was in fact unconstitutional, and in doing so ushered in the so-called 
"Lochner era."3 In being named a member of the "anti-canon," that is, the group of wrongly 
decided cases that have helped to identify what a proper interpretation of the Constitution should 
be, the dissenting opinion of Oliver Wendell Holmes in Lochner has shed light on the true 
meaning of the Constitution by pointing out a flaw which still pervades constitutional 
1 David E. Bernstein, "The Story of Lochner v. New York: Impediment to the Growth of the Regulatory State," in 
Constitutional Law Stories, ed. Michael C. Dorf, (New York: Foundation Press, 2004), 327. 
2 Donald E. Lively, Foreshadows of the Law: Supreme Court Dissents and Constitutional Development (Westport: 
Praeger, 1992, 66. 
3 Bernstein, "The Story of Lochner v. New York," 325. The Lochner era is said to have lasted from approximately 
1905 to 1937. In addition, Donald E. Lively states, "So profOund was the Court's commitment to economie rights 
during the Lochner era that one of the few deviations from the separate but equal doctrine, which limited 
constitutional attention to claims of racial discrimination, was grounded in the interest of protecting, economic 
liberty." Lively, Foreshadows of the Law, 67. 
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interpretation to this day.4 Holmes asserted that the "Constitution is not intended to embody a 
particular economic theory ... It is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the 
accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought 
not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with 
the Constitution of the United States," was one that would be remembered.5 Even today, one 
hundred years after it was decided, "avoiding Lochner·s error remains the central obsession ... of 
contemporary constitutional law."6 Supreme Court Justices are at pains to deny that their 
opinions declaring laws unconstitutional have anything to do with Lochner, while dissenting 
justices use Lochner as an epithet to criticize their colleagues.7 
The Rise of the Ten-Hour Work Day 
The story of the Supreme Court case that would usher in the era of substantive due 
process begins in the late 1800s. During this time, unionized New York bread bakers sought to 
limit their working hours to ten hours per day and sixty hours per week. 8 This demand increased 
over the years, as many bakers found it difficult to find work due to economic hardships. Of 
course, these economic hardships were fuelled by the fact that many bakers worked incredibly 
4 Ibid. 
'Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, 0., dissenting). 
6 Gary D. Rowe, .. Loehner Revisionism Revisited," 24 Low & Soc. Inquiry ( 1999), 221, 223. 
7 Bernstein, "The Story of Lochner v. New York," 326-327. For example, Justice William 0. Douglas states the 
following in Griswold v. Connecticut: "'Overtones of some arguments suggest that Lochner v. New York should be 
our guide. But we decline that invitation ... We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and 
propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social condiliuns. This law, however, operates 
directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician's role in one aspect of that relation." 381 
U.S. 479, 482 (1965). 
8 Bernstein notes that "[b ]akers favored shorter hours because they wanted more leisure time, and because they were 
typically paid by the day. If bakers were paid two dollars a day for ten hours of work, they expected to get paid the 
same two dollars for ten hours a day of work (although employers would obviously try to switch to hourly pay 
schedules). Also, many bakers apparently believed that shorter hours would eventually lead to higher wages, though 
it is not clear by what mechanism they thought this would occur." Bernstein, "The Story of Lochner v. New York," 
328. 
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long hours, and thus limited the number of jobs that were available for others in their field. It 
was therefore thought that by limiting the hours that bakers were allowed to work, jobs would be 
more evenly spread among bakers, and even more would be able to find jobs. Overall, this 
would serve to reduce unemployment, and would also create better working conditions for those 
who were employed.9 
It is interesting to note that this push for a ten-hour work day, and the eventual legislation 
that would mandate it, stemmed from a division in the baking industry. At this time, larger 
bakeries were staffed by German immigrants and ultimately came to comprise the majority of the 
Bakery and Confectionary Workers International Union, which was later referred to simply as 
"the bakers' union." These bakers typically worked fewer than ten hours a day and sixty hours a 
week, but they were concerned that this luxury might not last due to competition from smaller 
bakeries. These smaller "basement" bakeries were typically populated by many other immigrant 
groups (primarily the French, Italians, Jews, and a smaller number of Germans), who were 
usually divided by bakery, as bakers of a certain nationality typically worked for employers of 
the same ethnic group. For the most part, these bakers were not unionized, especially among the 
non-Germans, and regularly worked far more than ten hours per day. These smaller bakeries 
were perceived to be lowering unionized bakers' wages, and, thus, members of the bakers union 
thought thatthe establishment of a ten-hour work day would end competition from these bakers 
and also serve to bring about better working conditions for everyone involved. 10 
9 Baking was considered by many to be a thoroughly unhealthful profession. Even though bakers did not face the 
threat of sudden death or injury, they were constantly in contact with flour dust, fumes, dampness, and extreme 
temperatures that they characterized as daily threats to their overall health. The main concern noted by bakers was 
consumption, which was thought to give shape to many lung diseases including tuberculosis. Paul Kens, Judicial 
Power and Reform Politics: The Anatomy of Lochner v. New York (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990), 9-
11. 
JO Now for the Ten Hour Day, Baker's Journal, April 20, 1895. 
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As the bakers' union began focusing on the establishment. of law mandating a ten hour 
work day, others were becoming concerned with the unhealthy working conditions were in the 
smaller, basement bakeries. One story of a dying Jewish baker being carried from a cellar 
bakery on the Lower East Side of Manhattan was publicized by the president of the bakers' 
union at that time, Henry Weismann. Beyond making the situation of this man public, Weissman 
demanded an investigation into many of the cellar bakeries in Brooklyn and Manhattan to 
determine whether or the conditions there were unhealthy. The result of this investigation was 
an article by muckraking reporter Edward Marshall, which detailed "the poor and unhealthful 
conditions of basement bakeries, and also called for legislative intervention" in regulating these 
di · II con nons. 
Soon after the publication of Marshall's article, a bakery reform law was proposed to the 
state legislature. The Bakeshop Act, as it came to be known, consisted of a series of sanitary 
reforms for "biscuit, bread, and cake factories" and was modeled on England's Bakeshop 
Regulation Act of 1863. 12 But the New York law included one provision that the English law 
did not - a maximum hours provision - that served to limit biscuit, cake, and bread bakers' hours 
to ten per day and sixty per week. 13 The hours provision - included in the bill at the urging of 
the bakers' union - received an important endorsement from the state Health Commissioner, 
Cyrus Edson, who construed the maximum hours provision as being incredibly important "from 
a sanitary standpoint'', as "there is unmistakable evidence that these men are overworked, and 
that, in consequence of this, they are sickly and unfit to handle an article of food." 14 The first 
11 Kens, Judicial Power and Refortn Politics, 41. 
12 Bernstein, "The Story of Lochner v. New York," 333. 
13 Ibid. See also, Kens, Judicial Power and Reform Politics, 44-59. 
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section of the Bakeshop Act contained the hours provision, while the following sections 
contained various sanitary regulations, "such as prohibiting domestic animals in bakeries and 
prohibiting workers from sleeping in a bake room," and providing for "enforcement by the state 
factory inspector." The Bakeshop Act passed unanimously in both houses of the legislature. 15 
The Road from Utica 
In April 1902, Utica bakery owner Joseph Lochner was arrested for violating the hours 
provision of the Bakeshop Act. Allegedly, Lochner had employed a baker named Aman 
Schmitter for more than sixty hours in one week, and was thus found in violation of the law. 
Behind the scenes, it was known that Lochner had a longstanding dispute with the bakers' union, 
and it has been suggested that the union persuaded the factory inspectors to file a complaint 
against him, thus leading to his case. 
The 1902 arrest was Lochner's second for violating the hours provision of the Bakeshop 
Act. The first time he was arrested, he was convicted and fined twenty-five dollars for his crime. 
This time around, a grand jury indicted Lochner and at his trial in February 1903, he "refused to 
plead guilt or innocence, and offered no defense."16 The fact that Lochner offered no defense 
suggests that the New York Association of Master Bakers had persuaded Lochner to allow this 
prosecution to become a test case regarding the constitutionality of the hours provision of the 
14The Bakers' Bill Progressing, Bakers' Journal, Mar 30, 1895, L In addition to the rationale of Edson, the bakers' 
union's official rationale for supporting the Bakeshop Act was that it was "a sanitary measure solely" and therefore 
"will stand the closest scrutiny of constitutional lawyers and the courts." Bernstein, "The Story of Lochner v. New 
York," 333. 
15 At the last minute, the bill was amended to prohibit only employees from working more than ten hours a day; 
employers were permitted to work as many hours as they saw fit. Bernstein, "The Story of Lochner v. New 
York."333-334. 
16 Kens, Judicial Power and Reform Politics. 80-81. 
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Bakeshop Act. 17 In the end, the court found Lochner guilty, and he was sentenced to pay a fifty 
dollar fine or spend fifty-days in jail. 
Unsatisfied, Lochner appealed the decision. He lost again, this time in a 4-3 decision. 
However, his case had not gone unnoticed, as "The New York Association of Master Bakers met 
in February 1904 and decided to levy an assessment of one dollar on each member to pay for an 
appeal of the case to the Supreme Comt." 18 And so with the support of this organization, 
Lochner appealed his case to the nation's highest court. 
Lochner's attorneys, Frank Harvey Field and Henry Weismann (the previous president of 
the Bakers' Union), decided that their strongest argument in the case was that the hours provision 
was "illicit class legislation;" this was a fact that they focused heavily on in their brief. First, 
they argued that the hours provision was class legislation because it applied to some bakers and 
not to others.19 Second, they argued that the hours law was "not within the police power because 
there was no reason to single out bakers for special regulation." Unlike mining ... , baking was a 
generally healthful occupation, and allowing baking to be subject to police power "would mean 
that all trades will eventual! y be held within the police power." 20 
The opposing side made three points: "first, that the burden was on Lochner to show that 
the law was unconstitutional; second, that the Bakeshop Act's purpose was to safeguard both the 
17 Bernstein, "The Story of Lochfler v. New York," 335. 
18 Ibid., 337, 339. Quoted from Dowfl with the Ten Hour Law! Is the War Cry of the Boss Bakers, Bakers' Journal. 
Feb. 27, 1904. I. 
19 According to Lochner's brief, the hours provision did not cover at least one-third to one-half of people in the 
baking business because they worked not in the biscuit, bread. or cake bakeries covered by the law, but in pie 
bakeries, hotels, etc. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 7-8, Lochner v. New York, 198 US 145 (1905) (No. 292), reprinted 
in Bernstein, "The Story of Lochner v. New York," 341. 
20 Bernstein, "The Story of Lochner v. New York," 341. 
public health and the health of bakers; and third, that the law was within the police power 
because it was a health law ."21 
It was these two arguments which found themselves pitted directly against each other 
when Lochner's case came to the Supreme Court. In the end, however, it would be another 
argument that would be most important in deciding the fate of Lochner and many others in 
similar situations; an argument with regard to constitutional interpretation that was slowly but 
surely forming in the minds of the current court. 
A Heavy Dose of Liberalism 
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The Lochner Court was heavily shaped by the appointments of late nineteenth and early 
twentieth-century presidents, "who selected nominees based in significant part upon their 
commitment to preserving economic liberty."22 It was thought by some that these Supreme 
Court justices, "influenced by pernicious Social Darwinist ideology, sought to import their 
laissez-faire views on the American polity through a tendentious interpretation of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."23 "Infected with class bias," it was argued that 
the justices "knew that their decisions favored large corporations and harmed workers," and that 
their "survival of the fittest" mentality implied that this was exactly what they intended.24 
Perhaps for this reason, the Supreme Court would be most influential in furthering or 
restricting the reform policies of the day.25 Unlike the President and Congress, who were more 
21 Ibid .. 343. 
22 Lively, Foreshadows of the Law, 68. 
23 Bernstein, "'The Story of Lochner v. New York," 325. 
24 Ibid. 
25 David H. Burton, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (Boston: Twayne, 1980), 98. 
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apt to see the good in reform laws, the Court was "long suspicious of laws tampering with the 
status quo and quick to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment to stern the tide of change and 
preserve the rights ofproperty.'"6 Chief Justice Melville Fuller, along with Justice Brewer and 
Justice Shiras, held tight to their defense of property rights. The other justices whocornprised the 
Court, although sometimes known to support certain reform measures (for example the income 
tax law), they too erred on the side of conservativisrn with regard to property rights and reform 
law. Thus it was often thought that, based on the Court at the time, progress in this area would 
be at a stalemate unless there was a heavy dose of liberalism injected onto the bench. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes had a varied career as a practitioner, scholar and state supreme 
court justice.27 Although not a Progressive, he had "gained the reputation as a reformer while on 
the Massachusetts bench," and it was for this reason that President Theodore Roosevelt, a 
staunch Progressive, sought him out for appointment to the Supreme Court in 1902. As in the 
case of the other dissenters examined thus far, Holmes was specifically appointed by Roosevelt 
based on his record in being a friend of the Progressives, and the fact that he was strongly 
recommended by Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge.28 It was hoped that his 
appointment would be the dose of liberalism that the Court so desperately needed, as when 
Holmes was appointed, "only Justice Harlan was prepared to move in the direction of liberal 
nationalism."29 
26 Ibid. For this reason, Burton states the Court "deserved its reputation as a conservative bastion." 
27 Lively, Foreshadows of the Law, 68. 
28 This, however, was not to say that Holmes was merely a Progressive addition to a wholly conservative bench. 
"The distinction between Holmes' outlook and that of the Progressives," as is noted by Burton, is that they differ in 
their intent. Holmes, therefore, "did not consciously seek to hand down Progressive opinions," and even though, 
"many of his decisions coincided with Progressive preferences in the law and the Constitution, it can not be assumed 
from that fact that Holmes was a reformer. Coincidence is not causality." Burton, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 92-
93. 
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Holmes took his duty of interpreting the Constitution of the United States very seriously, 
and as many have written, with the care of a scholar. During the Progressive Era in which he sat, 
Holmes was faced not only with a Court filled by justices who differed in their political 
affiliation, but also in their approaches to interpreting the Constitution. For Holmes, the 
Constitution's meaning must read simply, but must also not be perverted; it must be extracted 
with care. As he famously stated in Gompers v. United States: "The provisions of the 
Constitution are not mathematical formulas, having their form, [but instead] organic living 
institutions transplanted from English soil. Their significance is vital not formal; it is to be 
gathered not simply by taking the words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the 
line of their growth."30 Holmes' opinions were, in this sense, rooted less in Progressivism and 
more in a principled, and carefully articulated method of interpreting the Constitution. 
When Lochner's case reached the Supreme Court, it was met by a "conservative bastion," 
tempered by Justice John Marshall Harlan and the newly appointed Justice Holmes.31 The nation 
would soon find out whether the dose of progressivism that Roosevelt sought to inject the 
conservative Court with would have any effect on the majority. 
An Economic Philosophy Professed 
The Supreme Court issued its ruling in Lochner v. New York on April 17, 1905. In a 5-4 
decision, the Court declared Lochner victorious, a decision that came as a surprise to almost 
everyone at the time. As was expected, Justices David Brewer and Rufus Peckham voted in 
29 Burton, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 98. 
30 Gompers v. United States 233 U.S. 604 (1914), 610. 
11 Burton, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 98. 
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Lochner's favor. 32 Chief Justice Melville Fuller also joined the majority, as he had dissented 
with Brewer and Peckham in the Court's most recent case upholding labor regulation. The two 
justices rounding out the majority were Henry Brown and Joseph McKenna, "neither of whom 
had previously voted to invalidate a state labor regulation for infringing on Fourteenth 
Amendment rights. "33 
As is evidenced by the 5-4 decision, Lochner's victory was a very close call. However, 
tills was not the only evidence of just how close. It has been suggested that the majority opinion 
by Justice Peckham was originally written as a dissent, and that Justice Harlan's dissenting 
opinion was originally the opinion of the Court.34 Many reasons have been given for tills 
account, including the fact that Harlan's son stated that his father told him that he was writing 
what was to be the majority opinion. And Justice Harlan's opinion, in fact, is arguably written 
more like a majority opinion than a dissent. Although we many never know exactly what 
occurred with regard to who was chosen to write the majority opinion and the principles the 
majority would then have embodied, we do know that the majority opinion was written in such a 
way as to justify the defendant's case through a logic completely separate from that in the brief 
presented by Iris lawyers. 
Thus, even though Lochner's brief focused heavily on class legislation, Peckham's 
majority opinion did not discuss that issue at all. Instead, the opinion of the majority was based 
solely on an argument for fundamental rights and the application of due process. Peckham began 
32 It has been suggested that Brewer and Peckham "rarely saw a labor law they thought was constitutional." 
Bernstein, ''The Story of Lochner v. New York," 343. 
33 Ibid. "As for the unusual votes of Brown and McKenna, they can most plausibly be attributed to the creativity of 
Lochner's brief in presenting a statistics filled appendix showing that baking was not an especially unhealthful 
profession, combined with the singularly ineffective brief filed by New York." 
34 See Charles Henry Butler, A Century at the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States (New York: G.P. 
Putnam's Sons, 1942), 172; and John E. Semonche, Charting the Future: The Supreme Court Responds to a 
Changing Society 1890-1920 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1978), 181-182. 
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by stating that the hours provision "necessarily interferes with the right of contract between the 
employer and employees," as "the general right to make a contract in relation to his business is 
part of the libeity of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal 
Constitution."35 Peckham claimed that the question of whether or not the hours provision was a 
valid labor law "may be dismissed in a few words" based on the fact that, "[t]here is no 
reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of person or the right of free contract, by 
determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker," indeed, he wrote, "we think that a 
law like the one before us involves neither the safety, the morals nor the welfare of the public, 
and that the interest of the public is not in the slightest degree affected by such an act." The 
majority ruled that the law did not at all affect the health or welfare of the population, as "[c]lean 
and wholesome bread does not depend upon whether the baker works but ten hours per day or 
only sixty hours a week."36 
With regard to the issue of the health of the baker as opposed to the health of the public, 
Peckam wrote that "there can be no fair doubt that the trade of a baker, in and of itself, is not an 
unhealthy one to that degree which would authorize the legislature to interfere with the right to 
labor, and with the right of free contract on the part of the individual, either as employer or 
employee." Further , he noted that "in looking through statistics regarding all trades and 
occupations, it. .. might be safely affirmed that almost all occupations more or less affect the 
health ... no trade, no occupation, no mode of earning one's living, could escape this all-
pervading power." Therefore, "upon the assumption of the validity of this act under review ... it 
35 Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). This "liher1y" guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the 
l'ouneenth Amendment was a right the Coun had first recognized in Allgeyer v. Louisiana , 165 U.S. 578 ( 1897). 
36 Ibid. This was due to the fact there according to Peckham, "There is no contention that bakers as a class are not 
equal in inte11igence and capacity to men in other trades or manual occupations, or that tl1ey are not able to assert 
their rights and care for themselves without the protecting arm of the State, interfering with their independence of 
judgment and of action. They are in no sense wards of the State." 
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might be said that it is unhealthy to work more than that number of hours in an apartment lighted 
by artificial light during the working hours of the day; that the occupation of the bank clerk, the 
lawyer's clerk, the real estate clerk, or the broker's clerk in such offices is therefore unhealthy."37 
In making an easily discernable slippery slope argument, it is not difficult to see the extremes to 
which Peckham resorted to prove this point. 
In concluding his opinion, Peckham noted that it would be impossible for the members of 
the Court to "shut [their] eyes to the fact that many of the laws of this character, while passed 
under what is claimed to be the police power for the purpose of protecting the public health or 
welfare, arc, in reality, passed from other motives."38 According the majority, the hour provision 
had 
no such direct relation to and no such substantial effect upon the health of the 
employee, as to justify us in regarding the section as really a health law. It seems 
to us that the real object and purpose were simply to regulate the hours of labor 
between the master and his employees (all being men, suijuris), in a private 
business, not dangerous in any degree to morals or in any real and substantial 
degree, to the health of the employees. Under such circumstances the freedom of 
master and employee to contract with each other in relation to their employment, 
and in defining the same, cannot be prohibited or interfered with, without 
violating the Federal Constitution.39 
With this opinion, the Court ushered in the era of substantive due process. 
"Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45, 59 (1905). 
38 Ibid., 64. 
39 Ibid. 
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"A Constitution is Not Intended to Embody a Particular Economic Theory" 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. filed his own opinion in Lochner v. New York, which 
has been referred to as "one of the most celebrated dissenting opinions in American 
constitutional history."40 In his dissent, Holmes argued that the majority's opinion was 
inherently flawed, and responded by offering very pointed criticisms as to their ruling in the case 
at hand, as well as their more general interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.41 
First, Holmes claimed that the case was "decided upon an economic theory which a large 
part of the country does not entertain."42 According to Holmes, "[t]he liberty of the citizen to do 
as he likes so long as he does not interfere with the liberty of others to do the same, which has 
been a shibboleth for some well-known writers, is interfered with by school laws, by the Post 
Office, by every state or municipal institution which takes his money for purposes thought 
desirable, whether he likes it or not."43 From this stemmed his pointed critique of the majority 
that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statistics."44 
In addition, Holmes asserted that "the word liberty" as it is meant to be read in the 
Fourteenth Amendment is "perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a 
dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that 
the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the 
traditions of our people and our law."45 This rational and fair man, according to Holmes, would 
40 Bernstein, "The Story of Lochner v. New York," 346. 
41 Burton, Oliver Wendell Holmes. Jr., 103. 
42 Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, 0., dissenting). 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 76. 
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"think it [the hours provision] a proper measure on the score of health ... ; as a first installment of 
a general regulation of the hours of work." However, the response of these reasonable men when 
asked whether or not the law created an inequality or a denial of liberty, Holmes thought it 
''unnecessary to discuss."46 
Thus, Holmes implied that the Court might go so far as to completely reverse the political 
process, construing almost all laws passed by the legislature as obstructions to the liberty ensured 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Holmes did not, in the end, suggest that protecting the liberty 
and interest of the individual was wrong, but instead that "but that the Lochner Court had 
identified the wrong interests."47 Justice Holmes' dissent "criticized an idea that he thought to be 
nothing more than 'a mere ideological fabrication. ""'8 For this reason, this dissenting opinion, 
containing as it did so much of the essence of Holmes' judicial thinking, has become a classic 
example of his legal philosophy.49 
The Lochner era of substantive due process "persisted into the 1930s over Holmes' 
almost unrelenting protest. His criticism evolved to the point that it indicated nearly zero 
tolerance for development of fundamental rights not specified by the Constitution itself."50 
Throughout this time, Holmes "consistently opposed the majority's expounding of principles that 
cramped legislative processes of innovation and reckoning."51 In Truax v. Corrigan, Holmes 
stated that he "must add one general consideration," to his dissent which read as follows: "There 
46 Ibid. 
47 Lively, Foreshadows of the Law, 70. 
48 Ibid., 68. 
49 Ibid. 
'
0 Ibid., 70. 
51 Ibid., 69. 
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is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond the absolute 
compulsion of its words to prevent the making of social experiments that an important part of the 
community desires, in the insulated chambers afforded by the several States, even though the 
experiments may seem futile or even noxious to me and to those whose judgment I most 
respect."52 Even twenty years after Lochner in Tyson & Brother v. Bantorn, Holmes once again 
stated that he thought "the proper course" was to "recognize that a state legislature can do 
whatever it sees fit to do unless it is restrained by some express prohibition in the Constitution 
of the United States or of the State, and that Courts should be careful not to extend such 
prohibitions beyond their obvious meaning by reading into them conceptions of public policy 
that the particular Court may happen to entertain."53 Thus, Holmes' view that the Constitution 
must not lead to "judicially induced principle that negated or narrowed legislative power. .. [as] 
an extension of personally favored ideology," remained at the forefront of his judicial philosophy 
throughout his years on the Court.54 
Regardless of his differing viewpoint, Holmes was highly respected by his peers. In 
taking a scholar's approach to the law, Holmes had "displayed a penetrating knowledge of the 
law, erudite yet in touch with social reality."55 He felt free to side with conservatives or liberals, 
52 Truax v. Corrigan 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921). 
53 Tyson & Brother v. Bantam 273 U.S. 418, 433-434 (1927). 
54 Lively, 69. In years to come, the Court reached a decision in United States v. Carolene Products 304 U.S. 144 
(1938) where it "abandoned its role as guardian of economic policy. Although reserving the possibility of stricter 
review when constitutionality enumerated rights were implicated or when 'prejudice against discrete and insular 
1ninorities' distorted the political process, the Court downgraded the due process clause as a departure point for the 
second-guessing legislative judgment." Ibid., 73. 
55 His place became known as the scholar's seat, afterwards to be occupied by Cardozo and Frankfurter. 
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depending on the facts of the case, the Jaw, or the constitutional provision at issue.56 This was 
due to the fact that for Holmes, 
the Constitution was not a literary document but an instrument of government. As 
such it was to be regarded not as an occasion for juggling with words but as a 
means for ordering the life of a people ... This conception of the Constitution was 
the background against which he projected every inquiry into the scope of a 
specific power or specific limitation. That the Constitution is a framework of 
great governmental powers to be exercised for great public ends was for him not a 
pale intellectual concept. It dominated his process of constitutional adjudication. 
His opinions, composed in harmony with his dominating attitude toward the 
Constitution, recognized an organism within which the dynamic life of a free 
society can unfold and flourish. From his constitutional opinions there emerges 
the conception of a nation adequate to its national and international tasks, whose 
federated states, though subordinate to central authority for national purposes, 
have ample power for their divers local needs. 57 
Thus, although he dissented often, his "reputation as 'the great dissenter' was not a 
particular badge of honor for Holmes."58 He did not enjoy dissenting from the opinion of his 
colleagues, but instead found it necessary based on his strong feelings regarding the proper 
interpretation of the Constitution. 
"Holmes' warfare was not waged with men but with ideas, "59 and it was "only at the 
points where Holmes' philosophy of life and of the law has clashed sharply with that of the 
majority of his colleagues that he ... found it necessary again and again, in many different 
aspects, in winged words, to expound and justify that philosophy. It is true that these utterances 
were not intended for us, the readers of the printed word, but for his colleagues and for the 
~6 Such an assessment is consistent with the notion of Holmes as the creator of a "new jurisprudence based on 
assumption which flatly contradicted some of the basic assumptions of time-honored jurisprudence." Burton, Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, ! 15. 
57 Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court (New York, Atheneum, 196 l ), 23. 
58 Lively, Foreshadows of the Law, 68. 
59 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Dissenting Opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes, arranged, with introductory notes by 
Alfred Lief (New York: Vanguard Press, 1929), x. 
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members of his profession, but they have only to be read to become the priceless possession of 
the wider community whose spokesman he was."60 
A Fighting Philosophy 
It is true that Justice Holmes has "given varied and eloquent expression to his philosophy 
of life and of the law in many public addresses and legal papers, and a compilation of elegant 
extracts from those utterances would give the reader a satisfying picture of a rich and finely-
tempered mind."61 However, it is in his dissenting opinions that Holmes tends to shine. "After 
all," as Holmes himself stated, "the place for a man who is complete in all his powers is in the 
fight. This is not only because we find ourselves caught up in the joy of battle with him, but for 
another, if not a better, reason, namely that we see the philosophy as well as the mettle of the 
man tried out in the only arena in which they can be tested."62 
Holmes' principled interpretation of the Constitution is not one that he keeps to himself. 
Instead, "his is a fighting philosophy, at war with many of the conceptions which have 
dominated and which still largely dominate legal policy." Although his view differed 
substantially from that of the majority, he never ceased to express it in hopes that one day the 
Court and the American public would realize where it went wrong.63 As Holmes stated himself, 
"every opinion tends to become a law," an idea which has been manifested many times during 
the history of the Supreme Court and which will continue in the years to come. Therefore, "it is 
'°Ibid., x-xi. 




to the years to come that we must look for the complete vindication of [Holmes'] role as 
dissenter, to the younger members of the bar, the judges of the future, who have found and will 
still find inspiration in his example and leadership in his principles of judicial action."64 
64 Ibid. 
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"THE ORIGINAL PURPOSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT" 
Constitutional questions regarding due process of law and the role of the Fourteenth 
Amendment were not quick to disappear after Lochner v. New York. The economic 
manifestation of substantive due process would be a point of controversy for years to come. In 
addition, questions of due process involving other liberties were beginning to arise, especially as 
to whether the Fourteenth Amendment extended the Bill of Rights to the states. Thus, by the 
time that Adamson v. California was heard by the Supreme Court in 1947, the judiciary and the 
public were looking for a definitive interpretation of the Constitution regarding the idea of 
incorporation of the first ten amendments into the Fourteenth Amendment. When the Court 
handed down the Adamson decision purporting this definitive interpretation, it would give yet 
another great dissenter the opportunity to profess his constitutional view to a Court which had, 
from his perspective, severely misinterpreted the Constitution: Justice Hugo Black. 
The majority in Adamson ruled that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not protect a defendant from compulsory testimony in state trials, basically, 
holding that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, like other rights and 
privileges guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, did not extend to state courts. Black's dissent called 
for a complete incorporation of the Bill of Rights to the states based on the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Using extensive historical research regarding the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to justify his dissent, Black argued that the framers of that amendment 
had intended for it to be used in such a way. This adherence to the intent of the framers of the 
Amendment, and the Constitution as a whole, would be the constitutional approach that 
characterized Black's career on the Court; it would also he the basis of his disdain for the 
misguided decisions of the Court that denied it. 
The Bill of Rights' Complicated Relationship with the States 
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The question of whether the Bill of Rights applies to the states was debated long before 
Adamson v. California. As early as 1833, the Court heard a case in which an owner of a 
Baltimore wharf named John Barron sued the city for depriving him of the waters necessary to 
conduct his business.1 It was their overdevelopment, he said, that had caused him to suffer 
financial losses. As the Fifth Amendment protects against the national government's taking of 
personal property without compensation, the question raised in Barron v. Baltimore was whether 
or not this right also extended to the states. Without even hearing arguments on behalf of 
Baltimore, the unanimous majority under Chief Justice John Marshall said that it did not.2 Since 
the framers had intended the Bill of Rights to be a check on the national government, Marshall 
stated that the Court had no jurisdiction in this case based on the fact that the Fifth Amendment 
was not applicable to the states. 3 
A century later, the Court would hear a similar case in which the application of First 
Amendment rights to the states was questioned. In the 1923 case of Gitlow v. New York, 
Benjamin Gitlow was arrested for distributing socialist literature that advocated class action to 
establish socialism.' Claiming that he advocated overthrowing the government, Gitlow was 
1 Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833). 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
arrested and convicted under a New York state criminal anarchy law. The question that then 
arose was whether his right to distribute his pamphlets, and thus his First Amendment right of 
free speech, was violated by the New York law. 
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If the Court had strict! y adhered to the precedent of Barron, the answer to Gitlow' s 
question would have been an obvious no. However, in the years since Barron was decided an 
important event had occurred: the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, based on the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that liberties such as freedom 
of speech must be protected on the state level.5 The only time in which a state may prohibit 
speech or publications is if they have a "dangerous tendency," which Gitlow's literature did.6 
Therefore, although Gitlow's conviction was affirmed, the establishment of the incorporation of 
a First Amendment right to free speech under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment would prove to be an important holding for many years to come. 
In addition to the historical importance of the previous cases, there were two cases prior 
to Adamson v. California were especially influential in the eventual arguments for and against 
the incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause. The first of these was the 
case of Twining v. New Jersey, decided in 1908.7 In this case, Albert C. Twining and David C. 
Cornell, both bank directors, were charged with the misdemeanor of deceiving bank examiner 
Larue Vreedenberg by submission of a false paper. When the case came to trial, both defendants 
declined to testify, and, as was permissible under New Jersey law, the prosecutor commented 
that their refusal to testify implied that they had something to hide. Both men were therefore 
4 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). 
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convicted of the misdemeanor. They then appealed their case, arguing that the prosecutor's 
comments violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
The majority opinion, written by Justice William H. Moody, held that neither the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause nor the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
embraced the self-incrimination clause in the Fifth Amendment. The rationale for such a decision 
was mainly historical, which determined that the right against self-incrimination was not 
fundamental and therefore was not able to be incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
A second influential case with regard to the incorporation power of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was that of Palko v. Connecticut.8 The defendant in this case, Frank Palko, had 
been charged with first-degree murder, and was convicted instead of second-degree murder and 
sentenced to life imprisonment. The state of Connecticut appealed this decision and won a new 
trial. This time, the court found Palko guilty of first-degree murder as he was first charged and 
sentenced him to death. The question that presented itself to the Court was whether Palko's 
second conviction violated the protection against double jeopardy guaranteed by the Fifth 
Amendment. 
Justice Benjamin Cardozo, writing for the majority, created principles in his opinion that 
would have many implications for the Court's actions in the years to come. In upholding Palko's 
second conviction, Cardozo stated that some guarantees in the Bill of Rights (such as freedom of 
thought and speech) are to be considered rights which are fundamental, and therefore applicable 
to the states via their absorption by the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. 9 According 
8 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). 
9 This validates Berger's assumption that "absorption of one or another portion of the Bill of Rights - free speech for 
example - antedated Adamson, but this was on a selective basis, under cover of due process." Raoul Berger, 
Government by Judiciary: The Transforniation ofthf" Fourteenth Amendment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1977), 137-138. 
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to Cardozo, "the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may make it unlawful for a 
state to abridge by its statutes the freedom of speech which the First Amendment safeguards 
against encroachment by the Congress, or the 1 ike freedom of the press, or the free exercise of 
religion, or the right of peaceable assembly," and thus these situations and those similar to them 
"are valid as against the federal government by force of the specific pledges of particular 
amendments have been found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through 
the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the states." 10 In Palko, Justice Cardozo 
discussed "a rationalizing principle which gives to discrete instances a proper order and 
coherence," and in which certain rights are identified as "principle[s] of justice so rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." 11 
Protection against double jeopardy, however, was not identified as a fundamental right, 
and the Connecticut Court's second conviction of Palko held. But what was more important than 
the fact that double jeopardy was not regarded as a fundamental right by Cardozo was that other 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights were considered fundamental, and therefore could reasonably be 
applied to the states based on due process. 
The test for whether or not such a privilege was fundamental was identified as "a 
rationalizing principle which gives to discrete instances a proper order and coherence."12 Asking 
questions such as whether or not an action of the state subjects a defendant to "a hardship so 
acute and shocking that our policy will not endure it," or whether it violates "those fundamental 
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions," 
'




will be the determining factors as to whether or not the privileges present in the Bill of Rights 
may be construed as so fundamental that they apply to the states based on due process. 
The Right Against Self-Incrimination in the States 
Admiral Dewey Adamson, was tried for first degree murder in Los Angeles. 13 This, 
however, was not Adamson's first conviction, as he was previously charged with, and convicted 
of burglary, larceny and robbery. Previous to his murder trial, Adamson answered that he was in 
fact convicted of such crimes, and under California law, "this answer barred allusion to these 
charges of convictions on the trial."14 However, even after answering affirmatively to charges 
alleging prior convictions, if Adamson were to take the witness stand to deny or explain other 
evidence that had been introduced, "the commission of these crimes could have been revealed to 
the jury on cross-examination to impeach his testimony." 15 Adamson was faced with quite a 
conundrum: "to choose between the risk of having his prior offenses disclosed to the jury or of 
having it draw harmful inferences from uncontradicted evidence that can only be denied or 
explained by the defendant."16 Based on this idea, Adamson did not take the stand in his own 
defense, and was therefore unable to discuss the evidence and testimony offered against him. 
For this reason, the prosecutor and judge were able to argue that under California law, 
Adamson's failure to refute the evidence against him logically implied guilt. He was convicted 
of murder and sentenced to death, a conviction which he appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing 
that "the Due Process Clause's guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination allowed him to 
13 Newman is careful to note that Adamson was not to be confused with an Admiral in the navy, but that Admiral 
was in fact his first name. Roger K. Newman, Hugo Black: A Biography (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994). 
14 Adamson v. California 332 U.S. 46 49 (1947). The California laws that allowed for this are cited as: 5 Under 
California's interpretation of I 025 of the Penal Code and 2051 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
15 People v. Adamson, 27 Cal.2d 478, 494, 165 P.2d 3, 11; People v. Braun, 14 Cal.2d 1, 6, 92 P.2d 402. 
16 Adamson v. California 332 U.S. 46 (1947). 
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remain silent and that the judge's comments, and those of the prosecutor, about Adamson's 
silence violated the Clause." 17 Thus, Adamson's case raised the question of whether "evidence 
used in a state trial resulting in a murder conviction was admissible in light of the Fifth 
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination." 18 In raising such a question, Adamson was 
not only asking the Court to rule on the traditional due process standard but instead the Fifth 
Amendment's right of self-incrimination incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Incorporation is Denied 
The majority held that the procedure in Adamson's trial did not in fact violate the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This was based on two premises: first, that the 
due process clause does not "draw all the rights of the federal Bill of Rights under its 
protection;" and second, that the California law used in this trial did not, on its own, "violate the 
protection against state action that the due process clause does grant to an accused." 
Justice Stanley Reed, writing for the majority, stated that the Court "reaffirm[ ed] 
the conclusion of the Twining and Palko cases that protection against self-incrimination is 
not a privilege or immunity of national citizenship." Specifically, Reed wrote that it was 
"settled law" that the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment 
is not made effective by the Fourteenth Amendment as a protection against state 
action on the ground that freedom from testimonial compulsion is a right of 
national citizenship, or because it is a personal privilege or immunity secured by 
the Federal Constitution as one of the rights of man that are listed in the Bill of 
Rights. 19 
17 Howard Ball, The Vision and the Dream of Justice Hugo L. Black; An examination of a Judicial Philosophy 
(University, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1975), 90. 
18 Tony Allan Freyer, Hugo L. Black and the Dilemma of American Liberalism (Glenview, IL: Scot~ 
Foresman/Little, Brown Higher Education, 1990), 118. 
19 Adamson v. California 332 U.S. 46, 50-51 (1947). 
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The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not "draw all the rights of the federal 
Bill of Rights under its protection," as "[n]othing ha[d] been called to [the Court's] attention that 
either the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment or the states that adopted intended its due 
process clause to draw within its scope the earlier amendments to the Constitution."2° Further, 
although the Court had held in Palko v. Connecticut that certain provisions of the Bill of Rights 
were "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," and thus, "became secure from state 
interference by the clause," it held nothing more.21 According to the majority, the "mere 
existence" of the due process clause did not necessitate all rights granted by the first ten 
Amendments to the Constitution be absorbed into it, and Adamson's right against self-
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment was not one of the fundamental rights that would 
allow for such an absorption to be recognized in his case. 22 
Implicit in this argument was not only the denial of incorporation of this guarantee of the 
Bill of the Rights, but also the idea that a state's requirement of testimony by the accused "is not 
necessarily a breach of a state's obligation to give a fair trial" in the most basic sense of due 
process. The only idea left to be examined was whether or not the California law allowing 
comments by the prosecutor and the judge regarding the defendant's failure to testify, "violate[d] 
the protection against state action that the due process clause does grant to an accused."23 With 
regard to this idea, the Court ruled that the law did not in fact violate this protection. According 
to the majority, as "[t]he purpose of due process is not to protect an accused against a proper 




23 Ibid., [Emphasis supplied] 
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require [a defendant] to choose between leaving the adverse evidence unexplained and subjecting 
himself to impeachment through disclosure of former crimes."24 
The due process clause did not make effective state action such as that identified in 
Adamson based on two facts: the Fourteenth Amendment did not necessarily incorporate the 
Fifth Amendment or the Bill of Rights, and the California Jaw did not violate due process 
narrowly understood without the incorporation of the rights and privileges ensured by other 
Amendments. 
"The Original Purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment" 
In conference after oral arguments, Justice Hugo Black did not vote, "saying he was 
uncertain whether allowing comment on a defendant's failure to testify infringed the Fifth 
Amendment."25 However, soon after hearing the opinion of the majority, Black "swallowed his 
doubts" and began drafting the one of his most influential dissents regarding what he saw as the 
proper understanding of the Constitution.26 
In his Adamson dissent, Black denied the judgment of the Court and "in so doing 
formulated his alternative interpretation of due process of law."27 This interpretation went 
beyond the standard adopted by Justice Cardozo in the Palko case, and advocated the 
incorporation of all procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights completely into the Due Process 
24 Ibid., 57-58. Reed characterizes this dilemma as one "with which any defendant may be faced. If facts, adverse to 
the defendant, are proven by the prosecution, there may be no way to explain them favorably to the accused except 
by a witness who may be vulnerable to impeachment on cross-examination. The defendant must then decide whether 
or not to use such a witness. The fact that the witness may also be the defendant makes the choice more difficult but 
a denial of due process does not emerge from the circumstances." 
25 Newman, Hugo Black: A Biography, 352. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ball, The Vision and the Dream of J,,stice Hugo L. Black, 92. 
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He viewed this idea of total incorporation as being the 
only correct interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore, of the Constitution as a 
whole. 
Black first responded to the constitutional theory used in deciding Adamson, a theory that 
had been originally adopted in Twining v. New Jersey. The constitutional theory expounded by 
the majority, as described by Black, is one that believes the "Court is endowed by the 
Constitution with boundless power under 'natural law' periodically to expand and contract 
constitutional standards to conform to the Court's conception of what at a particular time 
constitutes civilized decency' and 'fundamental liberty and justice. "'28 This "natural law" theory 
serves to do nothlng more than "degrade the constitutional safeguards of the Bill of Rights and 
simultaneously appropriate for this Court a broad power which we are not authorized by the 
Constitution to exercise."29 As made obviously apparent by these two statements, Black's 
dissent was not simply based on isolated incidents and small offenses of the Court. He sincerely 
believed that their overarching phllosophy regarding the Fourteenth Amendment and its power of 
incorporation was being misinterpreted so as to allow for the authority of the persons on the 
Court to trump the proper authority of the Constitution. Based on this strong belief that natural 
law theory misperceives the power of the Court as granted by the Constitution, he set out to 
specifically to negate the original Twining and Palko decisions as well as the reappearance of 
their theory in Adamson "by reference to the constitutional, judicial, and general hlstory that 
preceded and followed the case. "30 
28 Adamson v. California 332 U.S. 46, 69 (1947) (Black, H., dissenting). 
29 Ibid., 70. 
30 Ibid. Black stated "[t] hat reference must be abbreviated far more than is justified but for the necessary limitations 
of opinion-writing." 
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In first giving background, Black discussed the fact that before the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the guarantees created by the Bill of Rights were definitely not seen as 
extending to state govemments.31 However, this was not the case for long, as Black asserted that 
his "study of the historical events that culminated in the Fourteenth Amendment, and the 
expressions of those who sponsored and favored, as well as those who opposed its submission 
and passage," necessarily state that "one of the chief objects that the provisions of the 
Amendment's first section, separately, and as a whole, were intended to accomplish was to make 
the Bill of Rights, applicable to the states."32 As this historical purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was never identified or fully considered by the Court, Black sought to explicate the 
reasons why the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment unequivocally intended for the Bill of 
Rights to be embraced by the states. 33 
According to Black's examination of the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in the 
39•h Congress, the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment "was intended to make the Bill of 
31 Specifically. he writes that the Bill of Rights was originally proposed and eventually adopted so as to curb the 
interference of federal government with individual liberties. "The people wanted and demanded a Bill of Rights 
written into their Constitution ... to curb all branches of the Federal Government in the fields touched by the 
amendments -- Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. The Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments were pointedly aimed 
at confining exercise of power by courts and judges within precise boundaries, particularly in the procedure used for 
the trial of criminal cases. Past history provided strong reasons for the apprehensions which brought these 
procedural amendments into being and attest the wisdom of their adoption." This aim of protecting individual 
liberty, however, was not extended to state governments and courts as in 1833, Barron v. Baltimore, "specifically 
held inapplicable to the states that provision of the Fifth Amendment which declares: 'nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.' In deciding the particular point raised, the Court there said that it 
could not hold that the first eight amendments applied to the states. This was the controlling constitutional rule when 
the Fourteenth Amendment was proposed in 1866." Ibid., 70-71. 
32 With full knowledge of the import of the Barron decision, the framers and backers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
proelaimed its purpose to be to overturn the constitutional rule that case had announced. Ibid., 71-72. In addition, 
Black cites Flack, The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment ( 1908), who concludes that "Congress, the House 
and the Senate, had the following objects and motives in view for submitting the first section of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the States for ratification: 1. To make the Bill of Rights (the first eight Amendments) binding upon, 
or applicable to, the States; 2. To give validity to the Civil Rights Bill; 3. To declare who were citizens of the United 
States," Quoted in 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (Black, H., dissenting), 72 n5. 
33 Black writes that, "Neither the briefs nor opinions in any of these cases, except Maxwell v. Dow, (176 U.S. 581), 
make reference to the legislative and contemporary history for the purpose of demonstrating that those who 
conceived, shaped, and brought about the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment intended it to nullify this Court's 
decision in Barron v. Baltimore, supra, and thereby to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the States," Ibid., 73. 
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Rights applicable to the states."34 Specifically, he cited "the original purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment," as disclosed by the statements of Congressman Bingham and Senator Howard.35 
After analyzing speeches delivered by these two men, Black makes the assertion that it was 
obvious that their intention was to have the guarantees of the Bill of Rights apply to the states. 
For this reason, he included with his dissent an appendix chronicling the history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which would "conclusively demonstrate that the language of the first 
section of the Fourteenth Amendment, taken as a whole, was thought by those responsible for its 
submission to the people, and by those who opposed its submission, sufficiently explicit to 
guarantee that thereafter no state could deprive its citizens of the privileges and protections of the 
Bill of Rights."36 Further, he wrote that the "natural law" theory invoked by the majority should 
be abandoned as an "incongruous excrescence" on the Constitution. Black believed "that formula 
to be itself a violation of our Constitution, in that it subtly conveys to courts, at the expense of 
legislatures, ultimate power over public policies in fields where no specific provision of the 
Constitution limits legislative power."37 
34 Ibid., Black "concluded that its framers meant to apply the Bill of Rights to the states," and said in 1967 himself 
that "!fl didn't find that this was their view, my career on the Court would have been entirely different ... I would 
not have gone with due process and I'd be considered the most reactionary judge on the Court." According to 
author Roger K. Newman, "History as he read it was his means oflimitingjudicia] discretion and maximizing 
individual freedom under the Constitution. Black worked long hours with his clerk, culling from the he collection of 
notes, phrases and jottings he had compiled, organizing and writing anew." Newman, Hugo Black: A Biography, 
352-353. 
35 Berger, Govern1nent by Judiciary, 139. 
"Adamson v. California 332 U.S. 46, 74 (1947) (Black, H. dissenting). Specifically, Black refers to the speeches of 
Congressman Bingham in the framing and adoption of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment. He even goes 
so far to say that "Bingham may, without extravagance, be called the Madison of the first section of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." He also stated that "in the Twining opinion, the Court explieitly declined to give weight to the 
historical demonstration that the first section of the Amendment was intended to apply to the states the several 
protections of the Bill of Rights," and further that none of the cases used as precedent in Adamson "today made such 
an analysis." Ibid., 74-75. 
37 Ibid., Black wrote that he was not alone in his belief regarding natural law theory, as his "belief seems to be in 
accord with the views expressed by this Court, at least for the first two decades after the Fourteenth Amendment was 
adopted." Ibid., 74-75. 
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After denying natural law theory as a whole, he turned specifically to the cases of 
Twining and Palko, the most cited precedents relied upon by the majority. With regard to 
Twining he wrote that "[a]t the same time that the Twining decision held that the states need not 
conform to the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights, it consolidated the power that the Court 
had assumed under the due process clause by laying even broader foundations for the Court to 
invalidate state and even federal regulatory legislation," and therefore expanded the power of 
judiciary in attempting to control the power of the federal government. "Under the Twining 
formula (which includes non-regard for the first eight amendments)," Black asserted what are 
determined to be, "fundamental rights' and in accord with 'canons of decency,' as the Court said 
in Twining, and today reaffirms, is to be independently 'ascertained from time to time by judicial 
action' .... " This obviously implies that just as the Court denies the expansion of the Bill of 
Rights into the sphere of the state, it extends its own sphere by determining which guarantees can 
and cannot be incorporated. 
In Palko v. Connecticut, the Court "answered a contention that all eight [amendments] 
applied [to the notion of due process] with the more guarded statement... that 'there is no such 
general rule.' Implicit in this statement, and in the cases decided in the interim between Twining 
and Palko and since, is the understanding that some of the eight amendments do apply by their 
very terms."38 This, although not the full incorporation that Black advocated, was at least a step 
in the right direction, albeit a limited and theoretically unsound step in his perspective. 
After discussing the opinion of the majority and the precedents on which it was founded, 
Black wrote that he feared 
to see the consequences of the Court's practice of substituting its own concepts of 
decency and fundamental justice for the language of the Bill of Rights as its point 
of departure in interpreting and enforcing that Bill of Rights. If the choice must be 
38 Adamson v. California 332 U.S. 46, 85 (1947) (Black, H., dissenting). 
between the selective process of the Palko decision applying some of the Bill of 
Rights to the States, or the Twining rule applying none of them, I would choose 
the Palko selective process. But rather than accept either of these choices, I would 
follow what I believe was the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment -- to 
extend to all the people of the nation the complete protection of the Bill of Rights. 
To hold that this Court can determine what, if any, provisions of the Bill of Rights 
will be enforced, and if so to what degree, is to frustrate the great design of a 
. c . . 39 
wntten ons!Itu!Jon. 
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In closing, Black restated his two strongest arguments. First, he wrote that he could not 
"consider the Bill of Rights to be an outworn 18th Century 'strait jacket' as the Twining opinion 
did."40 "Its provisions may be thought outdated abstractions by some. And it is true that they 
were designed to meet ancient evils. But they are the same kind of human evils that have 
emerged from century to century wherever excessive power is sought by the few at the expense 
of the many. In my judgment the people of no nation can lose their liberty so long as a Bill of 
Rights like ours survives and its basic purposes are conscientiously interpreted, enforced and 
respected so as to afford continuous protection against old, as well as new, devices and practices 
which might thwart those purposes." 
As a second point, Black once again attacked "the natural-law-due-process formula," 
which was reaffirmed by the Court as having "been interpreted to limit substantially this Court's 
power to prevent state violations of the individual civil liberties guaranteed by the Bill of 
Rights," but also having "been used in the past, and can be used in the future, to license this 
Court ... to roam at large in the broad expanses of policy and morals and to trespass, all too 
freely, on the legislative domain of the States as well as the Federal Govemment."41 Just as 
abhorrent as was the "straight jacket" of Twining was regarding the Bill of Rights, the natural 
39 Ibid., 89. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., 91. 
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law standards employed by the majority that served to overextend the power of the judiciary as 
defined by the Constitution were equally so. 
Black regarded Adamson as his most important opinion, saying "I think it really is, no question 
about it. .. there I laid it all out. It culminated years of research and reflection.''42 This dissent 
would serve as the basis for his method of constitutional interpretation for years to come. 
Responses to Incorporation Theory 
After the draft of his Adamson dissent was completed, Black had his clerk, Louis 
Oberdorf er, deliver it to Justice Felix Frankfurter by hand. The clerk stood nearby and patiently 
waited while Frankfurter read the opinion. When he was finished, Frankfurter promptly flung 
the dissent across the desk and said, "At Yale they call this scholarship?"43 Oberdorfer, a recent 
Yale Law School graduate collected the pages of the dissent from the floor of the justice's office 
and then excused himself. Justice Frankfurter promptly told his clerk that "Hugo is trying to 
change the world and misreading history in the attempt, just making things up out of whole 
cloth," and began at once expanding his "earlier, brief concurrence just to counter Black's 
opinion."44 It would be his concurrence, and not the opinion of the ma,jority which can be read 
as a direct counter to Black's theory of incorporation. 
Thus, as Black knew it would be, the first and most obvious challenge to his dissent was 
the concurring opinion written by Justice Frankfurter. In an attempt by to refute "the total 
incorporation" argument presented by Black, Frankfurter stated that 
42 Newman, Hugo Black: A Biography, 352. 
43 Quoted in Newman, Hugo Black: A Biography, 354. 
44 lbid. 
[b ]etween the incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment into the Constitution 
and the beginning of the present membership of the Court - a period of seventy 
years - the scope of that Amendment was passed upon by forty-three judges. Of 
all these judges, only one, who may respeclfully be called an eccentric exception, 
ever indicated the belief that the Fourteenth Amendment was a shorthand 
summary of the first eight Amendments theretofore limiting only the Federal 
Government, and that due process incorporated those eight Amendments as 
restrictions upon the powers of the States."45 
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After the obvious mention of the "eccentric exception" of Justice Black, Frankfurter went on to 
say that "those reading the English language with the meaning which it ordinarily conveys, those 
conversant with the political and legal history of the concept of due process, those sensitive to 
the relations of the States to the central government as well as the relation of some of the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights to the process of justice, would hardly recognize the Fourteenth 
Amendment as a cover for the various explicit provisions of the first eight Amendments."46 
In applying the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, what is necessary is 
that the Court determine "whether [violations of certain rights] offend those canons of decency 
and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those 
charged with the most heinous offenses."47 Standards of justice such as these "are not 
authoritatively formulated anywhere as though they were prescriptions in a pharmacopoeia," but 
their interpretation also does not imply that "judges are wholly at large," as "the judicial 
judgment in applying the Due Process Clause must move within the limits of accepted notions of 
justice and is not to be based upon the idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment." Thus, 
according to Frankfurter, the due process clause had "an independent potency which neither 
comprehends the specific prohibitions (provisions) by which the founders deemed it appropriate 
45 Adamson v. California 332 U.S. 46, 61 (1947) (Frankfurter, F., concurring). 
46 Ibid 
47 Ibid., 67-68. He writes also that, "[t] his guidance bids us to be duly mindful of the heritage of the past, with its 
great lessons of how liherties are won and how they are Jost." Ibid., 65-66. 
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to restrict the federal government nor is it confined to them."48 This view of due process of law 
was one that "placed a tremendous burden on the shoulders of the judges. They had to be 
extremely qualified men in order to function fairly and consistently, for their view called for men 
who were dispassionate, scholarly, objective, scientific, and omniscient."49 
Thus, Justice Frankfurter "met Black head-on on the historical grounds," but his 
concurring opinion merely gave Black more ammunition for the second thrust of his attack. 
Frankfurter's philosophy, Black argued "was simply 'judicial mutilation' of the Constitution."50 
"He was appalled at the vague contours of the reasonableness which Justice Frankfurter said 
would guide judges in such cases: 'civilized decency,' 'fundamental liberty and justice,' 'canons 
of decency and fairness,' 'expressions of justice of English speaking peoples. "'51 Allowing a 
judge the power of making law in this sense was too great a task for human beings, which the 
judges undoubtedly were, and also gave judges the opportunity "to indulge his own subjective 
preferences instead of trying to read the language of the Constitution."52 Black argued against 
qualifications such as the ones identified in Adamson: 
Courts can strike down legislative enactments which violate the Constitution. This 
process, of course, involves interpretation, and since words can have many 
meanings, interpretation obviously may result in contraction or extension of the 
original purpose of a constitutional provision, thereby affecting policy. But to 
pass upon the constitutionality of statutes by looking to the particular standards 
enumerated in the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution is one thing; 
to invalidate statutes because of application of "natural law" deemed to be above 
and undefined by the Constitution is another. "In the one instance, courts 
48 Ball, The Vision and the Dream of Justice Hugo L. Black, 91. 
49 Ibid., 134. 
'
0 Black in Katz v. US 389 US 347, 364 (1967). Quoted in Ball. The Vision and the Dream of Justice Hugo L. Black, 
134. 
"Stephen Parks Strickland ed., Hugo Black and the Supreme Coun; A Symposium (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 
1967), 256. 
52 Ball, The Vision and the Dream of Justice Hugo L. Black, 134. 
proceeding within clearly marked constitutional boundaries seek to execute 
policies written into the Constitution; in the other, they roam at will in the 
limitless area of their own beliefs as to reasonableness and actual! y select policies, 
a responsibility which the Constitution entrusts to the legislative representatives 
of the people. "53 
Frankfurter was not the only person to challenge Black's theory of incorporation. 
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Extensive criticism of his position would come not from another member of the Court, but from 
Stanford law professor Charles Fairman, whose article in the Stanford Law Review served as a 
criticism of this perspective regarding the Fourteenth Amendment. According to Fairman, 
Black's historical argument for the incorporation of the Bill of Rights by the Fourteenth 
Amendment finds "the record of history overwhelmingly against him."54 With regard to the 
reasons for this statement, Fairman wrote that Justice Black's interpretation of Flack's The 
Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment warranted three comments: First, Fairman states that 
"Flack was writing generally about the adoption of the Amendment; but for Justice Black's 
purpose the only point that is material is Howard's statement about the Bill of Rights ... Flack 
does not even assert that statement was published so much as once." Second, Fairman asks the 
question, "how can Justice Black assert that Howard's speech (with or without the statement 
about the Bill of Rights) was published widely?" and answers this question negatively. Lastly, 
Flack writes that there does not seem to have been published any statement about whether the 
frrst eight amendments were applicable to the states or not. Professor Fairman denies Justice 
Black's historical basis for the incorporation theory based on these three assertions, and the fact 
that within his dissent Black makes many "confused and conflicting" statements such as 
regarding Bingham as the Madison of the Fourteenth Amendment. Fairman makes it quite clear 
53 Black as quoted in Strickland, Hugo Black and the Supreme Court; A Symposium, 256-257. 
54 Charles Fairman, "Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding," 
2 Stanford Law Review (1949), 5-139, reprinted in The Fourteenth amendment and the Bill of Rights: The 
Incorporation Theory (New York: Da Capo Press, 1970), 171. 
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that far from creating an accurate historical account of the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Black lacks of true understanding of the historical situation. 
After first reading Professor Fairman's article, Black wrote John Frank. "I must confess," 
he wrote, "a very great disappointment in Fairman's article. I had supposed he was more of a 
detached historian."55 Black was convinced that Frankfurter 'got' Fairman to write the article 
and that Fairman did it 'to get a job at Harvard. "'56 His extensive comment on Professor 
Fairman' s article merits lengthy quotation: 
I would thoroughly enjoy engaging in this debate with Mr. Fairman and his 
associates were I free to do so. I must say that Mr. Fairman's article reminds me 
of those advocates who come into court with the belief that strained inferences 
conclusively settle a matter. Even if Bingham were as corrupt in his lifetime as 
this article implies, and if Howard were the muddleheaded individual that Mr. 
Fairman seems to think he was, I should still think that there might be an 
opportunity for rebuttal. This is true in spite of the fact that by my agreeing with 
the conclusions of Flack in his nearly 300 page argument, it appears that I have 
committed an unpardonable sin. What governors did not say about the 14•h 
Amendment appears to have much more weight with Mr. Fairman than what the 
sponsors of the Amendment said themselves. And he seems to think there is no 
weight to be given any statement of the general purposes of the Amendment. 
Only those who enumerated in detail its specific purposes said anything that 
would influence Mr. Fairman and he of course is not influenced by them because 
he thinks they were either crooked or stupid. Naturally, I am not interested in his 
charges that I misquoted Flack. Anyone who reads Flack will know that is not 
true. Besides, I would suppose that a historian trying to find out what actually 
occurred would not be interested in whether one person writing about a historical 
event may have misinterpreted the full effect of what another historian said. At 
any rate, I now think of Mr. Fairman as an advocate, not a historian, and I would 
not rank him at the top of the advocates of the world.57 
But more important than his response to the article itself was the fact that for Justice Black 
"neither [Fairman's] arguments nor his vigorous reflections upon my accuracy shook my own 
55 Quoted in Newman, Hugo Black: A Biography, 355. 
56 Ibid., 356-357. 
57 Hugo L. Black to John Frank, January IO, I 950. Quoted in Newman, Hugo Black: A Biography, 355-356. 
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belief in the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment I expressed in Adamson."58 Justice 
Black remained true to his theory, even in the face of staunch criticism on the bench and off. 
A Tradition of Principled Dissent 
Long after the Adamson decision and the ensuing battles with Frankfurter and Fairman, 
Justice Black continued to hold to his incorporation theory, and also to communicate his disdain 
for the nebulous standards employed by his opponents, any time he thought the Court was again 
moving in the direction of "natural law" theory.59 For example, shortly after Adamson in the 
case of Faster v. Illinois, Black once again dissented, saying that "this decision is another 
example of the consequences which can be produced by substitution of this court's day-to-day 
opinion of what kind of trial is fair and decent for the kind of trial which the Bill of Rights 
guarantees This time it is the right of counsel. We cannot know what Bill of Rights provision 
will next be attenuated by the Court. "60 
In 1958, Black once again dissented in the case of Bartkus v. Jllinois.61 Responding to a 
majority opinion written by Frankfurter in which the right against double jeopardy was not 
regarded as "fundamental" and therefore not protected in the states, Black claimed that to deny 
the fact that trying someone twice for the same crime is a violation of that person's rights is to 
take down the procedural "fence against governmental wrongs" that exists in the Constitution.62 
58 Hugo L. Black to Charles P. Curtis, April 6, 1959. 
59 Ball, The Vision and the Dream of Justice Hugo L. Black, 96. See, for instance, Foster v. Illinois, Bartkus v. 
Illinois, In Re Winship, Williams v. Florida, Coleman v. Alabama, McGautha v. California. 
60 Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 140. (1946) 
61 Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 151 (1958). 
62 Ibid. 
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In a later case regarding the nature of juvenile justice Black once again put forth his 
constitutional ideology in favor of the incorporation theory.63 Dissenting in In Re Winship, 
Black wrote that "the only correct meaning of due process of law is that our government must 
proceed according to the 'law of the land' that is, according to written constitutional and 
statutory provisions as interpreted by Court decisions .... [the Due Process Clause does not 
create] blanket authority [to judge] according the to views of at least five members of this 
institution."64 In a passage strikingly similar to that of Justice Curtis in Dred Scott, Black 
explicated his warning to the Court yet again in stating: "when this Court assumes for itself the 
power to declare any law - state or federal - unconstitutional because it offends the majority's 
own views of what is fundamental, our nation ceases to be governed according to the 'law of the 
land' and instead becomes one governed by the 'law ofjudges."'65 
These arguments continue to this day. Many have been sympathetic to Black's view at 
different times, but a majority of the Court has never accepted Black it. history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. .. 66 Regardless of who was supporting him or criticizing him at any given 
moment, Black never swayed from his commitment to this theory. 
During the oral arguments of Gideon v. Wainwright, 
Justice Stewart asked whether he was right in his impression that Abe Fortas was 
not arguing the old proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the 
Sixth Amendment as such. Fortas agreed - he was not. ... Justice Black asked in a 
puzzled way why Fortas was laying aside that argument. 
63 In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 398 (1969). 
64 Ibid., 384. 
"Ibid. 
66Strickland, Black and the Supreme Court; A Symposium, 258. "It is true that, as Justice Douglas points out, ten 
Justices who have sat on the Court in the last twenty five years have agreed with Black and him on the total 
applicability question; but the problem is that no five of them have sat at the same time." 
'Mr. Justice Black,' Fortas replied, 'I like that argument that you make so 
eloquently. But I cannot as an advocate make that argument because the Court 
has rejected it so many times. I hope you never cease making it.' Justice Black 
joined in the general laughter.67 
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Joking aside, Black never did cease making such an eloquent argument. He believed that 
the Constitution should be interpreted based on the way in which its framers' intended it to be. 
"He searched for the 'original understanding' of a constitutional clause and with rare exceptions 
felt it bound him."68 This does not mean that he subscribed to a theory of the Constitution which 
was strictly textual. On the contrary, "Black did not believe in dead letters, lest they fetter us. 
He strove to find what animated them and their framers. This meant going to the original 
sources, without the intervention of interpreters, the historians."69 
Regardless of the fact that Justice Black's view has never become that of the far reaching 
majority, "the effects of Black's position on the Bill of Rights have become law without a full-
fledged acceptance of the per se applicability of all the Amendments to the states ... In short, 
though Black's reasoning on the basis of history has not gained acceptance, his philosophy of 
what due process has become, to use Senator Sam J. Ervin's phrase, "the best to guide to what 
the law is."70 
67 Anthony Lewis, Gideon's Trumpet (New York: Random House, 1964), 174. 
68 Newman, Hugo Black: A Biography, 360. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Strickland, Black and the Supreme Court; A Symposium, 259 
125 
"I DEFEND A DEAD CONSTITUTION" 
Important dissenters are not simply matters of historical curiosity; indeed, many have 
continued to emerge from among the justices on more recent Courts. Given the important cases 
of our time regarding issues such as abortion, the death penalty, and religion in the public sphere, 
differing views have inevitably led to many significant dissents being written over the past 
twenty years. One justice in particular, however, has surpassed most others in the writing of 
singularly significant dissents. 
Since his appointment to the Supreme Court of the United States in 1986, Justice Antonin 
Scalia has essentially defined his career by dissenting on the basis of his standard of what 
originalist constitutional interpretation requires. Although Scalia frequently asserts his beliefs 
regarding proper constitutional interpretation, he has written certain dissenting opinions which 
display his commitment in its clearest and most compelling form. One such opinion was brought 
about by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey; a 1992 case regarding 
abortion. 1 In Casey, Scalia responded to the majority opinion, which upheld the "central 
holding" of Roe v. Wade, with what has been described as "one of the most caustic opinions ever 
written by a Justice of the Supreme Court."2 The justice insisted that the Court had perpetuated 
the bad logic originally present in Roe, and, more important, had delivered a decision completely 
unfounded on any actual constitutional principle. Scalia rejected the majority's reliance on 
1 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
2 Kevin A. Ring, Scalia Dissents: Writings of the Supreme Court's Wittiest, Most Outspoken Justice (Washington 
DC: Regnery, 2004), 113. 
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notions of public necessity and stare decisis on the basis that, in his view, the Constitution was 
silent on the issue of abortion, thus leaving it to the states as a matter of policy. This was what 
was demanded by the Constitution's text and its original meaning. This expression of faith in the 
textual Constitution was not unique to his Casey dissent, but has characterized his career on the 
Court. Indeed, Scalia sees one of his most important obligations as a justice as espousing an 
original understanding of the Constitution in an effort to save the Court from itself. 
The Judicially Created Right to Privacy 
The relatively long series of cases regarding the issue of abortion has its roots in the case 
of Griswold v. Connecticut.3 The Griswold case was largely contrived by Yale law professors to 
test the constitutionality of contraceptives and other sexual issues.4 Participating in such a test 
case, Estelle Griswold, the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, 
and Lee Buxton, the Medical Director the same organization, gave information, instruction, and 
medical advice regarding birth control to married couples. Under Connecticut law, any 
counseling and treatment of married couples for purposes of birth control were illegal, and for 
this reason, Griswold and Buxton were tried and convicted. In 1965, the Supreme Court heard 
Griswold's case and ruled in her favor. 5 The majority opinion of Griswold relied on the First, 
Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments as well as the the Ninth Amendment to combine them all. 
According to Justice William 0. Douglas's majority opinion, "specific guarantees in the Bill of 
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life 
3 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
4 Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1990), 95-96. 
5 The Court earlier in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 ( 1961), had refused to hear what was essentially the same issue. 
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and substance", and the right of association, right against self incrimination, quartering of troops, 
searches and seizures, and so forth contained in the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights 
created zones of privacy to which every individual should be entitled.6 A concurrence by Justice 
Goldberg also cited the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as integral in the right 
to privacy in marriage, but emphasized the importance of the Ninth Amendment. 
This right to privacy was extended in 1973 to encompass the right of abortion by the 
holding of Roe v. Wade.7 "Jane Roe" was a Texan who had sought to terminate her pregnancy 
by means of an abortion. Texas law prohibited abortions except in cases where it was necessary 
to save the pregnant woman's life, a stipulation that did not apply to Roe. The Court twice heard 
arguments regarding whether or not the Constitution generally embraces a woman's right to 
terminate her pregnancy by means of abortion, and after the second round of arguments handed 
down its decision. The famous majority opinion, written by Justice Harry Blackmun, stated that 
the abortion laws in question were "violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment," and that a woman carrying a child could choose to have an abortion during the 
first trimester of her pregnancy in consultation with a physician; there was not, he insisted, any 
compelling state interest in her decision in the first weeks of the pregnancy. Forty-six states' 
laws regarding the issue of abortion were affected by this decision. 
After the Court's decision in Roe, the issue of abortion and its justification via an extra-
textual right to privacy became anything but a settled matter. In addition to the public debate 
surrounding the issue, the Court was subsequently plagued with cases attempting to re-affirm, 
6 Ibid., See also David J. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of Roe v. Wade (New 
York: Macmillan, 1994), 253. 
7 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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overturn, or further clarify the decision in Roe v. Wade. 8 The most important, among all the 
others, reached the Court in Casey, and once again the justices were forced to revisit the 
legitimacy of the holding of Roe and the cases that had followed in its wake. 
A Challenge to Roe 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey was a challenge to Pennsylvania's Abortion Control Act, 
which the Pennsylvania legislature had amended in 1988 and 1989 to include five new 
provisions. The 1989 Act required the following: first, that a woman seeking an abortion must 
give her informed consent prior to the procedure and be given state-provided information 
concerning her decision 24 hours before the abortion is performed; second, that a minor seeking 
an abortion was required to obtain the informed consent of one parent or guardian, but had an 
option of judicial bypass; third, that a married woman was required to sign a statement 
' indicating that she notified her husband of her intended abortion; fourth, that exemptions could 
be made in the event of a medical emergency; and fifth, that facilities providing abortion services 
were required to keep records of the events occurring there. 9 These provisions reinstated 
Pennsylvania restrictions that were previously ruled unconstitutional in Thornburgh v. American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 10 and were challenged by abortion clinics and 
physicians in Pennsylvania, including the Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania. The 
8 See, for example, Bigelow v. Virginia 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Beal v. Doe 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Maher v. Doe 432 
U.S. 464 (1977); Poelker v. Doe 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Bellotti v. Baird et al 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Akron v. Akron 
Center for Reproductive Health 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Thornburgh v. Amer. Coll. Of Obst. & Gyn 476 U.S. 747 
(1986); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Rust v. Sullivan 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
9 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
'
0 Thornburgh v. Amer. Coll. Of Obst. & Gyn 476 U.S. 747 (1986). In this case, the Court held that 1) "informed 
consent" and printed materials provisions unduly intruded upon the privacy of patients and physicians; 2) reporting 
and viability determination provisions were designed to identify and deter women from having abortions through the 
threat of harassment; and 3) post-viability care and second physician provisions unconstitutionally interfered with 
the health of the mother by increasing delays and medical risks. 
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Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld all the provisions except the husband notification 
requirement. 
A New Justice Johnson? 
The composition of the Court during the time that it would hear Casey was particularly 
important. Since the time when Roe was originally decided in 1973, the Court had changed 
greatly. Chief Justice Warren Burger had been succeeded by William H. Rehnquist, who 
dissented in Roe. Second, the appointments of both Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush had 
created a conservative Court that might consider overturning the decision. Since the last 
opportunity the Court had to overrule Roe, Webster v. Reproduction Health Services, Justices 
William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall had been replaced by Justices David Souter and 
Clarence Thomas, respectively. For these reasons especially, all eyes were on the Court. 11 
Ronald Reagan especially had sought to carefully nominate justices who would influence 
the Court by espousing the method of constitutional interpretation that he viewed as correct. 
Arguably the first president since Jefferson to focus on larger standards of constitutional 
interpretation rather than stances on policy issues or party lines in selecting members of the 
Supreme Court, "Reagan took office with the stated intention of selecting Justices who shared 
his judicial philosophy." 12 On May 5, 1980, Reagan told the Wall Street Journal: "I think for a 
long time we've had a number of Supreme Court Justices who, given any change, invade the 
prerogative of the legislature; they legislate rather than make judgments, and some try to rewrite 
the Constitution instead of interpreting it. I would want a constitutionalist."13 During his 1980 
11 Eugene W. Hickok and Gary L. McDowell, Justice v. Law: Courts and Politics in American Society (New York: 
The Free Press, 1993 ), 173. 
12 Terry Eastland, Energy in the Executive: The Case for the Strong Presidency (New York: Free Press, 1992), 236. 
13 Quoted in Eastland, Energy in the Executive, 236. 
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presidential campaign Reagan had said he wanted judges who "would interpret the laws, not 
make them," and he deliberately articulated his view concerning how Justices should interpret 
and apply the Constitution, an idea that would be the force behind his selecting Supreme Court 
justices when he was given the opportunity to do so shortly after his election to the presidency. 
Reagan's judicial philosophy was directly related to, or possibly even stemmed from, his 
general governmental philosophy. Thus, when he stated during his inaugural that "government 
is the problem," his assertion could fairly be interpreted as directly applying to the judiciary just 
as easily as the other two branches of government.14 With regard to the third branch of 
government, Reagan's critique was a response to the broad activism the Court had obtained 
under Chief Justice Earl Warren. 15 During the years in which Warren was chief justice, the 
Court not only "proscribe[ d], without clear constitutional warrant, numerous legislative acts," but 
also seemed to prescribe what various governmental bodies should do. 16 For these reasons, the 
Supreme Court had been thrust into the eye of the public like never before, and thus "provoked a 
strong popular reaction."17 
When Chief Justice Earl Warren's retired in 1969, Richard Nixon appointed federal 
appeals court judge Warren Burger to take Earl Warren's place, hoping to alter the ways of the 
largely activist Warren Court by adding "a strict constructionist" into the mix. In addition to 
Burger's appointment as chief justice, Nixon also appointed Justice Harry Blackmun, a decision 
that he said reflected his commitment to selecting a justice who would not be "super-legislator 
with a free hand to impose social and political viewpoints upon the American people." He 
14 Ibid. 
15 Eastland writes that "few students deny that the Warren Court had an expansive view of judicial power." Eastland, 




would also name Lewis Powell and William H. Rehnquist to the highest bench. It was Nixon's 
goal to curb the Court's expansive power by causing it to return to an originalist view. However, 
Burger and the three other justices appointed by Nixon did not change the Court in the way that 
he would have liked (although Rehnquist, especially, continually tried). Instead of restricting 
judicial power, the Burger "continued many of the Warren Court innovations and broke startling 
new ground," in using the right to privacy created by the Warren Court in Griswold to create a 
woman's right to an abortion in Roe v. Wade. 18 Beyond Burger's influence in Roe, it was Justice 
Blackmun, appointed to be the anti-thesis of the super-legislator, who wrote the "super-
legislating" opinion of the Court in Roe. 19 Based largely on Nixon's failure to change the 
direction of the Court, and Reagan's disdain for decisions such as Roe that were not based on a 
strict interpretation of the written Constitution, one of the main efforts of Reagan would 
undoubtedly be to curb the "excessive exercise of judicial power."2° Citing the example of the 
Founders, Reagan wrote: 
They understood that, in the words of James Madison, if 'the sense in which the 
Constitution was accepted and ratified by the nation is not to guide the 
expounding of it, there can be no security for the faithful exercise of its 
powers' .... For them, the question involved in judicial restraint was not- and it is 
not - will we have a liberal or conservative court' ... The question was, and is, 
will we have government by the people? And this is why the principle of judicial 
restraint has had an honored place in our tradition. 21 
Upon being given the opportunity to appoint a justice to the Supreme Court, Reagan first 
selected Sandra Day O'Connor, fulfilling a campaign promise to appoint the first woman to the 
High Court. It would be the only appointment he made to the Court during his first term, and 
18 Ibid., 236-237. 
19 Ibid., 238. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Edwin Meese Ill, With Reagan: The Inside Story (Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1992), 318. 
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although largely successful as a benchmark for women, the appointment of Day O'Connor was 
not as successful in the promotion of the originalist ideology that Reagan viewed as necessary. 
For this reason, in 1985, just after his re-election, and well before there were rumors that 
a vacancy might occur on the High Court, Attorney General Edwin Meese III asked Assistant 
Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds compile a list of men who were committed to 
Reagan's judicial philosophy. Reacting to what he viewed as the immense power of the Court 
that had been created under Warren and to the failure of Nixon's appointments to counteract it, 
Reagan wanted to be sure that his next appointee would adequately reflect his judicial and 
governmental philosophy and also affect the Court by judging accordingly. Reynolds, along 
with a group of Justice Department officials, carefully reviewed nearly everything known about 
the twenty candidates for the position.22 Focusing specifically on each man's judicial 
philosophy, "the published writings, judicial opinions, and speeches of each candidate were 
collected and placed in notebooks, and then read and assessed by three-person units assigned by 
Reynolds."23 The result of this labor was the recommendation of "the best available, most well-
qualified exponents of Reagan's judicial philosophy," two men who "were seen as giants in the 
law [and who might] someday rank among the few greats who have served on the Court": Judge 
Robert H. Bork and Justice Antonin Scalia. 24 
When Warren Burger announced that he would resign as chief justice in 1986, Reagan 
relied heavily on the information already compiled by Meese and Reynolds to ensure that his 
next appointee to the Court would be the voice of the constitutionalism he so desired. At 
22 Eastland, Energy in the Executive, 240. Most of the candidates were sitting federal judges, and many were 
appointed by Reagan. 
23 Ibid., 239. 
24 Ibid. 
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Meese's recommendation, Reagan would "pick Bork or Scalia as part of a two-step approach in 
which Rehnquist would be named to take Burger's place, with Scalia or Bork simultaneously 
named to replace him."25 After interviewing both Scalia and Bork, Reagan chose Scalia. 26 
Confident that Scalia both shared his judicial philosophy and was capable of "potential 
contribution to the Court [that] seemed enormous," Reagan appointed Scalia with the hope that 
he would have a similar effect on the activist Court that Justice Johnson had on the Federalist 
Court.27 Reagan had found his originalist equivalent of the Jeffersonian dissenter Justice 
Johnson in Antonin Scalia.28 
The similarities between Reagan's appointment of Justice Antonin Scalia and Thomas 
Jefferson's appointment of Justice William Johnson are readily apparent. Consciously selecting 
their appointees based what they perceived to be a commitment to the Constitution, both 
Jefferson and Reagan sought to alter the direction of the Court for what each saw as the better 
way. The question remained, would Scalia prove to be an equally powerful dissenter? As is 
evidenced by his dissenting opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the answer to this question 
was a resounding yes. 
25 Ibid. 240. 
26 Ibid., 239-240. Some say Reagan chose Scalia over Bork in part because of age; Scalia, at fifty, was nine years 
Bork's junior. Others assert that it was Scalia's Italian ancestry that played an important role in his being 
nominated. 
27 Ibid., 240. 
28 Edwin Meese, 318. Not everyone saw Scalia 's appointment in the positive light that Reagan did. "Critics of 
Reagan have alleged that his search for judges committees to a philosophy of judicial restraint was an effort to 
"politicize" the courts, since it posed "litmus test" questions to potential nominees. The truth was just the opposite. 
The President was seeking to depoliticize the courts, to ensure that they played a truly judicial role, rather than 
usurping the authority of the elected branches of our constitutional system." 
134 
The Unique Opinion of the Majority 
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter wrote an unusual joint opinion in Casey in which 
they again reaffirmed Roe v. Wade, but in which they also upheld most of the provisions of the 
Pennsylvania law. Specifically, the justices claimed to reaffirm Roe's "central holding" which 
was described as having three parts: "a recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have 
an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State"; "a 
confirmation of the State's power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, if the law contains 
exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman's life or health; and "the principle that the 
State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the 
woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child."29 In citing their reasons for upholding 
these principles, the Court claimed that its original creation of a constitutional right to abortion 
had established a rule of law that was now accepted by most Americans; individual liberty in this 
respect must continue to be guaranteed. "The inescapable fact," O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter 
claimed, "is that adjudication of substantive due process claims may call upon the Court in 
interpreting the Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by tradition courts always have 
exercised: reasoned judgment. Its boundaries are not susceptible of expression as a simple rule. 
That does not mean we are free to invalidaie state policy choices with which we disagree; yet 
neither does it permit us to shrink from the duties of our office."30 In lofty prose, the justices 
asserted that matters such abortion, 
matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a 
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the 
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right 
to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the 
mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes 
29 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). 
30 Ibid., 849. 
135 
of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State. 31 
Further, according to the joint opinion, the Court's legitimacy was at stake and any decision to 
overturn Roe would be perceived as succumbing to political pressure.32 As the authors of the 
opinion admitted, there would have been disastrous consequences for the Court and the country 
if it had not overruled certain pernicious decisions over the course of its history, such as Adkins 
v. Children's Hospital 33 by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish34 and Plessy v. Ferguson35 by 
Brown v. Board of Education.36 However, with regard to Roe they asserted that "the terrible 
price would be paid for overruling," an action that would "not only reach an unjustifiable result 
under principles of stare decisis, but would seriously weaken the Court's capacity to exercise the 
judicial power and to function as the Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated to the rule of law."37 
But the Court went beyond simply upholding the central holding of Roe. In addition, the 
Court upheld four out of the five Pennsylvania provisions in question based on a new standard 
for evaluating restrictive laws on abortion. Instead of simply basing their decision on a 
trimester-bound framework, this new standard would ask whether a state abortion regulation has 
the purpose or effect of imposing an "undue burden," on the woman. 38 Their reasons for having 
this standard replace that of the trimester framework of the previous decisions were as follows: 
31 Ibid., 851. 
32 Ring, Scalia Dissents, 113. 
33 Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261U.S.525 (1923) 
34 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
35 Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
36 Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
37 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992). 
38 Ibid., 874. 
The very notion that the State has a substantial interest in potential life leads to 
the conclusion that not all regulations must be deemed unwarranted. Not all 
burdens on the right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy will be undue. In 
our view, the undue burden standard is the appropriate means of reconciling the 
State's interest with the woman's constitutionally protected liberty. 39 
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Put into practice, this undue burden standard, which is defined as a "substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability,"40 was used to evaluate 
each of the provisions of the Pennsylvania law; only the provision demanding the husband 
notification requirement failed to pass this test. 
After upholding both Roe and most provisions of the Pennsylvania state law, the majority 
closed their opinion this way: 
Our Constitution is a covenant running from the first generation of Americans to 
us and then to future generations. It is a coherent succession. Each generation 
must learn anew that the Constitution's written terms embody ideas and 
aspirations that must survive more ages than one. We accept our responsibility not 
to retreat from interpreting the full meaning of the covenant in light of all of our 
precedents. We invoke it once again to define the freedom guaranteed by the 
Constitution's own promise, the promise of liberty.41 
The joint majority opinion, which has been described as "long on lofty rhetoric about things such 
as the 'mystery of human life' and 'the promise of liberty' and short on traditional constitutional 
interpretation" provoked Justice Scalia to pen one of his most biting dissents in response.42 
"We Should Get Out of This Area, Where We Have No Right To Be" 
Since his appointment, Justice Antonin Scalia has passionately and persistently criticized 
the view that "the Constitution contains a right to end the natural development of an unborn 
39 Ibid., 876. 
40 Ibid., 877. 
41 Ibid., 90 I. 
42 Ibid., 989. 
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child."43 In a 1990 case involving Minnesota's law requiring minors to obtain parental consent 
before having an abortion, Justice Scalia concluded, "The random and unpredictable results of 
our consequently unchanneled individual views make it increasingly evident, term after term, 
that the tools for this job are not to be found in the lawyer's - and hence not in the judge's -
work-box. I continue to dissent from this enterprise of devising an Abortion Code, and from the 
illusion that we have the authority to do so."44 His dissent in Casey offered this same substantive 
critique, communicated heavily by withering comments meant to show his utter contempt for the 
judicial philosophy embraced by the majority opinion. 
In opening his dissent, Scalia wrote that his views on abortion, unlike those of the Court, 
were not malleable and have not changed. Articulating his view, Scalia claimed that "[t]he 
States may, if they wish, permit abortion on demand, but the Constitution does not require them 
to do so. The permissibility of abortion, and the limitations upon it, are to be resolved like most 
important questions in our democracy: by citizens trying to persuade one another and then 
voting. As the Court acknowledges, 'where reasonable people disagree the government can adopt 
one position or the other. "'45 Thus, according to Scalia the practice of abortion should not raise a 
question of constitutionality at all; it is an issue on which the Constitution of the United States is 
silent. Further, Scalia insisted, the issue in this case and in others regarding abortion is, 
not whether the power of a woman to abort her unborn child is a 'liberty' in the 
absolute sense; or even whether it is a liberty of great importance to many 
women. Of course it is both. The issue is whether it is a liberty protected by the 
Constitution of the United States. I am sure it is not.40 
43 Ring, Scalia Dissents, 104. 
44 Ibid. 
"Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 (1992) (Scalia, A. dissenting). 
46 Ibid. 
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The way that Scalia recognizes this is, as he claimed, "not because of anything so exalted 
as my views concerning the 'concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the 
mystery of human life,"' but instead due to two simple facts:"(!) the Constitution says 
absolutely nothing about it, and (2) the longstanding traditions of American society have 
permitted it to be legally proscribed."47 The question of abortion is therefore a question outside 
the realm of proper judicial inquiry, a fact that the Court has not recognized but instead has 
moved toward "systematically eliminating checks upon its power."48 
After offering this "brief summary" regarding his position on the specific issue of 
abortion, Scalia concerned himself with responding to "a few of the more outrageous arguments 
in today's opinion, which it is beyond human nature to leave unanswered."49 The first of the 
"outrageous arguments" of the majority to which he responded was that which claimed 
"adjudication of substantive due process claims" requires the members of the Court to exercise 
"reasoned judgment. ,,so In Scalia' s view, "reasoned judgment" certain! y was not employed in 
originally arriving at the decision of Roe v. Wade, and a more disturbing neglect on the part of 
the majority with regard to adherence to the text was also apparent. To Scalia, "Roe was plainly 
wrong - even on the Court's methodology of 'reasoned judgment,' and even more so (of course) 
if the proper criteria of text and tradition are applied."51 To this day, he fumed, the "best the 
Court can do to explain how it is that the word liberty must be thought to include the right to 
destroy human fetuses is to rattle off a collection of adjectives that simply decorate a value 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 981. 
49 Ibid. 
so Ibid., 849. 
51 Ibid., 983. 
139 
judgment and conceal a political choice;" their decision is not based on textual analysis or even 
the 'reasoned judgment' that they claim, but, on "only personal predilection."52 
But Scalia did not end his blistering critique of the majority there. He went on to criticize 
a second argument made by the majority, that "Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of 
doubt." According to the dissenting justice, one thing that the Roe decision did not lack 
(although he is clear that it lacked many other things, including principle) was clarity. The 
standard that Roe created with regard to regulating abortion was that all measures restricting 
abortions in any trimester except the third were invalid. However, the "undue burden" standard 
created by the majority to take its place would be anything but clear; in fact, punning the phrase 
that they coined for such a standard, Scalia wrote that "to come across such a phrase [as that 
stated above]in the joint opinion ... is really more than one should have to bear."53 In his view, 
this standard will never be effective because it is "inherently manipulable" and will also prove to 
be "hopelessly unworkable in practice."54 
In addition to the practical problems with the new standard, Scalia reaffirmed the Chief 
Justice's concern that the "undue burden" test does not have a legal basis, and went a step further 
in stating that it is not possible for it to embody the "generally applicable" quality explicated by 
the joint opinion. Instead, it is "a unique concept created specifically for this case," and it's 
almost sole purpose can be construed as preserving "some judicial foothold in this ill-gotten 
territory."55 After an extended discussion of the ways in which the undue burden standard 
52 Ibid., 984. Quoting Justice Curtis in Dred Scott, Scalia once again brings to bear the idea that when strict 
interpretation is abandoned and individual opinion enters into law "we no longer have a Constitution; we are under 
the government of individual men." 
53 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 985 (1992) (Scalia, A. dissenting). 
54 Ibid., 986. 
55 Ibid., 988. 
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evolved from more "narrow formulations," Scalia articulated the problem with making these 
standards less stringent and more ambiguous: "it is difficult to maintain the illusion that we are 
interpreting a Constitution rather than inventing one when we amend its provisions so 
breezily."56 
The application of the "undue burden" standard to the Pennsylvania law in question 
proved just as problematic for Scalia as the creation of the standard itself. In relying on the 
factual findings of the District Court, as well as the particular record of the case, it becomes 
difficult to discern if the facts lead necessarily to the conclusion of the joint authors, or if "on a 
better record" a different preference or undue burden would be recognized. Scalia closes this 
section with biting ridicule, noting that "reason finds no refuge in this jurisprudence of 
confusion.''57 
Scalia also took issue with the majority's suggestion that even though they had 
reservations about reaffirming Roe, they felt obligated to do so based on the Court's commitment 
to individual liberty and stare decisis.58 Scalia regarded their use of stare decisis as contrived, at 
best, due to the fact that they retained only certain parts of the Roe decision and chose to simply 
dismiss the rest. Scalia was quick to point out that the majority's picking and choosing sections 
of the holding was a perverted use of the traditional doctrine of precedent. "It seems to me," he 
argued, "that stare decisis ought to be applied even to the doctrine of stare decisis, and I confess 
never to have heard of this new, keep-what-you-want-and-throw-away-the-rest version."59 
56 Ibid., 989-990. 
57 Ibid., 993. 
58 Ibid., 853. 
59 Ibid., 993. In this section of his dissent Scalia also explicates the portions of the Roe decision that are not saved 
by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, namely: "Under Roe, requiring that a woman seeking an abortion be provided 
truthful information about abortion before giving informed written consent is unconstitutional, if the information is 
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Scalia next counteracted the majority's assertion that, "[w]here, in the performance of its 
judicial duties, the Court decides a case in such a way as to resolve the sort of intensely divisive 
controversy reflected in Roe , .. , its decision has a dimension that the resolution of the normal 
case does not carry. It is the dimension present whenever the Court's interpretation of the 
Constitution calls the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by 
accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution."60 Of course, Scalia completely 
disagreed with the majority in this regard. "Not only did Roe not, as the Court suggests, resolve 
the deeply divisive issue of abortion," Scalia wrote, "it did more than anything else to nourish it, 
by elevating it to the national level where it is infinitely more difficult to resolve."61 As more 
attention was given to the issue of abortion, the more conflict and disagreement arose in the 
public sphere. Further, the issue was not dealt with politically at the state level as it should have 
been because the Court intervened in this extraconstitutional question. This resulted in "Roe's 
mandate for abortion on demand destroy[ing] the compromises of the past, render[ing] 
compromise impossible for the future, and requir [ing] the entire issue to be resolved uniformly, 
at the national level."62 Scalia was blunt: "To portray Roe as the statesmanlike 'settlement' of a 
designed to influence her choice. Under the joint opinion's "undue burden" regime (as applied today, at least) such a 
requirement is constitutional; Under Roe, requiring that information be provided by a doctor, rather than by 
nonphysician counselors, is unconstitutional. Under the "undue burden" regime (as applied today, at least) it is not; 
Under Roe, requiring a 24-hour waiting period between the time the woman gives her informed consent and the time 
of the abortion is unconstitutional. Under the "undue burden" regime (as applied today, at least) it is not; Under Roe, 
requiring detailed reports that incJude demographic data about each woman who seeks an abortion and various 
information about each abortion is unconstitutional. Under the "undue burden" regime (as applied today. at least) it 
generally is not," 994. 
60 Ibid., 994-995. 
61 Ibid., Scalia also writes that "[n]ational politics were not plagued by abortion protests, national abortion lobbying. 
or abortion marches on Congress before Roe v. Wade was decided." 
62 Ibid. 
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di visive issue, a jurisprudential Peace of Westphalia that is worth preserving is nothing less than 
Orwellian."63 
In additjon to the problems that deciding a case such as Roe posed to deliberative 
democracy and the ideological division of the nation, the judiciary itself was directly affected by 
the Court attempting to "end national division by accepting a common mandate." 64 The process 
of nominating and appointing Supreme Court justices was itself marred as judges began to be 
selected not based on their record and judicial philosophy, but instead based on their views on 
abortion and other such policy issues. By keeping the Court "in the abortion-umpiring business," 
Scalia asserted, "it is the perpetuation of that disruption, rather than of any Pax Roeana, that the 
Court's new majority decrees." Scalia made it quite clear that the majority had erred in their 
assessment of the national situation in making the claim that they had singlehandedly eliminated 
the nation's divisiveness with regard to this issue. 
Finally, Scalia took exception to the assertion of the majority that "to overrule under 
fire ... would subvert the Court's legitjmacy," and argued that their resolution to "remain stead-
fast" and rely on "the promise of constancy ... as long as the power to stand by the decision 
survives," was nothing less than "appalling." In perhaps the strongest argument made in his 
dissent, Scalia wrote, that he could not agree with 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
the Court's suggestion that the decision whether to stand by an erroneous 
constitutional decision must be strongly influenced - against overruling, no less -
by the substantial and continuing public opposition the decision has generated. 
The Court's judgment that any other course would 'subvert the Court's legitimacy' 
must be another consequence of reading the error-filled history book that 
described the deeply divided country brought together by Roe.65 
65 Ibid., 998. 
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He was deeply troubled by the majority's claim that overturning Roe would "subvert the Court's 
legitimacy," and therefore cause it to "decide a case differently from the way [they] otherwise 
would have in order to show that we can stand firm against public disapproval. "66 Although 
deciding cases in this way is a bad idea at all times, Scalia asserts that it becomes increasing I y 
problematic in a system where the "Court believes the Constitution has an evolving meaning," 
and in such a situation communicates an "almost czarist arrogance."67 
Scalia did not deny that there is a great deal of political pressure surrounding the Court 
during this case, or during any case concerning the issue of abortion for that matter. However, 
the fact that it is under such a pressure does not excuse the fact that the Justices should have 
detennined what is "legally right by asking two questions: (1) Was Roe correctly decided? and 
(2) Has Roe succeeded in producing a settled body of law?" If the answers to both of these 
questions were no, as Scalia believed they were, then Roe should "undoubtedly be overruled." 
With regard to dealing with the political pressure, Scalia told the Court to pay "less attention to 
the fact of this distressing phenomenon, and more attention to the cause of it: ... a new mode of 
constitutional adjudication that relies not upon text and traditional practice to determine the law, 
but upon what the Court calls 'reasoned judgment,' which turns out to be nothing but 
philosophical predilection and moral intuition."68 Scalia reiterated the importance of an 
originalist interpretation, and the inherent danger in relying upon any other standard of 
constitutional interpretation. 
In the end, Scalia made the observation that the "American people love democracy and 
the American people are not fools." During the time that the Court was doing their job as it was 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., 998-999. 
68 Ibid. 
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intended by reading, interpreting and staying true to the text of the Constitution, the American 
people "pretty much left [them] alone."69 However, as soon as the Court begins to stray from the 
work of interpreting the text of the Constitution and begins issuing "value judgments" instead, 
the attitude of "a free and intelligent people" towards the Court "can be expected to be (ought to 
be) quite different."70 In essence, the political pressure of the American people that was 
currently felt by the Court stemmed not from the gravity of the issue of abortion, but instead 
from the fact that the Court had taken the power away from the people and the democratic 
process of choosing their own fates with regard to issues such as these. On this, Scalia 
commented 
If, indeed, the 'liberties' protected by the Constitution are, as the Court says, 
undefined and unbounded, then the people should demonstrate, to protest that we 
do not implement their values instead of ours. Not only that, but confirmation 
hearings for new Justices should deteriorate into question-and-answer sessions in 
which Senators go through a list of their constituents' most favored and most 
disfavored alleged constitutional rights, and seek the nominee's commitment to 
support or oppose them. Value judgments, after all, should be voted on, not 
dictated; and if our Constitution has somehow accidentally committed them to the 
Supreme Court, at least we can have a sort of plebiscite each time a new nominee 
to that body is put forward.71 
Thus, the issue of abortion is not a question on which the Court should be ruling. As a 
result, Scalia closed his dissent with a warning to the current and future Court: "We 
should get out ofthis area, where we have no right to be, and where we do neither 
ourselves nor the country any good by remaining." 72 
69 Ibid., 1000. 
10 Ibid., 1001. 
71 Ibid., 1001. 
72 Ibid. 
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A "Dead" Constitution 
Justice Scalia's dissent was deeper than simply communicating his disdain for the 
majority's opinion in Casey. Going beyond considering abortion as the issue at hand, the 
essence of Scalia's argument was the importance of his particular method of interpreting the 
Constitution, textualism. In this sense, Scalia "believes laws - and especially that supreme law 
known as the Constitution of the United States - say what they mean and mean what they say.'m 
In A Matter of Interpretation, Scalia writes, 
The text is the law, and it is the text that must be observed. I agree with Justice 
Holmes's remark, quoted approvingly by Justice Frankfurter in his article on the 
construction of statutes: "Only a day or two ago - when counsel talked of the 
intention of a legislature, I was indiscreet enough to say that I don't care what 
their intention was. I only want to know what the words mean." And I agree with 
Holmes's other remark, quoted approvingly by Justice Jackson: "We do not 
inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means."74 
As obvious a choice that this method of constitutional interpretation is for Scalia, many 
have criticized his approach for various reasons. Some claim that textualism is "simpleminded -
'wooden,' 'unimaginative,' 'pedestrian."' Scalia responds that it is none of these things, as being 
a good textualist requires perceiving "the broader social purposes that a statute is designed, or 
could be designed, to serve," and also realizing that "new times require new laws."75 However, 
being a textualist also requires believing that "judges have no authority to pursue those broader 
purposes or write those new laws."76 
Other critics of Scalia' s approach claim that his textualism degenerates into strict 
constructionism. Scalia insists this is not the case, as textualism dictates that "a text should not 
73 Ring, Scalia Dissents, 1. 
74 Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton: Princeton University 




be construed strictly, and it must not be construed leniently; it should be construed reasonably, to 
contain all that it fairly means."77 In an analogy that communicates the difference between 
textualism and strict constructionism so well, Scalia writes "when you ask someone, 'Do you use 
a cane?' you are not inquiring whether he has hung his grandfather's antique cane as a decoration 
in the hallway."78 This reliance on reasonableness in the meaning of the words is absolutely 
necessary to make this distinction, and further define textualism itself. 
Yet another criticism of textualism claims it to be formalistic. Scalia regards this critique 
as the "most mindless" of them all.79 He answers this critique by declaring, "of course its 
formalistic! The rule of law is about form." According to Scalia and his mode of constitutional 
interpretation, it is the interpretation of the law by the discerning the truest sense its words' 
meaning that is necessary to decide cases properly. Without its formalism, law is nothing but the 
exercise of the personal preferences of the men who hold power; for Scalia that is a troubling 
notion indeed. "Long live formalism," he states adamantly: "it is what makes a government a 
government of laws and not of men."80 
77 Ibid., 24. 
78Ibid. Even though textualists are not to interpret the text strictly, they also must not go beyond the range of 
meaning that is .. permissible." Scalia's self-proclaimed favorite example of a departure from the text of this sort is a 
topic studied at length elsewhere in this work - the ineorporation of the Due Process Clause. He writes, "My 
favorite example of departure from the text - and certainly the departure that has enabled judges to do more 
freewheeling lawmaking than any other - pertains to the Due Process Clause found in the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments ... It has been interpreted to prevent the government from taking away certain liberties beyond those 
such as freedom of speech and of religion, that are specifically named in the Constitution. Well, it may or may not 
be a good thing to guarantee additional liberties. but the Due Process Clause quite obviously does not bear that 
interpretation. By its inescapable terms. it guarantees only process. Property can be taken by the state; liberty can 
be taken; even life can be taken; but not without the process that our traditions require - notable a validly enacted 
law and a fair trial. To say otherwise is to abandon textualisn1, and to render democratically adopted texts mere 
springboards for judicial lawmaking." 
79 Ibid., 25. 
80 Ibid. 
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Of course, simply explicating his textualist view is not the sole purpose of Scalia's many 
opinions, dissents, and other writings. Implicit in his argument is the fact that the Court has been 
led very far astray by attempting to construe the Constitution as a so called "living document." 
Countering the view that the Constitution is living document, Scalia humorously asserts that he 
likes his Constitution "dead."81 This "dead" Constitution is preferable to that of the living 
document as it is only by way of considering the text as fixed that true interpretation can be 
achieved. When the Court evaluates the Constitution as though it were living, the personal 
values, policy judgments, and prejudices of the justices inevitably find their way into the 
opinions they write. As Scalia constantly warns in his many dissents, the Court must change its 
ways if it wants to remain a neutral arbiter of the law. As sees it, "By trying to make the 
Constitution do everything that needs doing from age to age, we shall have caused it to do 
nothing at all. "82 
In always remaining true to the standard of textualism, Scalia has become the influential 
dissenter that Reagan believed he would be. Reagan's commitment to appointing justices who 
would look at the Constitution and statute law and expound their evident meaning, rather than 
using loopholes or convoluted logic to reach some preconceived conclusion, is still present in the 
Court in the opinions of Scalia. Reagan made an important contribution to the present state of 
American constitutional law in appointing Scalia and thus challenging the dangerous tendencies 
of an overactivist majority inclined to embrace the ideology of the "living Constitution." 
81 Antonin Scalia, "The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules," 56 University of Chicago Law Review (Fall 1989), 1184. 
82 Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, 47. 
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CONCLUSION 
The tradition of historically categorizing the Supreme Court of the United States by the 
name of the chief justice of the moment (the Marshall Court, Warren Court, and so forth), can 
give the misleading impression that it is the Chief Justice who is traditionally identified as 
providing the leadership that defines the Court that bears his name. Yet often, it is not the chief 
justice, but rather one of the associate justices who has the greatest influence. It is in this sense 
that the dissenting justice can be said to exert intellectual and judicial leadership in its truest 
sense. As is seen in the many decisions discussed throughout this work it is the justice that 
articulates a principled dissent that is often most deserving of the title intellectual leader. 
Whether conservative or liberal, restrained or activist, originalist or proponent of the living 
Constitution, each dissenter effectively exerts intellectual leadership in communicating what he 
or she believes to be the true interpretation of the Constitution. They merit what they believe to 
be a sound interpretation of the basic law and hope that in time the Court will come to see the 
wisdom of their view. 
Although many might like to think themselves as such, Supreme Court justices are not 
divine. They are mere human beings, and whenever a group of men assembles, there is always 
the possibility that personal preference will influence decision making and that error will 
undoubtedly occur. The Court is no exception to this rule, and for this reason, dissenters often 
are necessary to communicate something higher to a Supreme Court who they believe has 
strayed from the Constitution. 
The deeper and more abiding aim of principled dissent is more merely than speak to 
current policy decisions or value judgments. It seeks to speak to the true duty of the Supreme 
Court, the obligation to accurately interpret the fundamental law of the United States. If it fails 
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to do this properly and effectively, the Court is no longer serving its purpose as intended by the 
Founders, and ceases to provide the intellectual leadership to the nation with which it is 
entrusted. In order to guard against the inherent dangers of misinterpretation, the principled 
dissenting justice does more than merely explicate his particular views on constitutional 
interpretation. In effect, he seeks to deliver a warning that in order to retain its institutional 
legitimacy, the Court must reconsider its decision and follow his vision in its stead. It is in this 
sense that the dissenting justice acts as judicial leader. 
A Sampling of Judicial Leadership 
All of the men discussed in the previous chapters are have been intellectual leaders, in 
that each of them sought to explicate what they understood to be the true meaning of the 
Constitution in the face of a majority who had decided otherwise. Transcending basic policy, 
party, and issue-based opinions, each expressed something deeper and more fundamental about 
American constitutional law; they ail argued that without employing the correct constitutional 
interpretation, the Court had effectively cease to exert the proper guidance to the nation. In this 
way, regardless of whether Justices Black and Scalia would agree as to what the proper 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment might be, what is important is that each of them 
worked tirelessly (and, in Scalia's case, continues to work tirelessly) to try to persuade the Court 
to adopt, or at least become aware of, the interpretation that they viewed as being solely 
legitimate. 
Each of the dissenting justices examined in this work can be said to follow in the tradition 
set by the original dissenter, Justice Johnson, in a particularly important way. Beyond merely 
following in his footsteps by dissenting from the opinion of the Court in its broadest sense, each 
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justice challenged the majority in specifically the same way that Johnson did, albeit with 
different principles. Just as Justice Johnson was appointed by Thomas Jefferson to infiltrate the 
judicial stronghold of the Federalists and challenge the constitutional interpretation of Chief 
Justice John Marshall, Justices Curtis, Harlan, Holmes, Black and Scalia were similarly charged 
with communicating a particular interpretation of the Constitution in the face of an opposing 
majority. 
Justice Benjamin Curtis, the sole Whig on a Court composed entirely of Jacksonian 
Democrats, was the lone voice who asserted that according to a correct interpretation of the 
Constitution, blacks could and should be American citizens, Congress did have power to regulate 
slavery in new territories, and that the creation of rights such as Substantive Due Process and the 
striking down of laws such as the Missouri Compromise severely distort the power given to the 
Courts by the Constitution. 
Similarly, Justice John Marshall Harlan, the only justice who was receptive to racial 
issues on a Court full of "status-quo" sympathizers, boldly asserted that the text of the 
Constitution plainly states that all are equal under the law regardless of race or class, and, 
further, that the majority decision which stated that regulation of the enjoyment of civil rights 
based on race was constitutionally permitted, was in fact fatally flawed. 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. one of the two "great dissenters" and liberal on a 
Court described as a conservative bastion, forcefully claimed that the word liberty in the 
Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is used to perpetuate a certain economic theory or 
political interest of the majority of the Court in deciding the case. 
Justice Black, the former Southern Senator, used extensive historical research to 
substantiate his claim that, as it was intended by its framers, the Fourteenth Amendment 
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incorporates the guarantees of the Bill of Rights and extends the protections to the States. This 
former member of the Ku Klux Klan is remembered as a great fighter for individual liberties. 
Finally, Justice Antonin Scalia, a current member of the conservative Court majority and 
a committed textualist, was appointed by Ronald Reagan in an effort to infiltrate the previously 
activistCourt with a conservative originalist. Reagan got what he intended. Scalia has constantly 
argued that the Court should not concern itself with issues on which the Constitution is silent, 
such as abortion and homosexual sodomy. Issues such as these are best left to the people of the 
fifty states to be debated and adopted as policy or not. 
Each of these justices, in his own way tirelessly promoted a particular interpretation of 
the Constitution during their time on the Court. Some succeeded in changing the its direction; 
some did not. What is more important than whether the claims of each dissenter came to fruition 
is the fact that they all displayed the intellect, integrity, will, resolve, steadfastness, and what 
some might see as sheer stubbornness, that are necessary characteristics for true judicial 
leadership. In the end, the effect of the dissent may not matter as much as its intrinsic 
constitutional value. 
The Many Faces of Dissent 
At varied times during this work, a dissenting opinion has been described as function of 
deliberative democracy, an explication of judicial philosophy, a prophetic work of lofty prose, a 
cry in the wilderness, a caustic retort, or simply a grumbling form of judicial opinion. Although 
it is impossible to know whether some two hundred years ago Justice William Johnson could 
have perceived just how varied and far reaching his contribution to the Supreme Court of the 
United States would be, one can say with certainty that the evolution of American constitutional 
law would likely be much different had the practice of judicial dissent not been instituted and 
made routine. 
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Without the intellectual contributions of dissenters such as those described above, our 
ideas regarding history, philosophy, law, and the American nation would be fundamentally 
different. Moreover, without the conversation between the members of the majority and the 
dissenters recorded by the United States Reports, cases would lack the intellectual depth and 
deliberative quality that characterize them today. How different] y would the majority's decision 
in Casey be remembered without the scalding remarks of Antonin Scalia? Would Brown v. 
Board of Education exist had the view espoused by John Marshall Harlan in Plessy never been 
uttered? Would each chief justice be fated to exert less memorable versions of the leadership of 
John Marshall? 
Fortunately, we will never know the answers to these questions, as the establishment of 
dissent by Justice Johnson and its manifestations throughout history have allowed for much more 
than mere plurality in the opinions of the Court. Dissent has created singularly memorable 
opinions. It has overturned precedent. It has explicated the meaning of the Constitution. But 
perhaps most important, it has replaced what might have been a hollow form of institutional 
leadership by an all powerful chief justice with a distinctive form of intellectual leadership that is 
available to all members of the Court who wish to exert it. One can only hope that there will 
always be justices, such as those chronicled in this work, who wish to do so. The future of 
American constitutional law largely depends on such leaders, for truly, the greatest dissents echo 
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